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Imagining and pretending

In Mental Simulation. Cambridge: Blackwell (1995)

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  1. How Do Children Represent Pretend Play?Ori Friedman - 2013 - In Marjorie Taylor (ed.), Oxford handbook of the development of imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 186-195.
    How do young children represent pretend play? One possibility is that recognizing and representing pretend play depends on children’s ability to infer the mental states of the person engaged in pretend play (mentalist account). The two dominant alternative possibilities are that children view as a distinctive form of non-representational behavior (behavioral account), and that children represent pretense by temporarily treating objects as though they have fictional or make-believe properties (flagging account). This chapter provides an overview of the debate between these (...)
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  • A cognitive theory of pretense.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2000 - Cognition 74 (2):115-147.
    Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by describing a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, a Possible (...)
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  • Empathy, respect, and humanitarian intervention.Nancy Sherman - 1998 - Ethics and International Affairs 12:103–119.
    Sherman presents a slightly revised definition of empathy, in which empathy is the cognitive ability to place oneself in the world of another, imagining all of the realities, feelings, and circumstances of that person in the context of their world.
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  • Mentalising, schizotypy, and schizophrenia.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 1999 - Cognition 71 (1):43-71.
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  • . Normativity without Reflectivity: on the Beliefs and Desires of Non-Reflective Creatures.Hilla Jacobson - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):75-93.
    The view (held, e.g., by Davidson) that the having of beliefs and desires presupposes the having of reflective capacities is sometimes supported by appealing to the idea that the concept of belief is a concept of a mental state which involves a normative aspect: beliefs can be “successful” or “unsuccessful” from the perspective of their possessors, and sometimes discarded in light of their “failure.” This naturally invites the idea that believers must be capable of reflecting on their beliefs. Desires presuppose (...)
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  • Imagination and Belief in Action.Anna Ichino - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1517-1534.
    Imagination and belief are obviously different. Imagining that you have won the lottery is not quite the same as believing that you have won. But what is the difference? According to a standard view in the contemporary debate, they differ in two key functional respects. First, with respect to the cognitive inputs to which they respond: imaginings do not respond to real-world evidence as beliefs do. Second, with respect to the behavioural outputs that they produce: imaginings do not motivate us (...)
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  • The conceptual underpinnings of pretense: Pretending is not 'behaving-as-if.'.Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie - 2007 - Cognition 105 (1):103-124.
    The ability to engage in and recognize pretend play begins around 18 months. A major challenge for theories of pretense is explaining how children are able to engage in pretense, and how they are able to recognize pretense in others. According to one major account, the metarepresentational theory, young children possess both production and recognition abilities because they possess the mental state concept, PRETEND. According to a more recent rival account, the Behavioral theory, young children are behaviorists about pretense, and (...)
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  • Il test della falsa credenza.Marco Fenici - 2013 - Analytical and Philosophical Explanation 8:1-56.
    La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi utilizzano il test della falsa credenza per valutare la capacità dei bambini di attribuire stati mentali a se stessi e a agli altri. Tuttavia non è stato ancora pienamente compreso né quali requisiti cognitivi siano necessari per passare il test né quale sia il loro sviluppo. In questo articolo (...)
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