In a recent article in this journal, D. Wade Hands reviewed Charles Taylor's two-volume work, Philosophical Papers. Hands predicts that Taylor's work will have no impact on the philosophy of economics. This may indeed turn out to be the case; but if so, it will only be because the profession is not listening. Of course, it is typical of the profession to be more interested in exporting its product than in learning from other disciplines. This is exemplified in Hands's use (...) of the term “philosophy of economics” – philosophy is the handmaiden of the highly successful enterprise of economics. But this journal is called Economics and Philosophy, which means that a conversation requiring an openness and attentiveness is called for between economics and philosophy. (shrink)

Economic profit is produced by entrepreneurs, those special individuals able to detect and seize as yet unexploited market opportunities. Many large capitalist firms manage to deliver positive profits even in the most competitive environments. They can do so, thanks to internal entrepreneurs, a subset of their employees able to drive change and develop innovation in the workplace. This paper argues that the goal of increasing economic profit is fully consistent with the corporation doing good for society. However, there is little (...) justification for corporations to transfer the whole economic profit to shareholders. Economic agents entitled to receive the economic profit are precisely those who create this profit, namely the internal entrepreneurs. (shrink)

As made manifest by Clower's comments on their “science fiction” nature, general equilibrium theories present such peculiar and puzzling features that the methodologist must perforce seek some specific methodological accommodation for this part of economic theory. The role played by such theories in contemporary economics is so fundamental that the impossibility of appraising them by means of any version of falsificationism, and their patent lack of empirical content if approached with the conceptual devices of the methodology of scientific research programs, (...) have prompted several scholars interested in the methodology of economics to search for a reasonable way out. (shrink)

How do economists persuade their readers that one policy is superior to another? A glance at the literature on welfare economics quickly provides the answer to this question: Economists enter policy debates armed with mathematical models, evaluating options on the basis of their consequences. Economists typically classify a policy change as a welfare improvement with respect to the status quo if the gain realized by the winners exceeds the harm sustained by the losers. The best policy becomes the one that (...) generates the highest net benefit. (shrink)

The use of unrealistic assumptions in Economics is usually defended not only for pragmatic reasons, but also because of the intrinsic difficulties in determining the degree of realism of assumptions. Additionally, the criterion used for evaluating economic models is associated with their ability to provide accurate predictions. This mode of thought involves –at least implicitly– a commitment to the existence of unvarying invariant factors or regularities. Contrary to this, the present paper presents a critique to the use of invariant knowledge (...) in economics. One reason for this analysis lies in the fact that economic phenomena are not compatible with the logic of invariance, but with the logic of "possibility trees" or "open-ended results". The other reason is that the use of invariant knowledge may entail both external validity problems and negative exposures to a "black swan". Alternatively, an approach where models are understood as possible scenarios is proposed. It is argued that the realism of assumptions is crucial here, since it helps to ascertain the degree of resemblance between the different models and the target system. (shrink)

The Efficient Market Hypothesis often seems to suggest only that most people cannot outguess the financial markets. But the originator of the hypothesis, Eugene Fama, made the stronger claim that people cannot outguess the financial markets because financial-market prices are correct: They incorporate all known information accurately. This view omits the role that human traders’ interpretations of information must play if the information is to prompt them to buy or sell. Buyers and sellers disagree about the meaning of current information, (...) so at least half of them must be wrong. Bringing in many more (but equally fallible) people to predict the future does not somehow make their (collective) answer “right.” This is a logical disproof of the Fama hypothesis, but the inherently speculative nature of financial markets makes its empirical falsification (or verification) ambiguous if not impossible. The hypothesis must therefore be considered an unscientific article of faith. (shrink)

