The goal of neuroeconomics is a mathematical theory of how the brain implements decisions, that is tied to behaviour. This theory is likely to show some decisions for which rational-choice theory is a good approximation, to provide a deeper level of distinction among competing behavioural alternatives, and to provide empirical inspiration for economics to incorporate more nuanced ideas about endogeneity of preferences, individual difference, emotions, endogeneous regulation of states, and so forth. I also address some concerns about rhetoric and practical (...) epistemology. Neuroscience articles are necessarily speculative and the science has proceeded rapidly because of that rhetorical convention. Single-study papers are encouraged and are necessarily limited in what can be inferred, so the sturdiest cumulation of results, and the best guide forward, comes in review journals which compile results and suggest themes. The potential of neuroeconomics is in combining the clearest experimental paradigms and statistical methods in economics, with the unprecedented capacity to measure a range of neural and cognitive activity that economists like Edgeworth, Fisher and Ramsey daydreamed about but did not have. (shrink)

Les neurosciences sont utilisées en économie dans l’objectif d’améliorer la compréhension et la description des choix individuels. Elles permettent aussi d’évaluer la rationalité des décideurs et de réguler les comportements. Cet article analyse les implications normatives de la neuroéconomie, en dégageant les apports des neurosciences à l’économie du bien-être et à l’économie publique. L’interventionnisme économique défendu par les neuroéconomistes (par exemple, Bernheim et Rangel 2004) y est interprété comme une politique caractéristique du néo-libéralisme, au sens qu’en donne Michel Foucault (1978b). (...) Si la neuroimagerie ne permet pas de « manipuler » directement le cerveau des décideurs, elle offre en revanche la possibilité de détecter le caractère pathologique ou irrationnel de certaines conduites. Ce diagnostic justifie une régulation comportementale du bien-être, qui doit être distinguée du paternalisme libertarien de Sunstein et Thaler (2003). Dans les deux cas, c’est l’environnement plutôt que le décideur lui-même qui est la cible de l’intervention, mais la justification théorique n’est pas la même. Pour les neuroéconomistes, l’irrationalité d’un comportement tel que l’addiction ne résulte pas d’un biais cognitif de l’individu, mais de son interaction avec un environnement pathologique. Les réflexions normatives des neuroéconomistes s’inscrivent dans le prolongement théorique des réflexions de Michel Foucault sur la biopolitique et le néolibéralisme (Foucault 2004b). Notre étude vaut ainsi comme une contribution à l’étude de la gouvernementalité. Elle nous conduit à défendre une interprétation non-réductionniste des rapports entre savoir et pouvoir chez Foucault. Classification JEL : D87, H10, B41. (shrink)

Les neurosciences sont utilisées en économie dans l’objectif d’améliorer la compréhension et la description des choix individuels. Elles permettent aussi d’évaluer la rationalité des décideurs et de réguler les comportements. Cet article analyse les implications normatives de la neuroéconomie, en dégageant les apports des neurosciences à l’économie du bien-être et à l’économie publique. L’interventionnisme économique défendu par les neuroéconomistes (par exemple, Bernheim et Rangel 2004) y est interprété comme une politique caractéristique du néo-libéralisme, au sens qu’en donne Michel Foucault (1978b). (...) Si la neuroimagerie ne permet pas de « manipuler » directement le cerveau des décideurs, elle offre en revanche la possibilité de détecter le caractère pathologique ou irrationnel de certaines conduites. Ce diagnostic justifie une régulation comportementale du bien-être, qui doit être distinguée du paternalisme libertarien de Sunstein et Thaler (2003). Dans les deux cas, c’est l’environnement plutôt que le décideur lui-même qui est la cible de l’intervention, mais la justification théorique n’est pas la même. Pour les neuroéconomistes, l’irrationalité d’un comportement tel que l’addiction ne résulte pas d’un biais cognitif de l’individu, mais de son interaction avec un environnement pathologique. Les réflexions normatives des neuroéconomistes s’inscrivent dans le prolongement théorique des réflexions de Michel Foucault sur la biopolitique et le néolibéralisme (Foucault 2004b). Notre étude vaut ainsi comme une contribution à l’étude de la gouvernementalité. Elle nous conduit à défendre une interprétation non-réductionniste des rapports entre savoir et pouvoir chez Foucault. Classification JEL : D87, H10, B41. (shrink)

In this short note I speculate about the various ways in which the study of neurological aspects of decision making could be fruitful for economic modelling.

