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  1. Three Problems of Intersubjectivity—And One Solution.Wendelin Reich - 2010 - Sociological Theory 28 (1):40-63.
    Social thinkers often use the concept of intersubjectivity to mark out a problem of theoretical sociology: If people are unable to look into each others' minds, why do they often understand each other nonetheless? This issue has been debated extensively by philosophers and sociologists in three largely disconnected discourses. The article investigates the three discourses for isolable ideas that can be fitted into a sociological answer to the problem of intersubjectivity. An interactional solution, fully coherent with key insights from the (...)
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  • The origins of folk psychology.George Graham - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (December):357-79.
    Folk psychology is the psychology deployed by ordinary folk and by scientists in ordinary life. At its most basic level, it consists of deploying the concept of mind to explain and predict behavior. This article (i) considers how folk psychology may have begun, by considering an imaginary race of primitive folk deploying the rudimentary nucleus of the psychology, or a rudimentary concept of mind, and (ii) examines one argument for the evolutionary emergence and adaptivity of folk psychology. The crucial issue (...)
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  • Connection or Competition: Identity and Personhood in Feminist Ethics.Grace M. Jantzen - 1992 - Studies in Christian Ethics 5 (1):1-20.
  • Eliminacija eliminativizama.Davor Pecnjak - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):19-33.
    In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.
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