There are, broadly speaking, two ways to think about rationality, as defined in the following passage: ‘Reason’ for a long time meant the activity of understanding and assimilating the eternal ideas which were to function as goals for men. Today, on the contrary, it is not only the business but the essential work of reason to find means for the goals one adopts at any given time. To use what Horkheimer called objective reason, and what others have called expressive or (...) non–instrumental reason, is to reflect on one's goals, to attempt to determine what preferences one ought to hold. On the other hand, to use what Horkheimer called subjective reason is to ‘be concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted’, that is, to be instrumentally rational. This contrast between non-instrumental and instrumental reason is at the heart of many contemporary social and philosophical disputes. 1. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss James Buchanan’s contribution in the narrow domain of understanding committee voting under majority rule. We then go on to discuss Charles Plott’s seminal experimental work on the topic that sparked a wave of public choice experimental work. However, given Plott’s claims that Buchanan influenced him significantly, it is puzzling that his work with Morris Fiorina explores a question outside of those which Buchanan and Tullock found interesting. We suggest several ways to resolve this tension. Our (...) chapter concludes by discussing a lacuna in the experimental public choice literature in which Buchanan was particularly interested—logrolling, or vote trading. (shrink)

¿Qué entendemos hoy por “neoliberalismo”? Si bien hay varias formas de contestar tal pregunta, la respuesta más frecuente consiste en asociarlo con la aplicación de un conjunto de medidas estrictamente económicas; de hecho, se dice que los neoliberales, casi por defecto congénito, no pueden pensar la realidad más allá de los números y las recetas abstractas. Siguiendo el método arqueológico-genealógico de Michel Foucault y de algunos de sus intérpretes contemporáneos, el presente artículo buscará revisar y en lo posible ampliar aquella (...) concepción crítica. Nuestra hipótesis es que el neoliberalismo no se reduce a un mero “economicismo”, sino que contiene más bien toda una dimensión “espiritual”, todo un campo de prácticas y de discursos que se conforma como respuesta ante el excesivo racionalismo de las sociedades modernas. La cuestión consiste en transformar a los hombres desde dentro, hasta el punto de tornarlos más aptos para acceder a un conjunto de valores y asimilar ciertas formas de comportamiento. Según sostiene este artículo, es en los escritos de Wilhelm Röpke, un economista y sociólogo alemán de mediados del siglo XX, donde mejor se aprecia la dimensión espiritual del neoliberalismo. Röpke proponía un “diagnóstico” y una “terapéutica”. El primero sostiene que los hombres padecen una enfermedad espiritual denominada como “masificación” y “proletarización”, mientras que la terapéutica procura hacer de esos hombres unos emprendedores de sí mismos. Tal sería el modo de superar los efectos adversos del capitalismo: transformando a los hombres masificados y proletarizados en sujetos completamente comprometidos con su profesión. No se trata sencillamente de recuperar un pensamiento casi olvidado por la historia, sino de explorar los límites de nuestro presente, especialmente de nuestras formas de subjetividad. Aunque muchas de las críticas contemporáneas no hayan reparado aún en ello, hay que preguntarse hasta qué punto los diagnósticos y las terapéuticas propuestas por neoliberales como Röpke persisten en la actualidad. Aquí no se darán respuestas tajantes y definitivas, pero sí algunos indicios al respecto. (shrink)

Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of (...) a person to express his or her social being. From an internalist point of view, that is, from a viewpoint in which not only desires but also beliefs play a key role in social explanations as mental entities, this article rejects externalist reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped. (shrink)

Business research and teaching institutions play an important role in shaping the way businesses perceive their relations to the broader society and its moral expectations. Hence, as ethical scandals recently arose in the business world, questions related to the civic responsibilities of business scholars and to the role business schools play in society have gained wider interest. In this article, I argue that these ethical shortcomings are at least partly resulting from the mainstream business model with its taken-for granted basic (...) assumptions such as specialization or the value-neutrality of business research. Redefining the roles and civic responsibilities of business scholars for business practice implies therefore a thorough analysis of these assumptions if not their redefinition. The taken-for-grantedness of the mainstream business model is questioned by the transformation of the societal context in which business activities are embedded. Its value-neutrality in turn is challenged by self-fulfilling prophecy effects, which highlight the normative influence of business schools. In order to critically discuss some basic assumptions of mainstream business theory, I propose to draw parallels with the corporate citizenship concept and the stakeholder theory. Their integrated approach of the relation between business practice and the broader society provides interesting insights for the social reembedding of business research and teaching. (shrink)