By the late 1990s, several converging trends in economics, psychology, and neuroscience had set the stage for the birth of a new scientific field known as “neuroeconomics”. Without the availability of an extensive variety of experimental designs for dealing with individual and social decision-making provided by experimental economics and psychology, many neuroeconomics studies could not have been developed. At the same time, without the significant progress made in neuroscience for grasping and understanding brain functioning, neuroeconomics would have never seen the (...) light of day. The paper is an overview of the main significant advances in the knowledge of brain functioning by neuroscience that have contributed to the emergence of neuroeconomics and its rise over the past two decades. These advances are grouped over three non-independent topics referred to as the “emo-rational” brain, “social” brain, and “computational” brain. For each topic, it emphasizes findings considered as critical to the birth and development of neuroeconomics while highlighting some of prominent questions about which knowledge should be improved by future research. In parallel, it shows that the boundaries between neuroeconomics and several recent sub-fields of cognitive neuroscience, such as affective, social, and more generally, decision neuroscience, are rather porous. (shrink)

À la fin des années 1990, plusieurs tendances convergentes en économie, psychologie et neuroscience ont préparé le terrain pour la naissance d’un nouveau champ scientifique qualifié de « neuroéconomie ». Comme pour toute discipline émergente – pensons par exemple à l’économie mathématique, l’économétrie ou l’économie expérimentale en d’autres temps – la neuroéconomie est plutôt controversée en économie. Elle soulève un grand nombre de questions d’ordre empirique, méthodologique et philosophiques donnant lieu à des débats et controverses que l’article identifie et discute (...) à travers trois questions majeures relatives aux connaissances produites : Sont-elles fiables? Sont-elles scientifiquement légitimes? Sont-elles utiles pour les économistes? Sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, ce cadre analytique permet de comprendre l’essence des principales critiques adressées à la neuroéconomie. Dans le même temps, l’article éclaire la nature des réponses susceptibles d’être apportées à ces critiques au vu des progrès conceptuels et empiriques qu’a connus ce champ de recherche depuis son émergence et à la lumière du tournant apparu dans l’agenda de la neuroéconomie au cours de la dernière décennie. JEL Codes : A12, B41, C51, C81, C9, D03, D87. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics is examined critically using data on the response times of subjects who were asked to express their preferences in the context of the Allais Paradox. Different patterns of choice are found among the fast and slow responders. This suggests that we try to identify types of economic agents by the time they take to make their choices. Nevertheless, it is argued that it is far from clear if and how neuroeconomics will change economics.

I distinguish between two styles of research that are both called . Neurocellular economics (NE) uses the modelling techniques and mathematics of economics to model relatively encapsulated functional parts of brains. This approach rests upon the fact that brains are, like markets, massively distributed information-processing networks over which executive systems can exert only limited and imperfect governance. Harrison's (2008) deepest criticisms of neuroeconomics do not apply to NE. However, the more famous style of neuroeconomics is behavioural economics in the scanner. (...) This is often motivated by complaints about conventional economics frequently heard from behavioural economists. It attempts to use neuroimaging data to justify arguments for replacing standard aspects of microeconomic theory by facts and conjectures about human psychology. Harrison's grounds for unease about neuroeconomics apply to most BES, or at least to its explicit methodology. This methodology is naively reductionist and illegitimately assumes that economics should not do what all successful science does, namely, model abstract aspects of its target phenomena instead of would-be complete and fully ecologically situated facsimiles of them. (shrink)

The following is a set of reading notes on, and questions for, the Neuroeconomics enterprise. My reading of neuroscience evidence seems to be at odds with basic conceptions routinely assumed in the Neuroeconomics literature. I also summarize methodological concerns regarding design, implementation, and statistical evaluation of Neuroeconomics experiments.

This article presents and discusses one of the most prominent inferential strategies currently employed in cognitive neuropsychology, namely, reverse inference. Simply put, this is the practice of inferring, in the context of experimental tasks, the engagement of cognitive processes from locations or patterns of neural activation. This technique is notoriously controversial because, critics argue, it presupposes the problematic assumption that neural areas are functionally selective. We proceed as follows. We begin by introducing the basic structure of traditional “location-based” reverse inference (...) and discuss the influential lack of selectivity objection. Next, we rehearse various ways of responding to this challenge and provide some reasons for cautious optimism. The second part of the essay presents a more recent development: “pattern-decoding reverse inference”. This inferential strategy, we maintain, provides an even more convincing response to the lack of selectivity charge. Due to this and other methodological advantages, it is now a prominent component in the toolbox of cognitive neuropsychology. Finally, we conclude by drawing some implications for philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Reverse inference is the most commonly used inferential strategy for bringing images of brain activation to bear on psychological hypotheses, but its inductive validity has recently been questioned. In this article, I show that, when it is analyzed in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted in the recent literature, and I defend the appropriateness of treating reverse inference in these terms. 1 Introduction2 Reverse Inference3 Reverse Inference Defended3.1 Typical reverse inferences are fallacious3.2 No quick and (...) easy fix3.3 A likelihoodist defense of reverse inference3.4 An example4 Appropriateness of the Likelihoodist Approach4.1 Likelihoodist reverse inference is not applicable4.2 Cognitive neuroscientists are not interested in comparative conclusions4.3 Reverse inference and negative hypotheses4.4 Likelihoodist reverse inference may confuse cognitive neuroscientists4.5 Bayesian reverse inferences should be preferred to likelihoodist reverse inferences5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Reverse Inference ( RI ) is an imaging-based type of inference from brain states to mental states, which has become highly widespread in neuroscience, most especially in neuroeconomics. Recent critical studies of RI may be taken to show that, if cautiously used, RI can help achieve research goals that may be difficult to achieve by way of behavior-based procedures alone. But can RI exceed the limits of these procedures and achieve research goals that are impossible for them to achieve alone? (...) By way of answering this question we show that a conception of the mind—type identity—under which the answer is in the positive, is untenable for reasons that strongly support another conception of the mind—functionalism—under which the answer must be in the negative. On this basis we then conclude that RI cannot exceed the limits of behavior-based procedures in cognitive psychology. (shrink)

