This dissertation is a defense of a particular theory of the metaphysics of time which I call "accretivism", but which is popularly known in a form usually called the "Growing Block Theory". The goal of a metaphysics of time is to incorporate the various aspects of our temporal experience into a single, comprehensive whole. To this end I delineate five aspects of our ordinary experience of time: 1) The Tensed Aspect, in virtue of which objects are presented to us as (...) past, present, or future; 2) The Transitory Aspect, in virtue of which time passes or "flows"; 3) The Durational Aspect, in virtue of which entities have a certain temporal extent; 4) The Structural Aspect, in virtue of which entities are given as being in temporal relations to one another, and 5) The Differential-Repetitive Aspect, in virtue of which things are different from one time to another, and yet there is a certain recurrence of aspects of our experience form one time to another. I contrast the accretivist picture of time, according to which that which is past and that which is present both have ontological status, but nothing which is future has ontological status, and in which temporal passage consists in the coming-into-being of new entities at the temporal edge of reality marked by the present, with the two dominant theories of time in the contemporary literature: 1) presentism, according to which only that which is present has ontological status, and 2) four-dimensionalism, according to which time is to be understood on analogy with spatial dimensions. Accretivism, I argue, is superior to the other two views in virtue of the fact that it gives full status to both the Structural Aspect of Time, for which the presentist has difficulty accounting, and the Transitory Aspect of Time, for which the four-dimensionalist has difficulty accounting. I then defend the accretivist picture against a variety of objections that might be raised to it. (shrink)

This dissertation is based on Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action. Habermas uses communicative action as his main notion for distinguishing among four types of social actions: teleological, normatively regulated, dramaturgical and communicative action. The main characteristics of communicative action are: the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action, who try to reach an understanding about the interpretation of what constitutes the action situation, and who try to coordinate their actions by way of agreement, or "consensus." (...) ;Our main task is to apply the lessons learned about communicative action to two pre-Han Chinese traditions in the context of "words-deeds." I will emphasize the prominence of li, ritual action in the Confucian tradition, and te, potency, and tzu-jan, spontaneity in the Taoist tradition. ;I shall inter-relate the Confucian li, t'i, cheng-ming, and tao and similarly wu-wei, wu-chih, wu-yu, t'i$\sb4$ and tao for the Taoists and show how they form an "integrated" concept cluster. This will bring about a rapprochement between the Confucian and Taoist as a "fusion of horizons." We can take our stance between the two traditions to give us a better perspective to discover the shift in paradigm from a more yang to a more yin tradition. Correlatively, the main thrust of Taoism is a criticism of the Confucian ideology of the "tao of moral suasion." ;In general, the Confucian and Taoist sages are expert hermeneutic practitioners. They can explicate the relation between words and deeds, which abound in the Analects and in Mencius. They also can interpret the polarity between knowledge and action, which, in the Taoist case, becomes the "discarding of knowledge" , and wu-wei, of acting in a non-interfering way. ;We would also stress the side of "communicative receptivity," which builds upon the "passive" and "active" aspects of communicative action. In this regard, the Taoist concepts wu-wei, wu-chih, wu-yu, emphasize the non-contending, non-competitive aspects of our communicative receptivities. We will advance a concept of Chinese "sweet reasonableness" instead of the Western stress on "rationality." The clue to this reasonableness is the paradigm exemplified in Chuang-tzu's "goblet rationality," which is a metaphorical-evocative method of creating new and startling meanings, values, and significances. (shrink)