Claims that science may become 'self-fulfilling' through its impact on objects of study have recently risen to prominence. Despite radical statements about the supposed consequences of such accounts, however, the central notion of scientific self-fulfillment has remained obscure, leading to skewed views of its actual prevalence and significance. -/- Self-Fulfilling Science illuminates this underexplored phenomenon, drawing on insights from philosophy of science to address questions of its conceptualization, prevalence, and significance. The book critically engages with the popular notion that economic (...) theories of homo economicus exhibit self-fulfillment, and explores its relevance to various metaphysical, ethical, and epistemic issues. Extreme claims of fundamental incompatibility with our usual notions of scientific success are ill-founded. Instead, self-fulfillment’s true epistemic significance lies in more local, nuanced philosophical issues such as theory evaluation and the thesis of underdetermination. -/- In presenting a novel framework, this book facilitates deeper engagement with the developing field of self-fulfilling science and is of interest to philosophers of science, social scientists, and social constructionists. (shrink)

The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is better (...) than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline. (shrink)

The conjunction fallacy occurs whenever probability compounds are thought of as more likely than its component probabilities alone. In the experiment we present, subjects chose between simple and compound lotteries after some practice. Depending on the condition, they were given more or less information about the nature of probability compounds. The conjunction fallacy was surprisingly robust. There was, however, a puzzling dissociation between verbal and behavioral learning: verbal responses were sensitive, but actual choices entirely insensitive, to the amount of verbal (...) instructions being provided. This might reflect a dichotomy between implicit and explicit learning. Caution must be exercised in generalizing results from what people say to what people do. (shrink)

Are the recent findings of Behavioural Game Theory (BGT) on unselfish behaviours relevant for the progress of game theory? Is the methodology of BGT, centred around the attempt to study theoretically players’ utility functions in the light of the feedback that experimental evidence can produce on the theory, a satisfactory one? Or is the creation of various types of ‘social preferences’ just wasteful tinkering? This article compares BGT with the methodology of Rational Game Theory (RGT). BGT is viewed as a (...) more promising and constructive approach, with regard to the relationship between experimental data and theoretical modelling. However, I also argue that today RGT and BGT are closer to one another than often thought. (shrink)

Even the briefest and most superficial perusal of leading mainstream economics journals will attest to the degree that mathematical formalism has captured the economics profession. Whereas up to the early 20th century virtually all of the output of the dismal scientists was in the literary format, by the early 21st century this is not at all any longer the case. Mathematical formalism is supposed to serve economics, and yet now true economic insight has been crowded out by the math. If (...) mainstream neoclassical economics is to come back to its proper path, a far less central role for mathematical economics, statistics and econometrics will have to be fashioned. (shrink)

Abstract Sam Peltzman has brought discipline and common sense to economic analyses of voting and representation. Yet his approach suffers, like that of other economists, from disciplinary provincialism and a singular devotion to econometrics as a research methodology. Political science offers alternative models and research methods that can enliven and deepen the political analyses of Peltzman and other economists.

The views of thirteenth century Catholic thinker Thomas Aquinas and twentieth century economist Milton Friedman on the social responsibility of business are contrasted by probing the foundations of their positions. The basis of Aquinas' normative stance in political economy is found in the metaphysical and moral realism of the classic tradition. The role Descartes and Hobbes played in overturning this philosophical starting point and ushering in an age of ideology is traced out. Friedman's commitment to Comte's vision of positivism is (...) revealed and what this entails for metaphysics, ethics, and economics is given. (shrink)

