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  1. On the alleged illusion of conscious will.Marc van Duijn & Sacha Bem - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.
    The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity (...)
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  • The rotating spot method of timing subjective events.Susan Pockett & Arden Miller - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):241-254.
    The rotating spot method of timing subjective events involves the subject’s watching a rotating spot on a computer and reporting the position of the spot at the instant when the subjective event of interest occurs. We conducted an experiment to investigate factors that may impact on the results produced by this method, using the subject’s perception of when they made a simple finger movement as the subjective event to be timed. Seven aspects of the rotating spot method were investigated, using (...)
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  • The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.
    Benjamin Libet’s work paved the way for the neuroscientific study of free will. Other scientists have praised this research as groundbreaking. In philosophy, the reception has been more negative, often even dismissive. First, I will propose a diagnosis of this striking discrepancy. I will suggest that the experiments seem irrelevant, from the perspective of philosophy, due to the way in which they operationalize free will. In particular, I will argue that this operational definition does not capture free will properly and (...)
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  • Backward referral, flash-lags, and quantum free will: A response to commentaries on articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and trevena and Miller.Susan Pockett - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.
    The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the (...)
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  • Can Conscious Agency Be Saved?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):33-45.
    This paper is concerned with the role of conscious agency in human action. On a folk-psychological view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In the last decades, the development of new psychological and neuroscientific methods has made conscious agency an object of empirical investigation and yielded results that challenge the received wisdom. Most famously, the results of Libet’s studies on the ‘readiness potential’ have been interpreted by many as evidence in (...)
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  • Subjective reports of stimulus, response, and decision times in speeded tasks: How accurate are decision time reports?Jeff Miller, Paula Vieweg, Nicolas Kruize & Belinda McLea - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1013-1036.
    Four experiments examined how accurately participants can report the times of their own decisions. Within an auditory reaction time task, participants reported the time at which the tone was presented, they decided on the response, or the response key was pressed. Decision time reports were checked for plausibility against the actual RTs, and we compared the effects of experimental manipulations on these two measures to see whether the reported decision times showed appropriate effects. In addition, we estimated the amount of (...)
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  • Cortical movement preparation and conscious decisions: Averaging artifacts and timing biases.Jeff Miller & Judy Arnel Trevena - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):308-313.
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  • Brain signals do not demonstrate unconscious decision making: An interpretation based on graded conscious awareness.Jeff Miller & Wolf Schwarz - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:12-21.
    Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision . Given that a later event cannot cause an earlier one , such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously . We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in (...)
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  • Timing of conscious experience: Reply to the 2002 commentaries on Libet’s findings.Benjamin Libet - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
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  • Libet's timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries.Stanley Klein - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333.
    This issue of Consciousness and Cognition presents four target articles and eight commentaries on the target articles. The present article presents comments on those commentaries, grouped into backward referral and volition categories. Regarding backward referral: I disagree with my fellow commentators and take the unpopular position of defending Libet's notion of backward referral. I join my fellow commentators in critiquing Libet's notion of a 500-ms delay. I examine several of the hypotheses suggested by other commentators for why cortical and lateral (...)
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  • On experimental and philosophical investigations of mental timing: A response to commentary.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307.
    Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.
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  • Biases in the subjective timing of perceptual events: Libet et al. (1983) revisited.Adam N. Danquah, Martin J. Farrell & Donald J. O’Boyle - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):616-627.
    We report two experiments in which participants had to judge the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock. The experiments were based on the control condition used by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl [Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. . Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities : The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642] to correct for any bias in the (...)
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  • Distorted subjective reports of stimulus onsets under dual-task conditions: Delayed conscious perception or estimation bias?Daniel Bratzke, Donna Bryce & Tanja Seifried-Dübon - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:36-47.
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  • Inferior parietal lobule involved in representation of “what” in a delayed-action Libet task.Ondřej Bečev, Radek Mareček, Martin Lamoš, Bartosz Majchrowicz, Robert Roman & Milan Brázdil - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 93 (C):103149.
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  • On Timing Relations between Brain and World.William P. Banks - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-143.
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  • Biases in the subjective timing of perceptual events: Libet et al. (1983) revisited.Adam N. Danquah, Martin J. Farrell & Donald J. O’Boyle - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):616-627.
    We report two experiments in which participants had to judge the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock. The experiments were based on the control condition used by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl [Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. . Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities : The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642] to correct for any bias in the (...)
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