Switch to: References

Citations of:

Consciousness of action and self-consciousness: A cognitive neuroscience approach

In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press (2003)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. On the alleged illusion of conscious will.Marc van Duijn & Sacha Bem - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.
    The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Proprioceiving someone else's movement.Barbara Montero - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):149 – 161.
    Proprioception - the sense by which we come to know the positions and movements of our bodies - is thought to be necessarily confined to the body of the perceiver. That is, it is thought that while proprioception can inform you as to whether your left knee is bent or straight, it cannot inform you as to whether someone else's knee is bent or straight. But while proprioception certainly provides us with information about the positions and movements of our own (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Agency, simulation and self-identification.Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Absent minds and absent agents: Attention-lapse induced alienation of agency.James Allan Cheyne, Jonathan S. A. Carriere & Daniel Smilek - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):481-493.
    We report a novel task designed to elicit transient attention-lapse induced alienation of agency experiences in normal participants. When attention-related action slips occur during the task, participants reported substantially decreased self control as well as a high degree of perceived agency attributed to the errant hand. In addition, participants reported being surprised by, and annoyed with, the actions of the errant hand. We argue that ALIA experiences occur because of constraints imposed by the close and precise temporal relations between intention (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system.Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Fourneret - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in delusions of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Inside loops: Developmental premises of self-ascriptions.Radu J. Bogdan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):235-252.
    Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del “sentido de agencia”. Epistemological Requirements of the Sense of Agency.Fernando Broncano - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39:7-27.
    We discuss the conditions that the knowledge of an action must meet to reach the status of agency or complete intentional action. A first problem is to account how the subject appears in the action. We consider the model of a "sense of agency" and we oppose a theory of action control that does not take in charge the epistemological problems associated to the sense of agency model. Our claim is that epistemological requirements are intrinsic components of the agency, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Action observation and execution: What is shared?Frédérique De Vignemont - unknown
    Performing an action and observing it activate the same internal representations of action. The representations are therefore shared between self and other. But what exactly is shared? At what level within the hierarchical structure of the motor system do SRA occur? Understanding the content of SRA is important in order to decide what theoretical work SRA can perform. In this paper, we provide some conceptual clarification by raising three main questions: are SRA semantic or pragmatic representations of action?; are SRA (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Choice Blindness: The Incongruence of Intention, Action and Introspection.Petter Johansson - unknown
    This thesis is an empirical and theoretical exploration of the surprising finding that people often may fail to notice dramatic mismatches between what they want and what they get, a phenomenon my collaborators and I have named choice blindness. The thesis consists of four co-authored papers, dealing with different aspects of the phenomenon. Paper one presents an initial set of studies using a computerised choice procedure, and discusses the relation of choice blindness to the parent phenomenon of change blindness. Paper (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Systems for Theory-Of-Mind : Taking the Second-Person Perspective.Ingar Brinck - unknown
    Apperly's and Butterfill's theory about belief reasoning is taken as a starting-point for a discussion of how we make sense of other people's actions in real time. More specifically, the focus lies on how we can understand others' actions in terms of their epistemic states on an implicit level of processing. First, the relevant parts of Apperly's and Butterfill's theory are summarized. Then, their account of implicit theory of mind in terms of registration ascription and perceptual encountering is discussed and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•