Current developments in empirical moral psychology have spawned a new perspective on the traditional metaethical question of whether moral judgment is based on reason or emotion. Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists such as Joshua Greene argue that there is empirical evidence that emotion is essential for one particularly important subclass of moral judgments: so-called ?deontological judgments.? In this paper, I scrutinize this claim and argue that neither the empirical evidence for Greene's dual process-theory of moral judgment nor the normative conclusions it (...) is supposed to yield can be maintained. More specifically, I argue that the evidence from neuroimaging relies on a problematic reverse inference, that the behavioral data are flawed, and that the findings from focal brain damage do not support the model. From a normative point of view, Greene fails to show that we ought to discount the intuitions that give rise to deontological judgments because they respond to morally irrelevant factors: firstly, I show that they do not pick up on the factors Greene deems to be morally irrelevant in the first place, and secondly, I argue that there generally is reason to trust our deontological intuitions. (shrink)

The article explores education as a policy, as a power that moulds in a man “the correctness of the gaze.” A theory that we have called the special theory of education reveals the first image of education. The special theory of education considers education as a moulding matrix. The matrix consists of sets of special impact technologies by means of which it liberates the truths of the Dasein being’s experience hidden in the arete existentials. The special theory examines the Sophia (...) Republic policy, i.e., the power that regulates the ontological orientation and limits of self-realization of Dasein-mentalityabout’s being in accordance with the absolutized idea, ideal and values of “Those Who Transform the Universe.”. (shrink)