This paper takes part in the ongoing debate on how emotions can be dealt with by argumentation theory. Its main goal is to formulate a relationship between emotion and argumentation which differs from that usually found in most of the literature on the subject. In the “standard” conception, emotions are seen as the objects of appeals which function as adjuvants to argumentation: speakers appeal to pity, fear, shame and the like in order to enhance the cogency of an argument which (...) bears on something else—whether it be the validity of a disputable opinion or the opportunity of a course of action. According to the “alternative” conception which I propose to consider, emotions themselves may be viewed, in some cases, as the very objects of argumentation. This conception lays emphasis on the arguability of emotions. Drawing on insights from current psychological and philosophical theories, it involves a reassessment of the Aristotelian concept of pathos, as well as an in-depth critical discussion of normative and descriptive approaches to emotional appeals. (shrink)

Shame appeals may be both relevant to and make possible argumentation with reluctant addressees. I propose a normative pragmatic model of practical reasoning involved in shame appeals and show that its explanatory power exceeds that of a more traditional account of an underlying practical inference structure. I also illustrate that analyzing the formal propriety of shame appeals offers a more complete explanation of their normative pragmatic force than an application of rules for dialogue types.

This study is a socio-pragmatic analysis of persuasive strategies used by the participants in “al-ittijāh al-muʿākis”, “The Opposite Direction”, on the Al-­Jazeera TV channel. An ethnographic approach was adopted in the research; the analysis focused on the use of politeness strategies and face-saving and face-­threatening interactions in order to find out their persuasive factors. I observe that religious citations, prophetic sayings, proverbs, and metaphor are used predominantly by the participants in communicating various political issues. I argue that the persuasiveness of (...) these rhetorical strategies stems from their aesthetic influence in establishing moral credibility and in evoking emotional responses. I also argue that these rhetorical strategies are speech acts that indirectly provoke responses and/or aim at saving the speakers’ and/or addressees’ face. The study concludes that persuasiveness is facilitated in part by transferring socio-pragmatic meanings through the use of some politeness and figurative devices such as honorific modes, metaphors and proverbs. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, it seems plausible to say that fear appeals are designed to induce action—to generate persuasive force for addressees to act in order to avoid a fearful outcome (Walton 2000, 1-2, 20, 22, 143; Witte 1994, 113; Witte 1992, 329). Because a fear appeal is a kind of argument about harmful consequences, and because arguments about harmful consequences are commonplace in deliberations, fear appeals are practically inevitable in civic discourse. And, as some scholars have recently confirmed, making fear appeals (...) may be appropriate in civic discourse (Walton 2000, 139; Pfau 2007, 228). The challenge is to explain how they generate persuasive force—how they reasonably pressure addressees to act as the .. (shrink)

How do social actors get addressees to stop retreating to metadiscussions that derail ground-level discussions, and why do they expect the strategies to work? The question is of both theoretical and practical interest, especially with regard to ground-level discussions of systemic sexism and racism derailed by qualifying “not all men” and “not all white people” perform the sexist or racist actions that are the topic of discussion. I use a normative pragmatic approach to analyze two exemplary messages designed to halt (...) retreats to metadiscussions about using “not all men” and “not all white people” qualifiers in discussions of systemic sexism and racism. I find that social actors use strategies that may at first glance appear to be out of bounds in an ideal critical discussion—e.g., demanding, shouting, cussing, sarcasm, name-calling—to cultivate a context where using not-all qualifiers becomes increasingly costly. The strategies are designed to get addressees to recognize that using not-all qualifiers is not an epistemic correction of a hasty generalization or ethical intervention to halt promulgation of stereotypes about men and white people. Instead, the strategies display that using not-all qualifiers is a fallible sign of willful hermeneutical ignorance, willful ignorance, and an attempt to reassert a measure of social dominance. These findings affirm the need to investigate the various strategies and normative materials social actors actually bring to bear to regulate disagreement. (shrink)

Douglas Walton has been right in calling us to attend to the pragmatics of argument. He has, however, also insisted that arguments should be understood and assessed by considering the functions they perform; and from this, I dissent. Argument has no determinable function in the sense Walton needs, and even if it did, that function would not ground norms for argumentative practice. As an alternative to a functional theory of argumentative pragmatics, I propose a design view, which draws attention to (...) the way participants strategically undertake and impose norms on themselves in order for their arguments to have force. (shrink)

The concern for the role of emotion in argumentative encounters has rested upon the concept of emotion as arguments, emotions to obtain the adherence of the audience and reflect the virtues of a good arguer. In this paper, we focus on understanding emotion and argumentation based on cognitive approaches that identify the relationship between the two elements, to propose the use of emotion regulation strategies in deliberative dialogue. Bearing in mind that the intensity of emotional responses may, in some cases, (...) hamper one’s capacity to solve problems during a practical argument, we suggest that the use of emotion regulation strategies may favor deliberative dialogue, leading to more adaptive emotional responses and, in turn, better argumentative encounters, rendering decision-making more efficient. This article conceptualizes argumentation, revealing the historical path of emotion in studies on argumentation. It presents the concepts of emotion and emotion regulation, followed by the function of emotion regulation in argumentative encounters, illustrating this in two different situations. We conclude with the contribution made by the use of strategies for emotion regulation during deliberative dialogue. (shrink)

Natural normativity describes the means whereby social and cultural controls are placed on argumentative behaviour. The three main components of this are Goals, Context, and Ethos, which combine to form a dynamic and situational framework. Natural normativity is explained in light of Pragma-dialectics, Informal Logic, and Rhetoric. Finally, the theory is applied to the Biro-Siegel challenge.

I inquire into the issue of how to evaluate fear appeals. I propose modifications to Douglas Walton's position in Scare Tactics: Arguments that Appeal to Fear and Threats that will help improve assessment of fear appeals in complex argumentation such as political discourse. Walton has argued for attending to the underlying practical inference structure involved in fear appeals as well as the type of dialogue in which they occur. I propose, first, that theorists understand the practical reasoning not in terms (...) of an underlying inferential structure but rather as an account of how discourse strategies give fear appeals force; and, second, that theorists not deduce norms and standards from so-called dialogue types but rather explain how discourse strategies engage norms of argumentation that give fear appeals force. This approach generates a normative pragmatic theory of fear appeals that has more explanatory power than Walton's theory, because it explains how discourse strategies agents actually use engage norms of argumentation and are therefore compelling. I submit that compelling fear appeals are designed to show addressees risks to themselves of not carefully assessing the fearful circumstances and risks to the arguer of misjudging whether circumstances merit fear. (shrink)

I submit that arguers may use apostrophe to pressure reluctant auditors to adhere to norms of argumentation, and illustrate with the exemplary case of Abraham Lincoln’s 1860 speech at Cooper Union. Lincoln uses apostrophe to manifest the norm of tenta-tively considering a reasonable case and to discharge his obligation to adhere to the norm; and in doing so pressures auditors to adhere to it.

This paper pictures emotions as able to provide reasons for action in so far as the beliefs and desires which make up reasons for action are constitutive elements of emotions themselves. It claims that the states of the world which prompt emotional attitudes “justify” them in so far as they render the beliefs constitutive of those attitudes true. Finally, it addresses the question what can make the desires or valuings ingredient to emotions appropriate to their objects.