The first part is an account of the Trinity Controversy, centering on the question of the identity of persons, and of the respects in which points made in the controversy, in particular the circularity objection, may have influenced Locke’s formulation of his theory. The second part argues that Locke is attempting to come to grips with the circularity problem, but that his solution is ultimately a failure. The argument of II, xxvii, 13 is analyzed in detail and the form of (...) Locke’s theory of relative identity is discussed. Fundamental difficulties are found to reside in his theories of representation and agency. (shrink)

Contentions about the origin of early modern empiricism have been floating about at least since the 1980s, where its exclusive “Britishness” was initially question, and the name of Gassendi was provocatively put forward as the putative “founder” of the current to the detriment of Francis Bacon. Recent scholarship has shown that early modern empiricism did not derive from philosophical speculation exclusively but had multiple sources and “foundations.” Yet, from a historical viewpoint, the question whether Bacon’s method had any influence on (...) the origin and development of Gassendi’s version of empiricism still carries significance, for its answer may open up different views on how the relation between British and “continental” empiricisms shall be framed. In this paper, I deal with Gassendi’s reception of Bacon. On the basis of a deep examination of Gassendi’s corpus, I contend that there is no trace of a consistent influence of Bacon on Gassendi’s empiricism before 1650s; although I show that an indirect influence can be found through the mediation of Peiresc, I put forward the hypothesis that it was more the empirical attitude characterizing Peiresc’s intellectual figure, rather than his interest in Baconianism, to be relevant, along with Epicurus’ philosophy, for Gassendi’s early empiricism. I then analyze Gassendi’s treatment of Bacon’s logic in Gassendi’s Syntagma philosophicum. I show that despite Gassendi’s sympathy for Bacon’s project, his own logic lays on fundamentally different assumptions. Despite this, I argue for Gassendi’s reception of Bacon’s theory of the idols in Syntagma philosophicum. On this basis, I conclude by restating the untenability of “national” accounts of the rise of empiricism, and the importance of highlighting instead the sharing of ideas between its actors. (shrink)

Recent studies of the social and political meanings of English science in the 17th century have often included only a cursory inspection of Locke's work. Conversely, detailed studies of Locke's theory of knowledge have tended to refrain from taking into serious consideration the social context of English science in that period. The paper explores the contribution of Locke's conception of experience to the rise of experimental philosophy as a new social force. It shows that Locke elaborated a doctrine that rendered (...) human experience the natural and nurtured means by which agents could discharge their duty to God and realize their right in God's dominion. Locke's account of the production of empirical knowledge thus delineated a theocentric system of a moral economy, which dovetailed with current advertisements of the new vocation of experimental philosophy. More particularly, Locke's debt to Boyle is manifested in their shared imagery of experience as a divine gift. While Boyle sought to encourage polite society to participate in cultivating the experimenter's gift, Locke propagated the view that proper conduct in the public sphere hinged on the recognition of the experimenter's findings as a new source of authority in everyday life.Keywords: empiricism; experimental philosophy; ideology; moral economy; gift economy. (shrink)