It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively correct view. In this paper, we argue that it should not be. We have conducted two preregistered studies gauging English speakers’ intuitions about whether there is disagreement in a case where the parties have non-clashing beliefs and clashing intentions. Our results suggest that common intuitions tell against the default view. (...) Ordinary speakers describe clashes of intentions as disagreements, suggesting that the ordinary concept of disagreement is “wide” in that it extends beyond beliefs. (shrink)

How does public discussion contribute to the reasonableness with which power is exercised in a democracy? Contemporary answers to this question (such as formulated by Rawls or Habermas), are often based upon two interconnected preconceptions. These are, 1. the idea that the value of public discussion lies primarily in the fact that citizens can reach a reasonable consensus through argumentation and discussion and, 2. the belief that the exercise of power is legitimate only if it is determined by a reasonable (...) consensus among citizens. In this sense, 'reasonable consensus among citizens' eliminates, under ideal conditions, the 'autonomy' of the exercise of power. However, these ideals of democracy appear to conflict with certain aspects of democratic society; aspects, moreover, which we tend to value quite highly. I therefore advance an alternative account of the reasonableness of power in democratic societies; one which acknowledges both the characteristically unlimited scope of public discussion in democratic society and the fact that such discussion rarely or perhaps even never ends in a general consensus. In order to elucidate the democratic character of society we must explain the relationship between discussion and power in such a way that we understand both the need for discussion and the necessity of an autonomous exercise of power. (shrink)

La démocratie délibérative s’oppose fréquemment à une conception rationnelle du citoyen qui, selon ses théoriciens, ne permet pas d’atteindre une authentique démocratie. Pourtant, la démocratie délibérative souffre elle-même de difficultés théoriques importantes dont une partie des solutions a déjà été abordée dans la théorie du choix rationnel. Nous voulons montrer que le choix rationnel, dans sa version « étendue », peut servir à améliorer la démocratie délibérative sans pour autant en ébranler ses fondements. Nous effectuerons d’abord un survol de la (...) démocratie délibérative, en insistant sur les questions de formation et d’expression des préférences des citoyens dans l’agora. Nous y découvrirons certaines difficultés théoriques que nous tenterons par la suite de résoudre par un ensemble de mécanismes issus de la théorie du choix rationnel. Parallèlement, nous verrons que la délibération raisonnable est possible dans un paradigme rationnel, que nous appelons la « délibération circonstancielle ».Deliberative democracy frequently rejects the rational citizen model since, according to its proponents, it would not yield a proper democracy. And yet, deliberative democracy contains important theoretical difficulties, some of which have been dealt with by rational-choice theory. We intend to show that a “broad” version of rational-choice theory can actually improve deliberative democracy without condemning its foundations. First, we will briefly examine deliberative democracy, focusing on the formation and expression of citizens’preferences in the agora. Some theoretical problems will be identified; several mechanisms drawn from rational-choice theory will be used to try to solve them. Simultaneously, we will see that reasonable deliberation is possible in a rational-choice paradigm, in a model I call “circumstantial deliberation”. (shrink)

Los procesos democráticos de toma de decisiones pueden ser evaluados por sus resultados, por su valor intrínseco o por una combinación de ambas cosas. Mostraré que analizar a fondo estas alternativas permite sacar a la luz las debilidades más serias en los modos usuales de justificación del constitucionalismo. La fundamentación teórica de la articulación entre democracia y constitucionalismo ha permanecido atrapada en una trampa que busco romper. Concluiré mostrando la necesidad de rebasar los argumentos epistémicos y contra-epistémicos sugiriendo pautas que (...) hasta ahora creo han sido poco ponderadas en la literatura clásica sobre el tema. (shrink)