Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The knowledge argument: A response to Elizabeth Schier.David Hodgson - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):112-115.
    I much appreciated Elizabeth Schier's paper on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, published in the January 2008 issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Schier, 2008) -- in part, I confess, because of resonances with my gestalt argument for free will (Hodgson, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2007a,b). I would like to offer two comments on this paper.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dual Aspect Framework for Consciousness and Its Implications: West meets East.Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal - 2009 - In G. Derfer, Z. Wang & M. Weber (eds.), The Roar of Awakening. A Whiteheadian Dialogue Between Western Psychotherapies and Eastern Worldviews. Ontos Verlag. pp. 39.
    The extended dual-aspect monism framework of consciousness, based on neuroscience, consists of five components: (1) dual-aspect primal entities; (2) neural-Darwinism: co-evolution and co-development of subjective experiences (SEs) and associated neural-nets from the mental aspect (that carries the SEs/proto-experiences (PEs) in superposed and unexpressed form) and the material aspect (mass, charge, spin and space-time) of fundamental entities (elementary particles), respectively and co-tuning via sensorimotor interaction; (3) matching and selection processes: interaction of two modes, namely, (a) the non-tilde mode that is the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - 2018 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 89-91.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Nature, Common Usage, and Implications of Free Will and Determinism.Shirley Matile Ogletree & Crystal D. Oberle - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:97 - 111.
    Philosophers and psychologists have debated what is meant by free will as well as the nature of human choice. However, only recently have data been gathered to consider common usage of the term; our data support college students' belief in free will as indicating some degree of choice that is not constrained by genetic or environmental factors and as separate from a "soft" determinism perspective. How free will and determinism beliefs relate to other psychological attitudes, such as moral responsibility and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Embodied Freedom and the Escape from Uncertainty.Boris Kotchoubey - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):99-107.
    : Behavioral actions can attain their intended result either when all possible details and intervening factors are controlled in advance by the action plan, or when only the final outcome is taken into account while the rest is left for on-line correction. Both ways have numerous advantages and disadvantages. The former can be applied only in very simple instances and therefore, puts very strong limits on the complexity of behavior. The latter can be used for action plans of practically unlimited (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will?Gilberto Gomes - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43.
    Hodgson’s (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12 (1), 2005) defense of the plain person’s view that free will exists in conscious voluntary action is discussed. His position against the view that human action is automatically determined is favored, but his view that free will is incompatible with natural causation is countered. Eccles’ hypothesis to account for the presence of a readiness potential prior to a conscious decision to act now is discussed. It is argued that it is possible to preserve what (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations