Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion (...) for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist. (shrink)

When deciding how ‘death’ should be defined, it is helpful to consider cases in which vital functions are restored to an organism long after those vital functions have ceased. Here I consider whether such restoration cases can be used to refute termination theses. Focusing largely on the termination thesis applied to human animals, I develop a line of argument from the possibility of human restoration to the conclusion that in many actual cases, human animals continue to exist after they die. (...) The line of reasoning developed here can be extended to show that other organisms survive death in many actual cases. This line of reasoning improves on other arguments that have been offered against termination theses. And if my argument regarding human animals surviving death is successful, then assuming that human persons are animals, we can also conclude that human persons in many actual cases continue to exist after death. (shrink)

Usually, the organization of living systems is explained by appealing to an intrinsic purpose that is based on the biological survival. However, paradigmatically, it is inevitable to observe that the final destiny of all living organisms is death. In this work, we defend that, from an organizational approach, there is a form of death—Regulatory Cell Death—that, far from being a mere "absence of life", is a process of biological regulation and a feature of self-maintenance in multicellular organisms.

The purpose of this paper is methodological. I begin by showing the methodological frailties of both the heart and brain approach to the criteria of death used in connection with organ transplantation. I then clarify what a definition is. Finally, I propose to abandon the definition of death, and suggest a pragmatic definition of ‘explantability window’.

This study was designed to explore the concept of witnessed resuscitation. This was achieved through a serial approach to conceptually based research that systematically and incrementally developed understanding of the meaning of witnessed resuscitation in the context of emergency resuscitative care for adult victims of cardiorespiratory arrest. Theoretical investigation provided a strong conceptual foundation of existing knowledge and gave direction for further inquiry. Existential investigation comprised a hermeneuticphenomenological study to explore the phenomenon of lay presence during an adult cardiopulmonary resuscitation (...) attempt. Lived-experience material was subjected to thematic analysis and was revealing of five concepts that represented the essential nature of the lived experience. The concept of exposure emerged as the essence of this phenomenon. Research findings derived during theoretical and existential investigation were compared by adapting a method of template comparison. This process culminated in a synthesised conceptualisation of the meaning of witnessed resuscitation of a higher level of abstraction. Ongoing research is needed to determine whether this ‘state of the art’ conceptualisation of witnessed resuscitation holds its boundaries when applied to alternative phenomena, contexts and disciplines. Priority should be given to exploring the application of this concept in the context of patient and family-centred end-of-life care. (shrink)