Zygmunt Ratajczyk was a deep and subtle mathematician who, with mastery, used sophisticated and technically complex methods, in particular combinatorial and proof-theoretic ones. Walking always along his own paths and being immune from actual trends and fashions he hesitated to publish his results, looking endlessly for their improvement.

Ratajczyk, Z., Subsystems of true arithmetic and hierarchies of functions, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 64 95–152. The combinatorial method coming from the study of combinatorial sentences independent of PA is developed. Basing on this method we present the detailed analysis of provably recursive functions associated with higher levels of transfinite induction, I, and analyze combinatorial sentences independent of I. Our treatment of combinatorial sentences differs from the one given by McAloon [18] and gives more natural sentences. The same (...) method give also a combinatorial technique with no use of the cut-elimination theorem which is appropriate to study proof-theoretic strength of subsystems of first order arithmetic and some of their expansions. It was used to analyze iterated reflection principle and system of transfinite induction with a satisfaction class. (shrink)

Two crucial concepts of the methodology and philosophy of mathematics are considered: proof and truth. We distinguish between informal proofs constructed by mathematicians in their research practice and formal proofs as defined in the foundations of mathematics (in metamathematics). Their role, features and interconnections are discussed. They are confronted with the concept of truth in mathematics. Relations between proofs and truth are analysed.

We give some information about new proofs of the incompleteness theorems, found in 1990s. Some of them do not require the diagonal lemma as a method of construction of an independent statement.

We study some variations of the so-called Hardy hierarchy of quickly growing functions, known from the literature, and obtain analogues of Ratajczyk's approximation lemma for them.

Continuing the earlier research from [T. Bigorajska, H. Kotlarski, Partitioning α-large sets: some lower bounds, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 358 4981–5001] we show that for the price of multiplying the number of parts by 3 we may construct partitions all of whose homogeneous sets are much smaller than in [T. Bigorajska, H. Kotlarski, Partitioning α-large sets: some lower bounds, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 358 4981–5001]. We also show that the Paris–Harrington independent statement remains unprovable if the number of colors is (...) restricted to 2, in fact, the statement is unprovable in IΣb. Other results concern some lower bounds for partitions of pairs. (shrink)

The proof-theoretic results on axiomatic theories oftruth obtained by different authors in recent years are surveyed.In particular, the theories of truth are related to subsystems ofsecond-order analysis. On the basis of these results, thesuitability of axiomatic theories of truth for ontologicalreduction is evaluated.

The main aim of our paper was to present three formal tools for comparing various axiomatic theories of truth. In Section 2 we aimed at showing that there are indeed many different approaches to defining a set of axioms for the notion of truth. In Section 3 we introduced three different \measures of strength" of axiomatic theories of truth, i.e. three reflexive and transitive relations on the set of axiomatic theories of truth. We have explained the intuition behind each of (...) them. The three relations were called : Fujimoto definability, model-theoretical strength, proof-theoretical strength. Then in the last section we described how they order the truth theories introduced in Section 2. We observed that theories made equivalent by the coarser relation can be strictly ordered by the next one. (shrink)

We introduce a principle of local collection for compositional truth predicates and show that it is arithmetically conservative over the classically compositional theory of truth. This axiom states that upon restriction to formulae of any syntactic complexity, the resulting predicate satisfies full collection. In particular, arguments using collection for the truth predicate applied to sentences occurring in any given (code of a) proof do not suffice to show that the conclusion of that proof is true, in stark contrast to the (...) case of the induction scheme. We analyse various further results concerning end-extensions of models of compositional truth and the collection scheme for the compositional truth predicate. (shrink)