International government and corporate corruption is increasingly under siege. Although various groups of researchers have quantified and documented world-wide corruption, apparently no one has validated the measures. This study finds a very strong significant correlation of three measures of corruption with each other, thereby indicating validity. One measure was of Black Market activity, another was of overabundance of regulation or unnecessary restriction of business activity. The third measure was an index based on interview perceptions of corruption (Corruption Perceptions Index or (...) CPI) in that nation. Validity of the three measures was further established by finding a highly significant correlation with real gross domestic product per capita (RGDP/Cap). The CPI had by far the strongest correlation with RGDP/Cap, explaining over three fourths of the variance.Corruption is increasingly argued to be a barrier to development and economic growth. Business students often do not see ethics courses as being as relevant as other value-free disciplines or core courses. The data in this study suggests otherwise. Sustainable economic development appears very dependent on a constant, virtuous cycle that includes corruption fighting, and the maintenance of trust and innovation, all reinforcing each other. (shrink)

The authors use empirical research into the environmental practices of 31 manufacturing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to show that ‚business performance’ and ‚regulation’ considerations drive behaviour. They suggest that this is inevitable, given the market-based decision-making frames that permeate and dominate the industry in which manufacturing SMEs operate. Since the environment is a pillar of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the findings have important implications for CSR policy, which promotes voluntary actions predicated on a business case. It is argued that (...) this approach will not alter the behaviour of manufacturing SMEs significantly because CSR practice will be regarded as an optional and costly ‚extra’ affecting core business activity. Consequently, the use and development of existing regulatory structures, providing minimum standards for many activities covered by CSR, remains the most effective means through which the behaviour of manufacturing SMEs will be changed in the short to medium-term. Another feature of the paper is the distinction made between ‚business performance’ and the ‚business case’ argument. Business performance emphasises cost reductions and efficiency whereas the business case accentuates the benefits to shareholders of good practices as their firms become more attractive to stakeholders and society. Manufacturing SMEs␣try to improve business performance because of the pressures placed on them by market-dominated decision-making frames. These frames do not encourage manufacturing SMEs to undertake voluntary actions for the benefit of wider stakeholders and society. (shrink)

Popper's theory of demarcation has set the standard of falsifiability for all sciences. But not all falsifiable theories are part of science and some tests of scientific theories are better than others. Popper's theory has led to the banning of metaphysical and/or philosophical anthropological theories from science. But Joseph Agassi has supplemented Popper's theory to explain how such theories are useful as research programs within science. This theory can also be used to explain how interesting tests may be found. Theories (...) of rationality may be used to illustrate this point by showing how they fail or succeed in producing interesting and testable hypotheses in the social sciences. (shrink)

How should biological behaviour be modelled? A relatively new approach is to investigate problems in neuroethology by building physical robot models of biological sensorimotor systems. The explication and justification of this approach are here placed within a framework for describing and comparing models in the behavioural and biological sciences. First, simulation models – the representation of a hypothesis about a target system – are distinguished from several other relationships also termed “modelling” in discussions of scientific explanation. Seven dimensions on which (...) simulation models can differ are defined and distinctions between them discussed: 1. Relevance: whether the model tests and generates hypotheses applicable to biology. 2. Level: the elemental units of the model in the hierarchy from atoms to societies. 3. Generality: the range of biological systems the model can represent. 4. Abstraction: the complexity, relative to the target, or amount of detail included in the model. 5. Structural accuracy: how well the model represents the actual mechanisms underlying the behaviour. 6. Performance match: to what extent the model behaviour matches the target behaviour. 7. Medium: the physical basis by which the model is implemented. No specific position in the space of models thus defined is the only correct one, but a good modelling methodology should be explicit about its position and the justification for that position. It is argued that in building robot models biological relevance is more effective than loose biological inspiration; multiple levels can be integrated; that generality cannot be assumed but might emerge from studying specific instances; abstraction is better done by simplification than idealisation; accuracy can be approached through iterations of complete systems; that the model should be able to match and predict target behaviour; and that a physical medium can have significant advantages. These arguments reflect the view that biological behaviour needs to be studied and modelled in context, that is, in terms of the real problems faced by real animals in real environments. Key Words: animal behaviour; levels; models; neuroethology; realism; robotics; simulation. (shrink)

