The settlements surrounding the Exxon Valdez oil spill prove to be an interesting case of retributive and corrective justice in regard to damage to the ecology of the commons, particularly in light of the recent Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico. After reviewing the harm done to the ecology of Prince William Sound by the spill, and an account of Exxon Corporation’s responsibility, I examine the details of the litigation, particularly the Supreme Court decision in this matter. In (...) the early settlement, there is a clear disproportion between damage awards to plaintiffs representing the current economic users of Prince William Sound versus the trustees for the Sound’s commons. I argue that the disproportion reveals not only a thoroughly economic understanding of ecological commons, but bias in the treatment of its current economic users, as opposed to an understanding of such ecologies as true commons shared over generations. I argue that such biases fail reasonable moral tests and do not stand up to common principles of retributive justice. I end by suggesting a legal maneuver to correct such tendencies. (shrink)

Methods of punishing corporations have changed from self-regulation to economic sanctions by government as corporations have evolved from small groups of entrepreneurs to multinational entities. It is proposed that the next stage in the evolution of punishment methods is modified vendettas, or organized attempts by non-government groups to influence corporations through the application of economic and non-economic sanctions.This paper develops the concept of modified vendettas as a complement to government-initiated economic sanctions. The effectiveness of modified vendettas is analyzed through two (...) case examples. As with any punishment method, however, the usefulness of a modified vendetta depends not only on its effectiveness but also on how well it meets society's needs to monitor and check corporate activity while preserving corporations' rights to operate. To resolve this issue, modified vendettas are assessed using a philosophical framework incorporating both retributive and utilitarian principles. It is found that modified vendettas extend society's ability to control corporate behavior while corporations have legal and public relations means to protect themselves from frivolous use of the technique. Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked? (Baron Thurlow). (shrink)

This essay provides a critical overview of the debate about corporate moral responsibility. Parties to the debate address whether corporations are the kinds of entities that can be blamed when they cause unjustified harm. Proponents of CMR argue that corporations satisfy the conditions for moral agency and so they are fit for blame. Their opponents respond that corporations lack one or more of the capacities necessary for moral agency. I review the arguments on both sides and conclude ultimately that what (...) divides the two is not so much competing conceptions of the corporation as it is disagreement about what moral agency requires. Homing in on the real site of contention will, it is hoped, allow future participants in the debate to focus their efforts more productively. (shrink)

The idea that business firms qualify as group moral agents offers an attractive basis for understanding corporate moral responsibility. However, that idea gives rise to the “corporate autonomy problem” (CAP): if firms are moral agents, then it seems we must accept the implausible conclusion that firms have basic moral rights, such as the rights to life and liberty. The question, then, is how one might retain the fruitful idea of firms as moral agents, yet avoid CAP. A common approach to (...) avoiding CAP appeals to specific features of human embodiment, such as vulnerability to pain, as the basis for attributing moral rights to human persons but not to firms. But that response has less purchase in a Kantian framework, which does not ground moral status in such particularities of human embodiment, but rather in the rational nature that humans share with other rational beings. To avoid CAP while retaining a (broadly) Kantian framework, one does better to rely on features of firms as cooperative, compositionally derivative moral agents, created for the pursuit of specific ends. As derivative agents, firms do not qualify as Kantian ends in themselves, and thus are not appropriate bearers of basic moral rights. To further clarify the level of consideration we owe to firms, I draw on Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and moral esteem, arguing that we should not respect firms as unconditional ends in themselves, but rather esteem morally autonomous firms as collective achievements of their human members. (shrink)

Ethicists and legal theorists have proposed models of corporate culpability that shift the standard of guilt determination from vicariousattribution of individual action and intention to an assessment of culture, policies, as well as organizational action and inaction. This paper briefly reviews four prominent models of corporate culpability, arguing that each makes claims that extend well beyond the limits of existing law. As an alternative to these models, a constructive corporate fault is described that relies on both objective and subjective reasonableness (...) judgments. The paper concludes with a consideration of constructive corporate fault in relation to an Accountability model of corporate liability. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper explores an ontological approach to the issue of whether corporations, like individuals, are morally responsible for their actions. More specifically, we investigate the identity of organizations relative to the individuals that compose them. Based on general systems theory, the traditional assumption is that social collectives are more complex, variable, and loosely coupled than individuals. This assumption rests on two premises. The first is a view of the individual as simple, stable, and tightly coupled (i.e., unitary). The second premise (...) is that the relationship between social collectives and their members is characterized by the complete inclusion of individuals in higher order systems.We examine the social science literature that bears on these premises and conclude that they are false. The differences between organizations and individuals in the magnitude of complexity or variability appear to be minimal or nonexistent. An implication of our analysis is that individuals and organizations are coterminous and, therefore, inseparable as moral agents. (shrink)

