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  1. Thinking What One is Doing: Knowledge-how, Methods, and Reliability.John Turman - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):195-211.
    There has been renewed interest over the last twenty years in Ryle's claims and arguments about knowledge-how. Elzinga (2018) and Löwenstein (2017) have both recently defended independent Ryle-inspired accounts of knowledge-how. In what follows, I will propose and defend an amendment to accounts of knowledge-how like those of Elzinga and Löwenstein. I argue that this amendment provides an additional needed distinction between the performance robustness provided by certain performance methods (or styles), and the robustness of an agent's ability to perform (...)
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  • Wittgensteinian philosophy and empirical psychology.Richard Rorty - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (3):151 - 172.
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  • Reinterpreting Ryle: A nonbehaviorist analysis.Shelley M. Park - 1994 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (2):265-90.
    This paper argues that the behaviorist label yields a caricature of Ryle's position in The Concept of Mind that cannot be adequately fleshed out by reference to the larger corpus of Rylean texts. On the interpretation of Ryle that I offer here, he is best characterized as an "ontological agnostic." Ryle's aim, I believe, is to develop a nondenotational theory of meaning for mental-conduct terms--a theory of meaning which does not presuppose any metaphysical or ontological theory and, hence, does not (...)
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  • Confusion, Irrationality and the Ends of Philosophy: Horwich's Wittgenstein Inspired Metaphilosophy.Charles M. K. Djordjevic - 2018 - Philosophical Investigations 41 (3):329-365.
    This paper focuses on Horwich's metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, it focuses on Horwich's charge that all philosophy is irrational. First, I coordinate the various aspects of Horwich's metaphilosophical program to make sense of his charge of irrationality against philosophy. Second, I argue that this metaphilosophical program misfires in two distinct ways. However, third, I close by calling attention to what I posit to be a critical insight of Horwich's account.
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