This paper attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between Descartes’ commitments to the creation doctrine and the necessity of eternal truths by elaborating different conceptions of necessity in Descartes’ framework. More specifically, I argue that the fact that Descartes concedes the necessity of eternal truths does not compel him to assert the impossibility of their negation. Necessity, for Descartes, rather means immutability. Descartes distinguishes two kinds of immutable truths. While truths about God’s essence are absolutely immutable, truths about the essences (...) of God’s creation are conditionally immutable, i.e., they can change if God’s will changes. Since there are different kinds of eternal truths, they express different kinds of necessity as well, namely conditional and absolute necessity. After I clarify these two kinds of necessity, I explain how Descartes coherently maintains both that eternal truths are necessary and that God could have created eternal truths otherwise without undermining their necessity. (shrink)

In the latter half of the 17th century, Antoine Arnauld was a public and private defender of many of the central tenets of Cartesianism. Yet, one issue on which he is surprisingly silent is René Descartes’ claim that God freely created the eternal truths (the Creation Doctrine). Despite Arnauld’s evasion of the issue, whether he holds the Creation Doctrine is one of the most contested issues in Arnauld scholarship. In this paper I offer an interpretation of Arnauld’s position. I argue (...) that Arnauld does not hold what I call the metaphysical version of the Creation Doctrine according to which God in fact freely created the eternal truths. Rather, he holds what I call the epistemic version of the Creation Doctrine according to which we cannot know whether God freely created the eternal truths. (shrink)

In this brief space I want to describe how Chomsky's analysis of "psychological reality" departs from what I think is a fairly standard construal of the idea. This familiar formulation arises from distinguishing between someone's following a rule and someone's acting in conformity with a rule. The former idea, but not the latter, involves the idea that the person has some mental representation of the rule that plays a certain causal role in determining behavior. Although there may be many grammatical (...) rules to which a person's verbal behavior (ignoring slips of the tongue and other performance interferences) conforms, only some of those rules have psychological reality; these are the ones that are internalized in thought and play some appropriate causal role. (shrink)

In this article, I consider Descartes’ enigmatic claim that we must assert that the material world is indefinite rather than infinite. The focus here is on the discussion of this claim in Descartes’ late correspondence with More. One puzzle that emerges from this correspondence is that Descartes insists to More that we are not in a position to deny the indefinite universe has limits, while at the same time indicating that we conceive a contradiction in the notion that the universe (...) has a limit. I reject one attempt to resolve this apparent conflict which appeals to Descartes’ admission to More that divine omnipotence requires that God can create a vacuum in nature, and focus instead on his response to More’s claim that this omnipotence requires the possibility of a completion of the division of matter that results in atoms. Finally, I distinguish Descartes’ indefinite from two other kinds of infinity with which it might well be confused. The first is an essentially incomplete ‘potential infinity’ that Descartes discusses in the Third Meditation, and the second is the sort of quantitative infinity that Leibniz – contrary to Descartes – denies can constitute a completed whole. (shrink)

There is considerable debate among scholars over whether Descartes allowed for genuine body–body interaction. I begin by considering Michael Della Rocca’s recent claim that Descartes accepted such interaction, and that his doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths indicates how this interaction could be acceptable to him. Though I agree that Descartes was inclined to accept real bodily causes of motion, I differ from Della Rocca in emphasizing that his ontology ultimately does not allow for them. This is not (...) the end of the story, however, since two of Descartes’s successors offered incompatible ways of developing his conflicted account of motion. I contrast the occasionalist view of Nicolas Malebranche that changes in motion derive directly from divine volitions with the non-occasionalist claim of Pierre-Sylvain Regis that such changes derive from a nature distinct from God. In light of Della Rocca’s interpretation, it is noteworthy that the issue of eternal truths is relevant to both alternative accounts. Indeed, Regis took the doctrine that such truths are created to provide crucial support for his alternative to an occasionalist account of body–body interaction. What does not help Della Rocca, however, is that Regis’s view of motion requires a fundamental revision of Descartes’s ontology. Author Keywords: Descartes; Malebranche; Regis; Causation; Motion; Eternal Truths. (shrink)

In various arguments, Descartes relies on the principles that conceivability implies possibility and that inconceivability implies impossibility. Those principles are in tension with another Cartesian view about the source of modality, i.e. the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths. In this paper, I develop a ‘two-modality’ interpretation of the doctrine of eternal truths which resolves the tension and I discuss how the resulting modal epistemology can still be relevant for the contemporary discussion.

