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New life for Carnap's "Aufbau?"

Synthese 180 (2):265 - 299 (2011)

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  1. Carnap and the compulsions of interpretation: Reining in the liberalization of empiricism. [REVIEW]Sahotra Sarkar - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (3):353-372.
    Carnap’s work was instrumental to the liberalization of empiricism in the 1930s that transformed the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle to what came to be known as logical empiricism. A central feature of this liberalization was the deployment of the Principle of Tolerance, originally introduced in logic, but now invoked in an epistemological context in “Testability and Meaning”. Immediately afterwards, starting with Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, Carnap embraced semantics and turned to interpretation to guide the choice of a (...)
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  • Carnap's logical structure of the world.Chris Pincock - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):951-961.
    This article aims to give an overview of Carnap's 1928 book Logical Structure of the World or Aufbau and the most influential interpretations of its significance. After giving an outline of the book in Section 2 , I turn to the first sustained interpretations of the book offered by Goodman and Quine in Section 3 . Section 4 explains how this empirical reductionist interpretation was largely displaced by its main competitor. This is the line of interpretation offered by Friedman and (...)
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  • Carnap’s Logical Structure of the World. [REVIEW]Christopher Pincock - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):951-961.
    This article aims to give an overview of Carnap’s 1928 book Logical Structure of the World or Aufbau and the most influential interpretations of its significance. After giving an outline of the book in Section 2, I turn to the first sustained interpretations of the book offered by Goodman and Quine in Section 3. Section 4 explains how this empirical reductionist interpretation was largely displaced by its main competitor. This is the line of interpretation offered by Friedman and Richardson which (...)
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  • Constructing the World and Locating Oneself.Peter Pagin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):827-852.
    In Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Robert Stalnaker describes two opposed perspectives on the relation between the internal and the external. According to one, the internal world is taken as given and the external world as problematic, and according to the other, the external world is taken as given and the internal world as problematic. Analytic philosophy moved from the former to the latter, from problems of world-construction to problems of self-locating beliefs. I argue in this paper that these (...)
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  • Logic in general philosophy of science: old things and new things.Hannes Leitgeb - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):339 - 350.
    This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments.
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  • Theory structuralism in a rigid framework.Christian Damböck - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):693-713.
    This paper develops the first parts of a logical framework for the empirical sciences, by means of a redefinition of theory structuralism as originally developed by Joseph Sneed, Wolfgang Stegmüller, and others, in the context of a ‘rigid’ logic as based on a fixed (therefore rigid) ontology. The paper defends a formal conception of the empirical sciences that has an irreducible ontological basis and is unable, in general, to provide purely structural characterizations of the domain of a theory. The extreme (...)
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