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Philosophy of Science

In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan (2002)

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  1. The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.Andrew Brook & Pete Mandik - 2007 - Analyse & Kritik 29 (1):3-23.
    A movement dedicated to applying neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and using philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience began about twenty-five years ago. Results in neuroscience have affected how we see traditional areas of philosophical concern such as perception, belief-formation, and consciousness. There is an interesting interaction between some of the distinctive features of neuroscience and important general issues in the philosophy of science. And recent neuroscience has thrown up a few conceptual issues that philosophers are perhaps best trained (...)
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  • How mechanisms explain interfield cooperation: biological–chemical study of plant growth hormones in Utrecht and Pasadena, 1930–1938.Caterina Schürch - 2017 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 39 (3):16.
    This article examines to what extent a particular case of cross-disciplinary research in the 1930s was structured by mechanistic reasoning. For this purpose, it identifies the interfield theories that allowed biologists and chemists to use each other’s techniques and findings, and that provided the basis for the experiments performed to identify plant growth hormones and to learn more about their role in the mechanism of plant growth. In 1930, chemists and biologists in Utrecht and Pasadena began to cooperatively study plant (...)
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  • Rules are Laws: an Argument against Holism.Anne Ruth Mackor - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (3):215-232.
    In this paper I argue against the holistic claim that the description and explanation of human behaviour is irreducibly social in nature. I focus on the more specific thesis that human behaviour is rule-guided and that 'rule' is an irreducibly social notion. Against this claim I defend a teleofunctional and reductionist view. Following Millikan (1990), who argues that 'rule' can be explicated in functional terms, I extend her argument to cover social rules as well, and argue that rules are laws. (...)
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  • Real Knowledge. The problem of content in neural epistemics.J. J. M. Sleutels - unknown