Neste artigo, pretendo examinar a tese cartesiana da livre criação das verdades eternas a partir da conjugação dos atributos divinos que, segundo Descartes, são conhecidos por nós e sua tese de que, entre as verdades eternas livremente criadas por Deus, estão incluídos os princípios lógicos. A partir desse exame, concluo que, até onde o intelecto finito do homem pode conceber, a tese cartesiana da livre criação das verdades eternas envolve ao menos as seguintes teses: a) Deus, por ser infinito e (...) puro pensamento em ato, estabelece necessariamente em si todas as essências e verdades, incluindo essências e verdades que para o intelecto finito parecem impossíveis, já que lhe aparecem como contraditórias; b) ao estabelecer as essências e verdades, Deus instancia algumas (e assim as cria) como conteúdos de ideias inatas nas mentes finitas, que são criadas com estrutura lógica; c) ao estabelecer as essências e verdades, Deus instancia no mundo atual ao menos algumas das essências e verdades não contraditórias instanciadas nas mentes finitas; e d) embora a mente humana finita não as possa conceber clara e distintamente, é certo que Deus instancia no mundo atual ao menos algumas das essências e verdades que aparecem como contraditórias, isto é, instancia no mundo atual ao menos algumas das essências e verdades que para a mente finita aparecem como impossíveis por serem por ela inconcebíveis, o que é confirmado por ao menos dois casos mencionados por Descartes. In this article I intend to examine the Cartesian view on the free creation of the eternal truths considering the conjunction of the divine attributes, which according to the Cartesian thesis, are known to us and his thesis that logical principles are among the eternal truths freely created by God. From this examination I conclude that, as far as the finite intellect of man can conceive, the Cartesian view of the free creation of the eternal truths involves at least the following theses: a) being pure and infinite thinking in action, God necessarily sets in himself all the form of essence and truth, including all essence and truth that for, the finite intellect, seem impossible since they may appear to him as contradictory; b) while establishing all essence and truth, God instantiates some of them (and thus creates some of them) as contents of innate ideas in finite minds, which are created with a logical structure; c) while establishing all essence and truth God instantiates in the actual world at least some of the non-contradictory essences which are instantiated in the finite mind; and d) although the finite human mind cannot conceive it clearly and distinctly, it is certain that God instantiates in the actual world at least some of essence and truth that seem to be contradictory for the human mind, that is, God instantiates at least some of the essences and truths which appear to the finite mind as impossible since inconceivable, which is confirmed by at least two cases mentioned by Descartes. (shrink)

This paper defends an interpretation of Descartes according to which he sees us as having normative (and not merely psychological) certainty of all clear and distinct ideas during the period in which they are apprehended clearly and distinctly. However, on this view, a retrospective doubt about clear and distinct ideas is possible. This interpretation allows Descartes to avoid the Cartesian Circle in an effective way and also shows that Descartes is surprisingly, in some respects, an epistemological externalist. The paper goes (...) on to defend this interpretation against some powerful philosophical objections by Margaret Wilson and others by showing how Descartes' doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths can be brought in to support his epistemology. This doctrine and other analogous positions in Descartes can also reveal that Descartes, again surprisingly, takes important steps toward doing epistemology without direct appeal to God and God's veracity. (shrink)

This paper is on Descartes’ account of modality and, in particular, his account of the necessity of the laws of nature. He famously argues that the necessity of the “eternal truths” of logic and mathematics depends on God’s will. Here I suggest he has the same view about the necessity of the laws of nature. Further, I argue, this is a plausible theory of laws. For philosophers often talk about something being nomologically or physically necessary because of the laws of (...) nature, but this necessity is thought to be metaphysically contingent. However, they struggle to explain how the laws could be genuinely necessary while being metaphysically contingent. The chief advantage of Descartes view, I argue, is that God’s will can plausibly explain both the necessity of the laws and the contingency of the laws. So, Descartes’ theistic account of laws provides a plausible explanation, perhaps the best explanation, of the contingent-necessity of laws of nature. (shrink)

My two principal aims in this essay are interconnected. One aim is to provide a new interpretation of the ‘infinite modes’ in Spinoza’s Ethics. I argue that for Spinoza, God, conceived as the one infinite and eternal substance, is not to be understood as causing two kinds of modes, some infinite and eternal and the rest finite and non-eternal. That there cannot be such a bifurcation of divine effects is what I take the ‘infinite mode’ propositions, E1p21–23, to establish; E1p21–23 (...) show that each and every one of the immanent effects of an infinite and eternal God is an infinite and eternal mode. The other aim is to show that these propositions can be understood as part of an extended critical response to Descartes’s infamous doctrine that God creates eternal truths and true and immutable natures. If we have the correct (Spinozan) conceptions of what God is and how God works, we see that an eternal and infinite God can only be understood to cause ‘eternal truths,’ and that these eternal truths are infinite and eternal modes of God. (shrink)

We explore a ‘Neo-Cartesian’ account of divine ultimacy that raises the concept of God to its ultimate level of abstraction so that we can do away with even the question of his existence. Our starting point is God’s relation to the logical and metaphysical order of reality and the views of Descartes and Leibniz on this topic. While Descartes held the seemingly bizarre view that the eternal truths are freely created by God, Leibniz stands for the mainstream view that the (...) eternal truths are grounded in God’s nature. We argue that the implausibility of Descartes’ doctrine stems mainly from the assumption that there is a non-epistemic notion of absolute necessity that constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for all modal questions and that this assumption is questionable. We also question the assumption that God’s ultimacy merely requires that all reality be grounded in God in the sense of mere explanation, so that it suffices if the necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature but not in God’s will. This will lead us to a reassessment of Descartes’ position. In the final and main part of the paper, we push Descartes’ doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths to its ‘logical’ conclusion with the aim of getting to a novel conception of ‘God.’. (shrink)

We explore a ‘Neo-Cartesian’ account of divine ultimacy that raises the concept of God to its ultimate level of abstraction so that we can do away with even the question of his existence. Our starting point is God’s relation to the logical and metaphysical order of reality and the views of Descartes and Leibniz on this topic. While Descartes held the seemingly bizarre view that the eternal truths are freely created by God, Leibniz stands for the mainstream view that the (...) eternal truths are grounded in God’s nature. We argue that the implausibility of Descartes’ doctrine stems mainly from the assumption that there is a non-epistemic notion of absolute necessity that constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for all modal questions and that this assumption is questionable. We also question the assumption that God’s ultimacy merely requires that all reality be grounded in God in the sense of mere explanation, so that it suffices if the necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature but not in God’s will. This will lead us to a reassessment of Descartes’ position. In the final and main part of the paper, we push Descartes’ doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths to its ‘logical’ conclusion with the aim of getting to a novel conception of ‘God.’. (shrink)

Descartes famously endorsed the view that (CD) God freely created the eternal truths, such that He could have done otherwise than He did. This controversial doctrine is much discussed in recent secondary literature, yet Descartes’s actual arguments for CD have received very little attention. In this paper I focus on what many take to be a key Cartesian argument for CD: that divine simplicity entails the dependence of the eternal truths on the divine will. What makes this argument both important (...) and interesting is that Descartes’s scholastic predecessors share the premise of divine simplicity but reject the CD conclusion. To properly understand Descartes, then, we must determine precisely where he diverges from his predecessors on the path from simplicity to CD. And when we do so we obtain a very surprising result: that despite many dramatic prima facie differences, there is no substantive difference between the relevant doctrines of Descartes and the scholastics . Or so I argue. (shrink)

i l l ustrat es t he di ffi cul t y of providing a purely physical characterisation of phenomenal experi ence wi t ha vi vi d exampl e about a bat ’ s sensory apparatus. Whi l e a number of obj ect i ons have al ready been made to Nagel.

Algunas interpretaciones contemporáneas de Descartes sugieren que él defiende una posición conceptualista en relación con las verdades eternas. De acuerdo con esta lectura de Descartes, las modalidades se determinan por lo que las mentes de un universo puedan concebir. Dado que lo que es posible depende de aquello que los intelectos puedan concebir, no hay concepto de posibilidad alguno que preceda a la existencia de los intelectos. De ahí que, antes de la existencia de los intelectos,no es el caso que (...) cualquier cosa sea posible para Dios. Según tal punto de vista, el conceptualista puede evitar comprometerse con la doctrina de que Dios puede hacer cualquier cosa. En este artículo muestro, entonces, que los pasajes usados en favor de la lectura conceptualista de Descartes son malinterpretados. Concluyo que Descartes no es un conceptualista. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper seeks to shed light on the often-overlooked account of divine and human freedom presented by Anne Conway in her Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy, partly through a...

The problem of the source of necessity is the problem of explaining what makes necessary truths necessarily true. Simon Blackburn has presented a dilemma intended to show that any reductive, realist account of the source of necessity is bound to fail. Although Blackburn's dilemma faces serious problems, reflection on the form of explanations of necessities reveals that a revised dilemma succeeds in defeating any reductive account of the source of necessity. The lesson is that necessity is metaphysically primitive and irreducible.

The Question of Truth in Pedro da Fonseca: the Problem of the simplex apprehensio and the Foundation of Logical Identities. This article deals with the theory of truth in Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) as it is presented in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1577-1612). The first part of the paper is dedicated to Fonseca’s definition of intellective truth within the doctrinal topography of the Aristotelian tradition. The Author especially points out Fonseca’s attempt to justify the notion of a “simple” truth (...) of the “simple apprehension”, based on a specific use of Cajetan’s distinction between “signified act” and “exercised act” as well as on a (partially) nominalist account of the relationship between “simple” and “enunciative” concepts. The second part deals instead with Fonseca’s definition of transcendental truth, understood as the conformity between the intellect and the esse realis of the res, and as the conformity of the latter with exemplars in God’s mind. Here the Author also reconstructs Fonseca’s theory of divine ideas and his theory of logical identities. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the reception of the Cartesian theory of eternal truths in Spinoza’s thought. As demonstrated by several occurrences in his works, he had a deep and articulated knowledge of Descartes’s doctrine. Unlike most of important philosophers of the period, Spinoza did not simply reject the theory, but he tried to incorporate and integrate it in his own reflection. For this reason, by accepting some of its premises – the centrality of God’s efficient causation, the creation of (...) both the essence and the existence of things –, Spinoza ended up by refuting its metaphysical consequences. (shrink)

(2013). Thomas Bradwardine on God and the Foundations of Modality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 368-380. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.689754.

Descartes's claim that the eternal truths were freely created by God is fraught with interpretive difficulties. The main arguments in the literature are classified as concerning the ontological status or the modalities of possibility and necessity of the eternal truths. The views of the principal defenders of the Creation Doctrine – Robert Desgabets, Pierre Sylvain Régis, and Antoine Le Grand are contrasted with those of Nicolas Malebranche. In clarifying the theological, ontological, and logical terms of the debate we can see (...) that what was at stake was the objectivity and certainty of the truths of mathematics and physics. I conclude by suggesting that this issue might fruitfully be used to clarify the disparate discussions in the contemporary literature. (shrink)

Este artigo explora a relação que Descartes estabelece com as noções de forma e de matéria do aristotelismo escolástico ao tratar da interação entre as substâncias nas correspondências com Elisabeth, Gassendi e Arnauld. Partindo do exemplo do peso utilizado por Descartes em diversas cartas, traça-se uma relação de identidade entre a noção de forma em Tomás de Aquino e de pensamento em Descartes, assim como se traça a crítica à noção de forma, entendida como qualidade oculta, para os corpos inanimados. (...) Por fim, explora-se a interpretação ocasionalista do sistema cartesiano e a relevância dos movimentos celestes para a explicação dos movimentos naturais em Tomás de Aquino.This paper deals with the relation that Descartes points between his system and concepts of matter and form from Aristotelian scholasticism. The resemblance arises when Descartes treats interaction among substances in correspondences with Elisabeth, Gassendi and Arnauld. Beginning with the example of the scholastic concept of weight, used many times by Descartes, this article traces an identity between concepts of form in Thomas Aquinas and of thought in Descartes, as well as traces his criticism on the concept of form, understood as hidden qualities, to inanimate bodies. Finally, this paper investigates Cartesian occasionalism as well as the importance of celestial movements for a better comprehension of nature in Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

In his June 1643 letter to Princess Elizabeth, Descartes makes a claim that is a bit surprising given the hyper-intellectualism of the Meditations and other texts. He says that philosophy is something that we should do only rarely. Here I show how Descartes’ recommendation falls out of other components of his system—in particular his stoicism and his views on embodiment. A consequence of my reading is that to an important degree the reasoning of the Fourth Meditation is the imprecise reasoning (...) of a not-yet-Cartesian meditator. (shrink)