ZusammenfassungDer Krankheitsbegriff soll aus der Perspektive der klinischen Medizin am Beispiel der Radioonkologie dargestellt werden. Als theoretisches Modell zum ganzheitlichen Verständnis wird zunächst der interaktive Dualismus eingeführt. Danach wird die Interaktion zwischen Geist und Körper als wesentlich angesehen, um den Patienten mit Würde und Mitgefühl zu behandeln. Auch die Strahlentherapie erfordert nach ihrem Selbstverständnis einen ganzheitlichen Zugang zum Patienten. Demgegenüber zeigt die Analyse der aktuellen radioonkologischen Literatur einen reduktionistischen Krankheitsbegriff, der in erster Linie objektive Kriterien aus ärztlicher Sicht zur Definition (...) von Krankheit heranzieht. Im Dialog könnten stattdessen Arzt und Patient einen gemeinsamen Krankheitsbegriff entwickeln; hierbei finden im Sinne des interaktiven Dualismus gleichermaßen objektive ärztliche wie subjektive patientenbezogene Kriterien Berücksichtigung. Grenzen dieses neuen Konzepts erfordern eine besondere Beachtung und werden zuletzt erläutert. (shrink)

In the present paper it is argued that genetic interventions on human embryos are in principle permissible if they promote the health of the persons that these embryos will one day become and impermissible if they compromise their health. This so called health-intervention principle is reached by, inter alia, rejecting alternative approaches to the problem of the permissibility of genetic intervention. The health-intervention principle can be interpreted in different ways depending on how the notion of health is understood. The central (...) part of the paper is an attempt to find a concept of health which is such that it makes the health-intervention principle normatively plausible. For this purpose I examine two influential competing theories of health: Cristopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory of health and Lennart Nordenfelt’s welfare theory of health. I argue that the health-intervention principle is more plausible if health is understood in the latter sense, although it is not ruled out that the principle may be given an even more plausible explication in terms of some other notion of health. (shrink)

Although it is now generally acknowledged that new biomedical technologies often produce new definitions and sometimes even new concepts of disease, this observation is rarely used in research that anticipates potential ethical issues in emerging technologies. This article argues that it is useful to start with an analysis of implied concepts of disease when anticipating ethical issues of biomedical technologies. It shows, moreover, that it is possible to do so at an early stage, i.e. when a technology is only just (...) emerging. The specific case analysed here is that of ‘molecular medicine’. This group of emerging technologies combines a ‘cascade model’ of disease processes with a ‘personal pattern’ model of bodily functioning. Whereas the ethical implications of the first are partly familiar from earlier—albeit controversial—forms of preventive and predictive medicine, those of the second are quite novel and potentially far-reaching. (shrink)