Resumo Neste artigo, vamos considerar o recente debate na metafísica da evolução, no que diz respeito tanto à persistência como à “mudança” em espécies biológicas, segundo a tese que considera a espécie como o agregado de indivíduos. Centrar-nos-emos na proposta de Thomas Reydon, que argumenta que em biologia, o termo “espécie” refere-se a duas entidades biológicas, por si denominadas evolverons e phylons, que desempenham vários papéis epistemológicos em pelo menos duas disciplinas diferentes, nomeadamente na biologia sistemática e na biologia evolutiva. (...) Em particular, analisamos criticamente a alegação de Reydon, que estas duas entidades biológicas geraram um problema para a tese que sustém a equivalência entre duas teorias de persistência, desenvolvidas pela metafísica analítica contemporânea: o tri–Dimensionalismo e tetra–Dimensionalismo. Neste artigo, pretende-se restaurar a tese da equivalência metafísica, recorrendo a uma tripla estratégia: promover a ideia de que os evolverons e os “phylons” são duas dimensões de uma mesma realidade; recorrer a uma noção menos problemática noção de endurantismo e, por último, destacar alguns problemas que surgem dos exemplos biológicos empregues por Reydon para basear o desenvolvimento dos seus argumentos. Palavras-chave : conceito de espécie, endurantismo, equivalência metafísica entre 3D e 4D, espécies biológicas sincrónicas e diacrónicas, persistênciaIn this paper we revise a recent debate on the metaphysics of evolution pertaining to both the persistence and change of biological species, and the species-as-individuals thesis. We focus on Thomas Reydon’s proposal that, in biology, the term “species” refers to two different biological entities, which he calls evolverons and phylons, and plays different epistemological roles in at least two different disciplines in which it is used, namely, evolutionary and systematic biology. In particular, we critically revise Reydon’s claim that these two biological entities raise a problem for the thesis of the equivalence between the two theories of persistence developed in contemporary analytic metaphysics: three–dimensionalism and four–dimensionalism. In this paper, we aim to reinstate the thesis of metaphysical equivalence by a threefold strategy: motivation of the idea that evolverons and phylons are two dimensions of the same entity, shifting to a less problematic notion of endurance, and an exploration of doubts about the particular biological examples upon which Reydon bases his arguments. Keywords : 3D / 4D metaphysical equivalence, endurantism, persistence, species concept, synchronic and diachronic biological species. (shrink)

According to the “received view” the disagreement between endurantism and perdurantism is ontological and concerns the existence of temporal parts of continuants. In a recent paper, argues that the ontological conception of these theories does not address the crucial point: explaining the way things persist. According to Wasserman, perdurantism is not just the view that things have temporal parts; it is the view that things persist by having temporal parts. Moreover, in the last decade an alternative understanding of the dispute (...) between endurantism and perdurantism, the so called “locative turn”, has lead to an understanding of these two theories as concerning crucially locational rather than mereological notions. Our main aim in this paper is to bring together those two revisionary approaches to the received view, and show how they can enrich each other and open up further dimension of the debate. Finally in the last section we focus on some of the non-standard accounts of persistence and location that arise from this approach, such as “autonomism of persistence and location” and “reverse locational endurantism/perdurantism”. (shrink)

This paper aims at bringing together two debates in metaphysics that so far have been kept separate: the debate about determinism vs. indeterminism as de re modality on the one hand, and the debate about persistence on the other hand. Both debates significantly involve talk of things. We will show that working out a proper semantics for singular terms and an accompanying theory of things, motivated by considerations of quantified modal logic, can significantly further the persistence debate. We will use (...) our semantic framework to give an argument in support of the endurantist position as the best theory of persistence. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that things persist, though thinkers disagree over what persistence consist in. Views about time are closely related to views about persistence, though some have questioned the compatibility of certain combinations, such as Jonathan Tallant’s recent argument that presentism is incompatible with all views of persistence, including endurantism. We believe that such arguments can be avoided with neutral definitions of the terms. However, a nearly exhaustive investigation of contemporary literature revealed that, except for two that we could (...) find, all definitions of “persist,” “endure,” and derivatives are incompatible with presentism! And, the exceptions fail to capture endurantist intuitions about endurance. But we believe that present-friendly and intuitive definitions of these concepts can be given. In this paper we offer such definitions. We go on to apply our definitions to two sample cases, showing that if our neutral definitions are used, the arguments in the cases fail. (shrink)

The most common form of endurantism takes enduring objects to be wholly located at every time they occupy. Such a view is believed to give rise to a problem concerning intrinsic change. My laptop may have been shut before, but it is currently open. Yet, if we understand endurantism as above, then my laptop is in possession of two contradictory properties: the shapes of being open and shut. This problem is known as the “problem of temporary intrinsics,” and, to avoid (...) it, two major kinds of moves have been made. The first is to meddle with the relationship between an enduring object and its properties by, for instance, claiming enduring objects bear their properties relationally to times rather than intrinsically. Many who have found this move unappealing have instead turned to presentism, claiming that endurantists should be presentists to avoid the problem. I take it that while both options can work, neither is optimal. Instead, I argue in favor of an alternative understanding of endurantism that allows endurantists to have it all: there is a version of endurantism that leaves the intrinsic properties of objects untouched, avoids the problem of temporary intrinsics, and does not require adopting presentism. (shrink)

Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...) for the endurantist. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPresentism and endurantism are natural bedfellows: arguments have been mounted from endurantism to presentism and vice versa. I generalise an argument against the compatibility between presentism and endurantism offered recently by Tallant. I then show how to reformulate endurantism so that it is compatible with presentism. I demonstrate that this reformulated version of endurantism can do the same work with respect to the problem of temporary intrinsics as can standard definitions.

Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...) a house burns to the ground and becomes ashes, or when someone dies. Armed with these distinctions, Aristotle would then say that, in the case of accidental changes, (1) and (2) are both false—a changing thing can really change one of its “accidental properties” and yet literally remain one and the same thing before and after the change. (shrink)

Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.

M. Johnston proposed an adverbialist solution to the problem of intrinsic change of enduring things. D. Lewis interpreted it as a way of tensing the copula. In his view, it has the defect of replacing having a property simpliciter by standing in a triadic relation to a property and a time, and so is threatened by Bradley’s Regress. I agree with Lewis on requiring having a property to be non-relational, while I disagree with him on restricting it to having simpliciter. (...) I tense the copula non-relationally and yet more seriously than Johnston, by characterizing tense as a copulative de re modality concerning endurance, which I relate to R. Taylor’s ‘pure becoming’. I will show that my way gives a better solution to the problem of intrinsic change than those by other endurantists, because of its close connection to an account of tense, endurance and becoming. (shrink)