The Black-Scholes model of options pricing establishes a theoretical relationship between the “fair” price of an option and other parameters characterizing the option and prevailing market conditions. Here I discuss a common application of the model with the following striking feature: the output of analysis apparently contradicts one of the core assumptions of the model on which the analysis is based. I will present several attitudes one might take toward this situation and argue that it reveals ways in which a (...) “broken” model can nonetheless provide useful information. (shrink)

This article reports the results of an exploratory investigation of a particular area of moral tension experienced by MBA students in a graduate school of business. During the first phase of the study, MBA students'' own perceptions about the moral climate and culture of the business school were examined. The data gathered in this first part of the study indicate that the students recognize that a central part of this culture is constituted by a shared familiarity with a set of (...) institutionally reinforced premises about human behavior and motivation including the ideas that: 1) people are self-interested utility-maximizers, 2) individuals should be unimpeded in their pursuit of their own self-interest through economic transactions, and 3) virtually all human interactionsare economic transactions. The data further indicated that the business students experience a degree of tension between this ethic of self-maximizing and the everyday ethics prevalent in our broader culture, in which altruism and selflessness are central elements. The final section of the study was an effort to see whether and how these institutionally sanctioned premises were integrated into the students'' arguments about the relationship between self-interest and social responsibility. (shrink)

The Adam Smith problem refers to a claimed inconsistency between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, regarding the portrayal of human nature in these two books. Previous research predominantly resolved the claimed inconsistency by uncovering virtuous, less selfish character traits in the Wealth of Nations. This article voices caution. I acknowledge – on methodological grounds – fundamental differences regarding the portrayal of human nature in Smith’s behavioral ethics, i.e. the Theory of Moral Sentiments, as compared with (...) Smith’s economic research. The key argument is that Smith’s two books address different research problems and hence do not, need not and cannot adopt the same view of human nature – for methodological reasons, so my argument. Adam Smith scholarship overlooked that Smith himself in considerable degrees understood “economic man” as a heuristic abstraction. I connect to the philosophies of science of Imre Lakatos and Karl Popper. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs in economic terms Friedman's theorem that the only social responsibility of firms is to increase their profits while staying within legal and ethical rules. A model of three levels of moral conduct is attributed to the firm: (1) self-interested engagement in the market process itself, which reflects according to classical and neoclassical economics an ethical ideal; (2) the obeying of the "rules of the game," largely legal ones; and (3) the creation of ethical capital, which allows moral (...) conduct to enter the market process beyond the rules of the game. Points (1) and (2) position the Friedman theorem in economic terms while point (3) develops an economic revision of the theorem, which was not seen by Friedman. Implications are spelled out for an instrumental stakeholder theory of the firm. (shrink)

The paper maps out an alternative to a behavioural (economic) approach to business ethics. Special attention is paid to the fundamental philosophical principle that any moral ‘ought’ implies a practical ‘can’, which the paper interprets with regard to the economic viability of moral agency of the firm under the conditions of the market economy, in particular competition. The paper details an economic understanding of business ethics with regard to classical and neo-classical views, on the one hand, and institutional, libertarian thought, (...) on the other hand. Implications are derived regarding unintentional and passive intentional moral agency of the firm. The paper moves on to suggest that moral agency can be economically viable in competitive ‘market’ interactions, which is conventionally disputed by classical/neo-classical and institutional, libertarian economics. The paper here conceptualises active moral agency of the firm as the utilisation of ethical capital in firm--stakeholder interactions. This yields a reinterpretation of instrumental stakeholder theory. (shrink)

