In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first lay out Searle?s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, (...) social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle?s legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle?s legal positivism. (shrink)

Nursing as normative praxisThe purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it introduces a variety of concepts of ‘praxis’, and argues in support of those which reflect the normative dimension of the critical social perspective. This begins with the Aristotelian concept, and moves through a variety of sources, including Hannah Arendt and Paulo Freire, but focuses primarily, and uniquely in the nursing literature, upon the work of the Yugoslavian ‘praxis Marxists’. Second, specific ways of conceiving nursing as praxis are outlined, (...) including political, aesthetic and ethical forms which have immediate import for nurses. The paper concludes with brief suggestions as to how these ways of conceiving praxis may be used by nurses to develop a more intimate and productive understanding of their own practices. (shrink)

Academics and practitioners: nurses as intellectuals In the author's experience, nurse educators working in universities generally accept that they are ‘academics’, but dismiss suggestions that they are ‘intellectuals’ because they see it as a pretentious description referring to a small number of academics and aesthetes who inhabit a conceptual world beyond the imaginative capacity of most other people. This paper suggests that the concept of the ‘intellectual’, if not the word itself, be admitted into nursing discourse through the adoption of (...) a non‐élitist Gramscian understanding, similar to the more recently formulated conception of the reflective practitioner. According to the Italian Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci, intellectuals are those people who develop ways in which to construct the conditions of their own existence, a possibility he believed was open to all. It is suggested that, from a Gramscian perspective, all nurses are intellectuals to varying degrees, and nurse educators should not only be nurturing their own intellectualism but also the potential for intellectualism as it exists within each individual. The ways in which this project are related to Habermasian critical theory are also briefly outlined. (shrink)

This study elucidates and appraises a conception of praxis developed by the Yugoslav Marxist Mihailo Markovi . This notion is first distinguished from everyday and alternative theoretical uses of 'practice', 'practical', and 'praxis' . Markovic's view is then characterized as a normative, pluralistic theory of both human being and doing. Praxis , for Markovi , is activity which realizes one's best potentialities: (i) the humanly generic dispositions of intentionality, self-determination, creativity, sociality, and rationality, and (ii) one's relatively distinctive abilities and (...) bents compatible with (i). Following a critical analysis of Markovic's attempts to justify praxis as norm, two substantive criticisms are advanced. The theory needs (i) priority rules for the relative weighting of praxis components when they cannot all be (fully) realized in an action, and (ii) a specification of the genus praxis so as to recognize important differences among optimal activities which shape things, construct theories, rear children, and share with mature persons. (shrink)

In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, (...) social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle’s legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle’s legal positivism. (shrink)