Ishihara's problem of decidable variables asks which class of decidable propositional variables is sufficient to warrant classical theorems in intuitionistic logic. We present several refinements to the class proposed by Ishii for this problem, which also allows the class to cover Glivenko's logic. We also treat the extension of the problem to minimal logic, suggesting a couple of new classes.

Kalrnaric. We set out a system T, consisting of normal proofs constructed by means of elegantly symmetrical introduction and elimination rules. In the system T there are two requirements, called ( ) and ()), on applications of discharge rules. T is sound and complete for Kalmaric arguments. ( ) requires nonvacuous discharge of assumptions; ()) requires that the assumption discharged be the sole one available of highest degree. We then consider a 'Duhemian' extension T*, obtained simply by dropping the requirement (...) ()). T* is a proper subsystem of intuitionistic relevant logic. Our main result is that T* is a double negation consistency companion to classical logic. Thus all one needs to add to T* to obtain classical logic is the (intuitionistic) absurdity rule, and the (classical) rule of double nega-. (shrink)

In this paper we prove conservation theorems for theories of classical first-order arithmetic over their intuitionistic version. We also prove generalized conservation results for intuitionistic theories when certain weak forms of the principle of excluded middle are added to them. Members of two families of subsystems of Heyting arithmetic and Buss-Harnik’s theories of intuitionistic bounded arithmetic are the intuitionistic theories we consider. For the first group, we use a method described by Leivant based on the negative translation combined with a (...) variant of Friedman’s translation. For the second group, we use Avigad’s forcing method. (shrink)

In this note, we prove that certain theories of (many‐sorted) intuitionistic predicate logic are closed under the independence of premiss rule (IPR). As corollaries, we show that and extended by some non‐classical axioms and non‐constructive axioms are closed under IPR.

A notion of feasible function of finite type based on the typed lambda calculus is introduced which generalizes the familiar type 1 polynomial-time functions. An intuitionistic theory IPVω is presented for reasoning about these functions. Interpretations for IPVω are developed both in the style of Kreisel's modified realizability and Gödel's Dialectica interpretation. Applications include alternative proofs for Buss's results concerning the classical first-order system S12 and its intuitionistic counterpart IS12 as well as proofs of some of Buss's conjectures concerning IS12, (...) and a proof that IS12 cannot prove that extended Frege systems are not polynomially bounded. (shrink)

We constructively prove completeness for intuitionistic first-order logic, iFOL, showing that a formula is provable in iFOL if and only if it is uniformly valid in intuitionistic evidence semantics as defined in intuitionistic type theory extended with an intersection operator.Our completeness proof provides an effective procedure that converts any uniform evidence into a formal iFOL proof. Uniform evidence can involve arbitrary concepts from type theory such as ordinals, topological structures, algebras and so forth. We have implemented that procedure in the (...) Nuprl proof assistant.Our result demonstrates the value of uniform validity as a semantic notion for studying logical theories, and it provides new techniques for showing that formulas are not intuitionistically provable. Here we demonstrate its value for minimal and intuitionistic first-order logic. (shrink)

The paper presents a refined method of extracting reasonable and sometimes unexpected programs from classical proofs of formulas of the form ∀x∃yB . We also generalize previously known results, since B no longer needs to be quantifier-free, but only has to belong to a strictly larger class of so-called “goal formulas”. Furthermore we allow unproven lemmas D in the proof of ∀x∃yB , where D is a so-called “definite” formula.