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  1. Wundt and “Higher Cognition”: Elements, Association, Apperception, and Experiment.Gary Hatfield - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):48-75.
    Throughout his career, Wundt recognized Völkerpsychologie (VP) as (at first) ancillary to experimental psychology or (later) as its required complement. New scholarship from around 1979 highlighted this fact while claiming to correct a picture of Wundt as a pure associationist, attributed to Boring’s History of Experimental Psychology, by instead emphasizing apperception in Wundt’s scheme (sec. 2). The criticisms of Boring, summarized by Blumenthal in 1980, overshot the mark. Boring’s Wundt was no pure associationist. Both Boring and the seventy-niner historians emphasized (...)
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  • Why the “stimulus-error” did not go away.M. Chirimuuta - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:33-42.
  • Perceptual science and the nature of perception.Alessandra Buccella - 2022 - Theoria 37 (2):149-162.
    Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perceptual ontology, which however are generally relied upon by philosophers (...)
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