The number of corporate apologies has increased dramatically during the past decade. This article delves into the ethics of apologies offered by chief executive officers (CEOs). It examines ways in which public apologies on the part of a representative (CEO) of a corporate body (the firm) differ from both private, interpersonal apologies, on the one hand, and nation-state/collective apologies, on the other. The article then seeks to ground ethically desirable elements of a corporate apology in the nature or essence of (...) the corporate apology itself. It explores the largely ignored roles played by the speaker’s ethos and audience pathos in genuine or ethical apologies and suggests that attention needs to be paid to the problems posed by “role contamination,” context, and other overlooked factors. The reception by the actual audience of a given apology is a highly contingent matter. Ethicists should concentrate, therefore, on what makes a proffered apology, in principle, trustworthy and not merely efficacious for a given audience. (shrink)

In his 2007 Ethics article, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Philip Pettit argued that corporations qualify as morally responsible agents because they possess autonomy, normative judgment, and the capacity for self-control. Although there is ongoing debate over whether corporations have these capacities, both proponents and opponents of corporate moral agency appear to agree that Pettit correctly identified the requirements for moral agency. In this article, I do not take issue with either the claim that autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are the requirements for (...) moral agency or the claim that corporations possess them. I claim that if both of these claims are correct, then corporate moral agency entails that, in a liberal democracy, corporations should have the right to vote. I show that under the conception of democracy supported by most liberal political theorists, all parties subject to the law are entitled to the right to vote, and all parties that possess autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are subject to the law. Therefore, if the proponents of corporate moral agency are correct, then corporations satisfy the requirements for the right to vote. I then consider potential objections to this argument. I show that the strongest objection to the corporate right to vote is undermined by Pettit’s own argument for corporate autonomy. I then show that objections derived from other arguments for limiting the rights of corporations are equally unavailing. I conclude with some observations about the implications of my argument for the question of corporate speech rights. (shrink)

Vicarious responsibility is sometimes analysed by considering the different kinds of agents involved—who is vicariously responsible for the actions of whom? In this paper, I discuss vicarious responsibility from a different angle: in what sense is the vicarious agent responsible? I do this by considering the ways in which one may take responsibility for events caused by another agent or process. I discuss three senses of taking responsibility—accepting fault, assuming obligations, and fulfilling obligations—and the forms of vicarious responsibility that correspond (...) to these. I end by explaining how to judge which sense applies in a given case, based on the degree of (what I call) moral entanglement between the agent and what they should take responsibility for. (shrink)

Vicarious responsibility is a notoriously puzzling notion in normative reasoning. In this article we will explore two fundamental issues, which we will call the “explication problem” and the “justification problem”. The former issue concerns how vicarious responsibility can plausibly be defined in terms of other normative concepts. The latter issue concerns how ascriptions of vicarious responsibility can be justified. We will address these two problems by combining ideas taken from legal theory and moral philosophy. Our analysis will emphasise the importance (...) of the voluntary involvement of the normative parties considered liable in a relation with other normative parties who causally contributed to a prohibited state-of-affairs. (shrink)

Models of moral responsibility rely on foundational views about moral agency. Many scholars believe that only humans can be moral agents, and therefore business needs to create models that foster greater receptivity to others through ethical dialog. This view leads to a difficulty if no specific person is the sole causal agent for an act, or if something comes about through aggregated action in a corporate setting. An alternate approach suggests that corporations are moral agents sufficiently like humans to be (...) treated as persons, which leads to questions of intentionality and the organizational structure required to support the claim. In this article, I make an intermediate claim combining Goodpaster and Matthews' (60:132–141, 1982 ) view that a corporation may have a moral culture which affects subjective choices, with those of Painter-Morland (17(3):515–534, 2007 ) who points out that we should move from a model that posits discrete persons acting on each other to one where morality comes about through shared experience between agents who participate in each other’s lives. I argue that the discussion has been trapped in traditional dichotomies, and is better served by language that more accurately represents the dynamic interplay between organization and individual. I underwrite this claim by looking at recent changes in British and American legal approaches to corporate responsibility. These provide greater incentives for owners and business leaders to encourage employees to discuss the reflexive nature of legal and moral responsibility in business, facilitate workers to voice their moral concerns, and create structures and processes that allow those concerns to be heard. (shrink)

The phenomenon of distributed knowledge is well-known in epistemic logic. In this paper, a similar phenomenon in ethics, somewhat neglected so far, is investigated, namely distributed morality. The article explains the nature of distributed morality, as a feature of moral agency, and explores the implications of its occurrence in advanced information societies. In the course of the analysis, the concept of infraethics is introduced, in order to refer to the ensemble of moral enablers, which, although morally neutral per se, can (...) significantly facilitate or hinder both positive and negative moral behaviours. (shrink)

I argue that state apologies face a distinctive normative challenge. The reason for this is that when states apologize for their transgressions, they tend to implicate their citizens as morally responsible. However, because citizens are coerced into supporting state activities through taxation, I argue that their responsibility is mitigated. Citizens do not support state transgressions in the same way that private investors support corporate transgressions. Consequently, state apologies have a distinctive difficulty performing one of the core normative functions of apologies (...) – namely, the admission of moral responsibility on behalf of a morally responsible party (or parties). Because of this, state apologies might be normatively deficient, and we should doubt their ability to provide robust moral repair. (shrink)