We group the existing variants of the familiar set-theoretical and truth-theoretical paradoxes into two classes: connective paradoxes, which can in principle be ascribed to the presence of a contracting connective of some sort, and structural paradoxes, where at most the faulty use of a structural inference rule can possibly be blamed. We impute the former to an equivocation over the meaning of logical constants, and the latter to an equivocation over the notion of consequence. Both equivocation sources are tightly related, (...) and can be cleared up by adopting a particular substructural logic in place of classical logic. We then argue that our perspective can be justified via an informational semantics of contraction-free substructural logics. (shrink)

Humberstone asks whether every theorem of BCI provably implies $\phi\to\phi$ for some formula $\phi$. Meyer conjectures that the axiom $\mathbf{B}$ does not imply any such "self-implication." We prove a slightly stronger result, thereby confirming Meyer's conjecture.

We show the admissibility for BCI of a rule form of the characteristic implicational axiom of abelian logic, this rule taking us from →β to α. This is done in Section 8, with surrounding sections exploring the admissibility and derivability of various related rules in several extensions of BCI.

In this paper we consider the implicational fragment of Abelian logic \ . We show that although the Abelian groups provide an semantics for the set of theorems of \ they do not for the associated consequence relation. We then show that the consequence relation is not algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi . In the second part of the paper, we investigate an extension of \ in the same language and having the same set of theorems and (...) show that this new consequence relation is algebraizable with the Abelian groups as its equivalent algebraic semantics. Finally, we show that although \ is not algebraizable, it is order-algebraizable in the sense of Raftery. (shrink)

Defines and examines a notion of logical friendliness, a broadening of the familiar notion of classical consequence. Also reviews familiar notions and operations with which friendliness makes contact, providing a new light in which they may be seen.