The purpose of the third section of Kant’s Groundwork is to prove the possibility of the categorical imperative. In the end of the second section, Kant establishes that a proof like this is necessary to show that morality is ‘something’ and ‘not a chimerical idea without any truth’ or a ‘phantom’. Since the categorical imperative was established as a synthetic a priori practical proposition, in order to prove its possibility it is necessary ‘to go beyond cognition of objects to a (...) critique of the subject, that is, of pure practical reason’. Kant names this kind of proof a deduction. The present paper intends to show the argument whose purpose is to justify the categorical imperative; show that the argument is a transcendental deduction; present the argument as it is reconstructed by Allison, and show that, although it seems compelling, the position of the commentator could not be accepted by Kant himself. (shrink)

A ciência e a tecnologia ocupam um lugar fundamental e insubstituível na construção da realidade sociocultural atual. Estão ligadas ao destino da vida humana, sendo que o ser do homem está marcado cada vez mais pela ciência e a depender dela em sua efetivação. Porém, do expressivo avanço científico tecnológico advém um dilema que penetra o âmago da realidade sociocultural humana. O homem contemporâneo, por um lado, sente-se orgulhoso de ter superado a pura facticidade existencial de uma vida simplesmente inserida (...) em crenças tradicionais, assumindo, por sua vez, a consciência de seu processo de autoconstrução e uma vida eminentemente racionalizada, mas, por outro, ele não consegue superar e ultrapassar a vigência histórica da normatividade da comunidade humana histórica na qual ele está inserido. Contudo, percebendo-se que o progresso científicotecnológico avança rapidamente, exigindo, pois, um novo espectro do raciocínio ético da ação, dimensão esta desconhecida a todas as formas precedentes de ação e reflexão, constata-se certo descompasso entre os avanços da ciência e da tecnologia com o alcance da reflexão e da práxis do agir ético, especialmente, depois que a ciência e a técnica ampliaram a margem de liberdade e autonomia a ponto de ser possível afirmar, depois de um desencantamento da natureza externa, agora, uma espécie de um novo encantamento com a natureza interna. À luz dessa nova conjuntura sociocultural, tem-se o propósito de remontar à Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes de Kant na segunda formulação do imperativo categórico, humanidade como fim, a fim de investigar se a mesma, por um lado, pode ser aproximada à compreensão do fim último e do fim final no processo de moralização na Crítica do juízo, e, por outro lado, se tal formulação pode ser ancoradouro razoável à discussão ética contemporânea de espectro em nentemente científico. (shrink)

Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from (...) pure if theoretical reason, while for Kant pure practical reason works only by effecting a feeling of respect (in the works) or by cultivating, i.e. affecting, natural dispositions to moral feeling (in the works). I argue that Kant's is the more realistic theory on this point. (shrink)

This article is concerned with examining Kant's derivation of the various formulae of his Categorical Imperative. It is in agreement with Paton in maintaining that Kant actually mentions five formulae. But it is not in agreement with him, and some others, in maintaining that they are ultimately reducible to three. Nor is it in agreement with those who maintain that they are ultimately reducible to just one. According to the present article, they are ultimately reducible to two: that about a (...) moral law being a universal law; and that about a moral law involving treating human beings as ends in themselves. (shrink)

Kant offers the following argument for the formula of humanity (FH): Each rational agent necessarily conceives of her own rational nature as an end in itself and does so on the same grounds as every other rational agent, so all rational agents must conceive of one another's rational nature as an end in itself. As it stands, the argument appears to be question-begging and fallacious. Drawing on resources from the formula of universal law (FUL) and Kant's claims about the primacy (...) of duties to oneself, I propose a contractualist reconstruction of this puzzling line of reasoning. (shrink)

Consider manipulation in which one agent, avoiding force, threat, or fraud mobilizes some non-concern motive of another so as to induce this other to behave or move differently than she would otherwise have behaved or moved, given her circumstances and her initial ranking of concerns. As an instance, imagine that I get us to miss the opening of a play that I have grudgingly agreed to attend by engaging your sublimated compulsive tendency to check the stove when we are halfway (...) to the theatre. Such motive manipulation is, I take it, widely regarded as morally worrisome. If it really is morally worrisome, then we should be able to explain adequately why it is so. But existing condemnations of manipulation come up short in this regard. In this paper, I develop and defend a more plausible account of the moral status of this phenomenon. (shrink)

Kant, having identified the formulas of the supreme principle of morality, offers a succinct explanation of their interrelation. What Kant says is, “The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and any one of them of itself unites the other two in it.”1 This claim – hereafter the “Unity Claim” – plays the role of the eccentric cousin in the family of Kant’s ethics: although glaringly present, (...) it is little spoken of, but seldom disowned. Most commentators, at any rate, focus their attention on more important matters, such as the content of the individual formulas, the moral psychology, or the deduction of freedom. Such matters are sufficiently absorbing to leave the Unity Claim often passed over without remark. But the Unity Claim should not be ignored. Kant does assert it, which compels us to attempt to find a place for it in his moral theory. It would seem to constrain the interpretation of the other, more momentous issues. How one interprets the content of the categorical imperative, in particular, would seem to be significantly restricted by the Unity Claim; one could not, given the Unity Claim, offer a complete interpretation of any single formula without also at least referring to the other formulas. And, as I shall argue in Part III below, the Unity Claim is no accident. Kant is committed to the Unity Claim by virtue of some basic features of his moral theory. This paper will thus offer what amounts to an extended commentary on the Unity Claim. I shall review the various suggestions of what it might mean, and how it might, or might not, be accommodated within Kant’s moral theory. The structure of this paper will be as such. Part II will examine the two main strategies for including the Unity Claim within Kant’s moral theory, and explain why they are both inadequate. Part III will examine the other main approach to the 2 Unity Claim: giving up on it.. (shrink)