We briefly describe ways in which neuroeconomics has made contributions to its contributing disciplines, especially neuroscience, and a specific way in which it could make future contributions to both. The contributions of a scientific research programme can be categorized in terms of (1) description and classification of phenomena, (2) the discovery of causal relationships among those phenomena, and (3) the development of tools to facilitate (1) and (2). We consider ways in which neuroeconomics has advanced neuroscience and economics along each (...) line. Then, focusing on electrophysiological methods, we consider a puzzle within neuroeconomics whose solution we believe could facilitate contributions to both neuroscience and economics, in line with category (2). This puzzle concerns how the brain assigns reward values to otherwise incomparable stimuli. According to the common currency hypothesis, dopamine release is a component of a neural mechanism that solves comparability problems. We review two versions of the common currency hypothesis, one proposed by Read Montague and colleagues, the other by William Newsome and colleagues, and fit these hypotheses into considerations of rational choice. (shrink)

In the recent literature at the interface between economics, biology and neuroscience, several authors argue that by adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of decision making, economists will be able to construct predictively and explanatorily superior models. However, most economists remain quite reluctant to import biological or neural insights into their account of choice behaviour. In this paper, I reconstruct and critique one of the main arguments by means of which economists attempt to vindicate their conservative position. Furthermore, I (...) develop an alternative defense of the thesis that economists justifiably rely on a methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of choice behaviour. (shrink)

We argue that neuroeconomics should be a mechanistic science. We defend this view as preferable both to a revolutionary perspective, according to which classical economics is eliminated in favour of neuroeconomics, and to a classical economic perspective, according to which economics is insulated from facts about psychology and neuroscience. We argue that, like other mechanistic sciences, neuroeconomics will earn its keep to the extent that it either reconfigures how economists think about decision-making or how neuroscientists think about brain mechanisms underlying (...) behaviour. We discuss some ways that the search for mechanisms can bring about such top-down and bottom-up revision, and we consider some examples from the recent neuroeconomics literature of how varieties of progress of this sort might be achieved. (shrink)

This PhD thesis focuses on the philosophical foundations of Neuroeconomics, an innovative research program which combines findings and modelling tools from economics, psychology and neuroscience to account for human choice behaviour. The proponents of Neuroeconomics often manifest the ambition to foster radical modifications in the accounts of choice behaviour developed by its parent disciplines. This enquiry provides a philosophically informed appraisal of the potential for success and the relevance of neuroeconomic research for economics. My central claim is that neuroeconomists can (...) help other economists to build more predictive and explanatory models, yet are unlikely to foster revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of choice. The contents are organized as follows. In chapters 1-2, I present neuroeconomists’ investigative tools, distinguish the most influential approaches to neuroeconomic research and reconstruct the case in favour of a neural enrichment of economic theory. In chapters 3-7, I combine insights from neuro-psychology, economic methodology and philosophy of science to develop a systematic critique of Neuroeconomics. In particular, I articulate four lines of argument to demonstrate that economists are provisionally justified in retaining a methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of decision making. My first argument points to several evidential and epistemological concerns which complicate the interpretation of neural data and cast doubt on the inferences neuroeconomists often make in their studies. My second argument aims to show that the trade-offs between the modelling desiderata that neuroeconomists and other economists respectively value severely constrain the incorporation of neural insights into economic models. My third argument questions neuroeconomists’ attempts to develop a unified theory of choice behaviour by identifying some central issues on which they hold contrasting positions. My fourth argument differentiates various senses of the term ‘revolution’ and illustrates that neuroeconomists are unlikely to provide revolutionary contributions to economic theory in any of these senses. (shrink)