- Is children’s wellbeing different from adults’ wellbeing?Andrée-Anne Cormier & Mauro Rossi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1146-1168.details
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Authenticity, Meaning and Alienation: Reasons to Care Less About Far Future People.Stefan Riedener - forthcoming - In Jacob Barrett, Hilary Greaves & David Thorstad (eds.), Essays on Longtermism. Oxford University Press.details
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Pleasure, Pain, and Pluralism about Well-Being.Eden Lin - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Children's Well-Being: A Philosophical Analysis.Anthony Skelton - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge. pp. 366-377.details
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Perfectionist Bads.Gwen Bradford - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):586-604.details
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Alienation, Deprivation, and the Well-being of Persons.Benjamin Yelle - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (4):367-384.details
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Classifying theories of welfare.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):787-803.details
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Scales for Scope: A New Solution to the Scope Problem for Pro-Attitude-Based Well-Being.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):417-438.details
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On being difficult: towards an account of the nature of difficulty.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):45-64.details
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On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value.Joseph van Weelden - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):137-156.details
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Can welfare be measured with a preference-satisfaction index?Willem van der Deijl - 2018 - Journal of Economic Methodology 25 (2):126-142.details
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Can desire-satisfaction alienate our good?Willem van der Deijl - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (4):687-700.details
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Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate?Willem van der Deijl - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (3):209-234.details
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Why Fly? Prudential Value, Climate Change, and the Ethics of Long-distance Leisure Travel.Dick Timmer & Willem van der Deijl - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (5):689-707.details
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The Worst Things in Life.Wayne Sumner - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):419-432.details
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The All-Happy God.Joseph Stenberg - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (4):423-441.details
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The Case for Stance Dependent Reasons.David Sobel - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (2).details
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A Thomistic Solution to the Deep Problem for Perfectionism.Matthew Shea & James Kintz - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (4):461-467.details
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Justificatory Moral Pluralism: A Novel Form of Environmental Pragmatism.Andre Santos Campos & Sofia Guedes Vaz - 2021 - Environmental Values 30 (6):737-758.details
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Virtue, Happiness, and Wellbeing.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):112-127.details
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Emotions and Wellbeing.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):461-474.details
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Happiness and Well-Being: Shifting the Focus of the Current Debate.Raffaele Rodogno - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):433-446.details
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Objective List Theories and Ill-Being.Christopher M. Rice - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1073-1085.details
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Minor Goods and Objective Theories of Well-Being.Christopher M. Rice - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):221-231.details
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Explanatory perfectionism: A fresh take on an ancient theory.Michael Prinzing - 2020 - Analysis (4):704-712.details
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What Justifies the Allocation of Health Care Resources to Patients with Disorders of Consciousness?Andrew Peterson, Sean Aas & David Wasserman - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):127-139.details
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How should utilitarians think about the future?Tim Mulgan - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2-3):290-312.details
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Die Eigenständigkeit des sinnvollen Lebens innerhalb des guten Lebens.Sebastian Muders - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 5 (2):79-118.details
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Will intelligent machines become moral patients?Parisa Moosavi - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7309-7349.details
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The Normative Value of Making a Positive Contribution–Benefiting Others as a Core Dimension of Meaningful Work.Frank Martela - 2023 - Journal of Business Ethics 185 (4):811-823.details
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Well‐being, part 1: The concept of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
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Well‐being, part 2: Theories of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
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The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being.Eden Lin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):99-114.details
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Enumeration and explanation in theories of welfare.Eden Lin - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):65-73.details
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Subjectivism without Idealization and Adaptive Preferences.Stéphane Lemaire - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (1):85-100.details
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Quand nos émotions sont-elles raisonnables?Stéphane Lemaire - 2016 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):215-234.details
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A Stringent but Critical Actualist Subjectivism about Well-Being.Stéphane Lemaire - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):133-150.details
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The morality-welfare circularity problem.William Lauinger - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1959-1981.details
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The Value of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):503-520.details
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Mood and Wellbeing.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?Peter Königs - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):165-179.details
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What's So Great about Experience?Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):371-388.details
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A critical view on using “life not worth living” in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.Agnes Elisabeth Kandlbinder - forthcoming - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy:1-15.details
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Haidt’s Durkheimian Utilitarianism—a Charitable Interpretation.Maciej Juzaszek - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):763-777.details
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Can happiness measures be calibrated?Mats Ingelström & Willem van der Deijl - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5719-5746.details
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Ways to Be Worse Off.Ian Stoner - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (4):921-949.details
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Depression and the Problem of Absent Desires.Ian Tully - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-16.details
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CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value.Walter Horn - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):191-215.details
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The Contribution of Security to Well-being.Jonathan Herington - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (3).details
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