The article aims to demonstrate that the nudge theory suffers from three main weaknesses stemming from its theoretical dependence on behavioural economics. The first two weaknesses endanger the paternalistic goal, whereas the third does not justify the libertarian attribute. The first weakness lies in the incomplete realistic characterisation of behavioural economics theory that is the central theoretical pillar of Nudge theory. The second weakness is even more relevant. The normative model of behavioural economics is neoclassical rationality. It can be applied (...) to choices in conditions of risk, when it is possible to forecast the probability of the outcomes of one’s choices. On the contrary the real life problems are inside a complex and uncertain environment. In an uncertain environment the neoclassical algorithms are no longer valid, in that they postulate the knowledge of the probability of the outputs. Thus errors and bias, as observed in behavioural economics, are not such in many instances, but they are instead adaptive and therefore rational responses to the context of decision-making. Therefore nudge theory that pursues the normative paternalistic objective of neutralising the bias and judgement errors discovered by behavioural economics and putting paternalistically the citizen on the right track, is in fact proceeding in the wrong direction. The last weakness concerns an assumption of Nudge theory about the duality of mind. System 1 represents the intuitive mind, while System 2 corresponds to the analytical one. System 1 tends to make decisions quickly and unconsciously, while System 2 follows a slow and conscious process. Biases and judgement errors are mainly generated by System 1. However, System 2 may later intervene to correct them. From this premise, the Nudge theory affirms its libertarian character. In this paper I will argue that the dualism of the mind would not entail the reversibility of some nudges, particularly of default states. In this way the fundamental pillar is weakened to justify the libertarian character of the nudge theory. (shrink)

Many economic theorists hold that social institutions can lead otherwise irrational agents to approximate the predictions of traditional rational choice theory. But there is little consensus on how institutions do so. I defend an economic internalist account of the institution-actor relationship by explaining economic rationality as a feature of individuals whose decision-making is aided by institutional structures. This approach, known as the subjective transaction costs theory, represents apparently irrational behavior as a rational response to high subjective transaction costs of thinking (...) and deciding. The theory has two attractive features. First, it reconciles rational choice theory with the increasing body of evidence cataloguing putative errors in economic decision-making. Second, it vindicates the explanatory power of individual choice against externalist challenges; the subjective transaction costs theory keeps economic rationality in the head. (shrink)

The tone of this paper is largely critical. Therefore, I would like to begin by praising Donald McCloskey and Arjo Klamer for their exciting and provocative initiative in the metatheory of economics. They have done us a great favor by opening our eyes to some hidden aspects in the intellectual practices of economists. They have shown that economics is rhetoric; it is persuasion, discourse, conversation, and negotiation, to use their favorite phrases. They have provided plausible arguments and illuminating examples to (...) convince us of the literary character of economic reasoning, notwithstanding the formal languages used by economists and the positivist pretensions typical of the self-image of the discipline. However, McCloskey and Klamer have been less successful in trying to convince us of what economics is not. In particular, it concerns me that they have opened up a gap between rhetoric and realism. They seem to think that because economics has a rhetorical character, it cannot be understood in realist terms. I will argue that this view is mistaken: rhetoric and realism do not exclude each other, but rather they are capable of being combined in a coherent methodology of economics. It is a valuable contribution to import the insights of the newly rehabilitated rhetoric to the metatheory of economics; but it is unnecessary to marry them with enthusiasm about the fashionable anti-realism of Richard Rorty and others. While this is my overall thesis, it is clear that only initial steps towards its substantiation can be taken in this paper. I intend to proceed as follows. I will first make an attempt to locate the problem at hand in the history of the metatheory of economics. Then I will point out those elements in rhetorical metatheory as practiced and defended by Klamer and McCloskey that apparently have anti-realist or non-realist assumptions or implications, either directly or via considerations of scientific rationality. Next I will formulate a few concepts of realism, the differences between which have been ignored in the methodology of economics to this day. Then I will make preliminary attempts to inquire into the mutual compatibility of the rhetorical insights provided by McCloskey and Klamer and realism in this context. I will show that, in principle, there should be no insurmountable obstacles to combining the two; in some of its senses, realism will even turn out to be presupposed by the rhetorical approach. I do not primarily intend to argue for realism as such in this paper. Instead, I will argue for the compatibility of realism and rhetoric. The argument is based on Klamer's and McCloskey's own commitments; in this sense, the argument is immanent to their rhetorical approach. As a final point, I will argue that one should not be indifferent about realism: it does make a difference in economics and in the methodology of economics whether rhetoric is accepted with or without realism. (shrink)

