Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Likelihood and Consilience: On Forster’s Counterexamples to the Likelihood Theory of Evidence.Jiji Zhang & Kun Zhang - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):930-940.
    Forster presented some interesting examples having to do with distinguishing the direction of causal influence between two variables, which he argued are counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence. In this paper, we refute Forster's arguments by carefully examining one of the alleged counterexamples. We argue that the example is not convincing as it relies on dubious intuitions that likelihoodists have forcefully criticized. More importantly, we show that contrary to Forster's contention, the consilience-based methodology he favored is accountable within the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Abducted by Bayesians?Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):430-439.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Empirical progress and truth approximation by the 'hypothetico-probabilistic method'.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):313 - 330.
    Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method’.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):313-330.
    Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a 'Hypothetico-Probabilistic method', in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three cases, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A Philosopher’s Guide to Empirical Success.Malcolm R. Forster - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600.
    The simple question, what is empirical success? turns out to have a surprisingly complicated answer. We need to distinguish between meritorious fit and ‘fudged fit', which is akin to the distinction between prediction and accommodation. The final proposal is that empirical success emerges in a theory dependent way from the agreement of independent measurements of theoretically postulated quantities. Implications for realism and Bayesianism are discussed. ‡This paper was written when I was a visiting fellow at the Center for Philosophy of (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine‐Tuning of the Universe.Robin Collins - 2009 - In William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 202–281.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: Setting Up the Argument The Evidence for Fine‐Tuning Epistemic Probability Determining k′ and the Comparison Range Justifying Premises (1) and (2) The Multiverse Hypothesis Miscellaneous Objections Conclusion: Putting the Argument in Perspective References.
    $39.82 new   $39.87 used   $50.04 from Amazon    (collection)    View on Amazon.com
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.
    Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, recalcitrant problem in philosophy of science. It is the identification of the logic that governs evidence and its inductive bearing in science. That is the logic that lets us say that our catalog of planetary observations strongly confirms Copernicus’ heliocentric hypothesis; or that the fossil record is good evidence for the theory of evolution; or that the 3oK cosmic background radiation supports big bang cosmology. The definitive (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations