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  1. Utility of Gambling when Events are Valued: an Application of Inset Entropy. [REVIEW]C. T. Ng, R. Duncan Luce & A. A. J. Marley - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (1):23-63.
    The present theory leads to a set of subjective weights such that the utility of an uncertain alternative (gamble) is partitioned into three terms involving those weights—a conventional subjectively weighted utility function over pure consequences, a subjectively weighted value function over events, and a subjectively weighted function of the subjective weights. Under several assumptions, this becomes one of several standard utility representations, plus a weighted value function over events, plus an entropy term of the weights. In the finitely additive case, (...)
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  • Purity, Resistance, and Innocence in Utility Theory.R. Duncan Luce - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):109-118.
    This note addresses 3 issues that seem to pervade much of economic thought about individual decisions among uncertain alternatives: (1) Restricting primitives to just orderings of first-order gambles and not admitting, e.g., compound acts or joint receipt of consequences and gambles. (2) Great resistance to experimental findings that strongly suggest that most current theories fail descriptively. (3) Taking for granted the innocence of some assumptions when, in fact, they are not innocent, e.g., that constant acts are idempotent. My conclusion is (...)
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  • Testing transitivity in choice under risk.Michael H. Birnbaum & Ulrich Schmidt - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (4):599-614.
    Recently proposed models of risky choice imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. This study explored whether people show the predicted intransitivity of the two models proposed to account for the certainty effect in Allais paradoxes. In order to distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice (...)
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  • New paradoxes of risky decision making.Michael H. Birnbaum - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (2):463-501.
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