In “The Toolbox of Science” (1995) together with Towfic Shomar we advocated a form of instrumentalism about scientific theories. We separately developed this view further in a number of subsequent works. Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno and Newton Da Costa (FLBD) have since written at least eight papers and a book criticising our work. Here we defend ourselves. First we explain what we mean in denying that models derive from theory – and why their failure to do so should (...) be lamented. Second we defend our use of the London model of superconductivity as an example. Third we point out both advantages and weaknesses of FLBD’s techniques in comparison to traditional Anglophone versions of the semantic conception. Fourth we show that FLBD’s version of the semantic conception has not been applied to our case study. We conclude by raising doubts about FLBD’s overall project. (shrink)

Biorobotics research should not only target “realistic” models of living systems and be judged exclusively from that perspective. It should pay just as much attention to formal models and artificial systems. They allow the examination of assumptions which do not necessarily hold for living systems, but precisely therein lies their value. They generate insight by enabling a comparison between the artificial and the real.

This essay examines the issue of false assumptions in models via a case study of a prominent economic model of sustainable development, wherein the assumption of an infinite future plays a central role. Two proposals are found to be helpful for this case, one based on the concept of derivational robustness and the other on understanding. Both suggest that the assumption of an infinite future, while arguably legitimate in some applications of the model, is problematic with respect to what I (...) call “Parfitian” welfare functions. This result is relevant to debates about discounting the future in economics and environmental ethics. (shrink)

Alexander Rosenberg has played a large role in creating the philosophy of economics as a distinct area of philosophy. But since the publication of Microeconomic Laws in 1976, Professor Rosenberg's thinking about economics has been casting the subject in an increasingly uncomplimentary light. This development is reflected in Rosenberg's new book Economics–Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? In this stimulating work Rosenberg endorses the view that economics does not constitute scientific empirical knowledge. He says.

Patient autonomy, as exercised in the informed consent process, is a central concern in bioethics. The typical bioethicist's analysis of autonomy centers on decisional capacity—finding the line between autonomy and its absence. This approach leaves unexplored the structure of reasoning behind patient treatment decisions. To counter that approach, we present a microeconomic theory of patient decision-making regarding the acceptable level of medical treatment from the patient's perspective. We show that a rational patient's desired treatment level typically departs from the level (...) yielding an absence of symptoms, the level we call ideal. This microeconomic theory demonstrates why patients have good reason not to pursue treatment to the point of absence of physical symptoms. We defend our view against possible objections that it is unrealistic and that it fails to adequately consider harm a patient may suffer by curtailing treatment. Our analysis is fruitful in various ways. It shows why decisions often considered unreasonable might be fully reasonable. It offers a theoretical account of how physician misinformation may adversely affect a patient's decision. It shows how billing costs influence patient decision-making. It indicates that health care professionals' beliefs about the ‘unreasonable’ attitudes of patients might often be wrong. It provides a better understanding of patient rationality that should help to ensure fuller information as well as increased respect for patient decision-making. (shrink)

The examples and concepts that Shoemaker cites are rather heterogeneous. Some distinctions need to be drawn. An optimality thesis involves not just an ordering of options, but a value judgment about them. So let us begin by distinguishing minimality from optimality. And the concept of minimality can play a variety of roles, among which I distinguish between extremum descriptions, statements hypothesizing an optimizing process, and methodological recommendations. Finally, I consider how the three categories relate to Shoemaker’s question that “Who is (...) optimizing: the scientist or nature?” . (shrink)