I argue from a hermeneutic point of view that formal elements of poetry can only be identified because poetry is based on both the phenomenon and the conception of poetry, both of which precede the attempt to identify formal elements as the defining moment of poetry. Furthermore, I argue with Gadamer that poetry is based on a rupture with and an epoche of our non-poetic use of language in such a way that it liberates “fixed” universal aspects of everyday language, (...) and that through establishing itself in a new, self-referential and monologue unity, it individualizes speech . From the hermeneutic position, poetry is a form of speaking rather than a “fixed” object. As such, I will try to make sense of what Paul Celan said in his famous “Meridian” speech: namely, that the poem is “actualized language, set free under the sign of a radical individuation, which at the same time stays mindful of the limits drawn by language, the possibilities opened by language.”. (shrink)

This article argues that the later philosophy of Wittgenstein has significant affinities with surrealist approaches to the ordinary. It links the question of ordinary language first to the dilemmas of poetic speech after Mallarmé, then to a current of thought on everyday life that emerges in France in the wake of surrealism. Finally, a reading of prose texts by Breton and Aragon brings together these two lines of argument, demonstrating that surrealism appeals to ordinary language and everyday life as a (...) remedy against the threat of scepticism. Surrealist manipulations of language are less a departure from the real than an attempt both to restore and to renew the human relation with the world. Obscured by its very familiarity, the everyday comes into view as what Cavell calls the ‘surrealism of the habitual’. (shrink)