The article discusses issues raised by Daniel Came, Ken Gemes, Peter Kail, and Stephen Mulhall in commentaries on Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's "Genealogy" (2008). The main topics are disinterestedness, aesthetic experience, perspectivism, affects and drives, the self, genealogical method, naturalistic psychology, and Nietzsche's rhetoric. The article argues that Nietzsche's criticisms of the conception of aesthetic experience as disinterested are justified, in particular his criticisms of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche's rejection of disinterestedness is linked to his claim that there is "only a (...) perspectival knowing" and his conception of genealogical method. The article argues that perspectivism is the view that we understand best when we feel a multiplicity of affects, and that Nietzsche's own rhetorical method is a therapeutic provocation of affects which constitute the true basis of his readers' values. A particular example from Genealogy I. 14 is examined.--Correspondence to: cjanaway @soton.ac.uk. (shrink)

This article has its origin in a symposium on Christopher Janaway's 2007 book, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy. It comprises responses by the author to articles by the commentators Daniel Came, Ken Gemes, P.J.E. Kail, and Stephen Mulhall.

Este texto contrasta o entendimento comum do "perspectivismo de Nietzsche" com o seu uso da palavra "Perspektive" e termos semelhantes. As primeiras seções proporcionam uma breve pesquisa do desenvolvimento dos diversos significados através da carreira de Nietzsche e a influência de Gustav Teichmüller. As seções subsequentes revelam alguns problemas de leituras comuns do perspectivismo, como a teoria do conhecimento de Nietzsche. Discutindo os assuntos de falsificação, objetividade e autorreferência, as seções remanescentes levam à conclusão que o perspectivismo não deve ser (...) entendido como a doutrina epistemológica de Nietzsche, mas como algo que não o deixa criar tal doutrina.This paper contrasts common understandings of "Nietzsche's perspectivism" with his use of the word "Perspektive" and related wordforms. The first sections provide a brief survey of the development of different meanings throughout Nietzsche's career and the influence of Gustav Teichmüller. The next sections unfold some problems of common readings of perspectivism as Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. Discussing the issues of falsification, objectivity and self-reference, the remaining sections lead to the conclusion that perspectivsm should not be understood as Nietzsche's doctrine of epistemology but rather as what keeps him from providing such a doctrine. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” has often invited the charge of relativism. I give a reading of GM III 12 in order to show, on the contrary, that perspectivism is in part a claim about how best to seek knowledge. I argue that perspectivism consists of two claims, one descriptive and one prescriptive. The first claim describes the nature of enquiry; it is that enquiry is guided and shaped by the affects. The second is a prescriptive claim about how we ought to enquire (...) given that the descriptive claim is true. It is that we can enquire better if we approach a subject-matter in a way that is affectively-engaged, rather than affectively-detached. I argue that affective-engagement can benefit enquiry in two ways. First, Nietzsche thinks that affective states cause us to adopt moral and philosophical views. By attending to our affects, we can gain knowledge of the states that give rise to those views. Second, we can gain knowledge of why we hold a given moral/philosophical view when, instead of ignoring our affects, or letting them guide us unconsciously, we attend to them directly. Thus, perspectivism involves an injunction to probe our intuitions about a given subject-matter for the sake of knowledge. (shrink)