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  1. Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW]Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):205-14.
    In a recent article in this journal (Adams and Aizawa 1992), Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa argued that Jerry Fodor's proposed naturalistic sufficient condition for meaning is unsatisfactory. In this paper, I respond to Adams and Aizawa, noting that (1) they have overestimated the importance of their “pathologies” objection, perhaps as a consequence of misunderstanding Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition, (2) they have misunderstood Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition in formulating their Twin Earth objection, and (3) they have, in addition to under (...)
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  • On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought.Robert D. Rupert - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):95-131.
    Naturalistically minded philosophers hope to identify a privileged nonsemantic relation that holds between a mental representation m and that which m represents, a relation whose privileged status underwrites the assignment of reference to m. The naturalist can accomplish this task only if she has in hand a nonsemantic criterion for individuating mental representations: it would be question-begging for the naturalist to characterize m, for the purpose of assigning content, as 'the representation with such and such content'. If we individuate mental (...)
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  • A dilemma for asymmetric dependence.Joseph Mendola - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):232-257.
    Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter.
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  • Content Naturalized.Luciano B. Mariano - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (2):205-238.
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  • Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.
    In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...)
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  • Causal relevance and the mental : towards a non-reductive metaphysics.Brian Jonathan Garrett - 1996 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
    My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states, then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim that our explanatory practice should guide our (...)
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