Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Why are there no objective values?Gebhard Geiger - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):35-62.
    Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Why there are no objective values: A critique of ethical intuitionism from an evolutionary point of view. [REVIEW]Gebhard Geiger - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (3):315-330.
    Using concepts of evolutionary game theory, this paper presents a critique of ethical intuitionism, or non-naturalism, in its cognitivist and objectivist interpretation. While epistemological considerations suggest that human rational learning through experience provides no basis for objective moral knowledge, it is argued below that modern evolutionary theory explains why this is so, i.e., why biological organisms do not evolve so as to experience objective preferences and obligations. The difference between the modes of the cognition of objective and of valuative environmental (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Evolutionary anthropology and the non-cognitive foundation of moral validity.Gebhard Geiger - 1993 - Biology and Philosophy 8 (2):133-151.
    This paper makes an attempt at the conceptual foundation of descriptive ethical theories in terms of evolutionary anthropology. It suggests, first, that what human social actors tend to accept to be morally valid and legitimate ultimately rests upon empirical authority relations and, second, that this acceptance follows an evolved pattern of hierarchical behaviour control in the social animal species. The analysis starts with a brief review of Thomas Hobbes'' moral philosophy, with special emphasis on Hobbes'' authoritarian view of moral validity (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • An examination of Max Scheler’s phenomenological ethics.Stephen R. Wigmore - unknown
    This thesis examines the little-known phenomenological ethical theory of Max Scheler, discussed in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values and The Nature of Sympathy, also bringing in various other complementary philosophers. It argues that Scheler’s theory, when supplemented with complementary ideas, is superior to those offered by contemporary analytic intuitionism and other meta-ethical theories. It argues that a theory of pluralist emotive intuitionism provides a better description of both our experience of ethical value and the logical requirements (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•