Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...) to be constituted as awareness in the first place. Can anything relate to itself in this way? Can there be a relation that is necessarily one-term, reflexive, non-logical , concretely realizable, dynamically real, such that its holding is a necessary condition of the existence of the thing it holds of? It helps to consider the thought this very thought is puzzling. Many accept the reality of the kind of awareness of awareness posited in and , and think it must be not only ‘pre-reflective’ and ‘non-positional’, but also irrelational or non-intentional. But perhaps such awareness of awareness can be fully relational and fully intentional, and can be legitimately said to be its own object or content, even while being pre-reflective and non-positional. (shrink)

My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...) In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach. (shrink)

En este artículo se revisa la hipótesis sobre la transparencia de las imágenes de Kendall Walton y sus diferentes críticas. Propongo que la imagen fotográfico-cinematográfica solo puede ser potencialmente transparente. Debería, así, hablarse de grados de transparencia. La transparencia de la imagen se divide en umbrales que dependen de la fase de producción en la que esté. De esta forma tenemos transparencia en el registro, de representación, de enunciación y epistémica.

The dissertation concerns on the theory of perception of David Hume. The problem of perception is the problem about the object of perception. According to Jerome Valberg, the problem of perception is an antinomy. For Hume the problem is a dilemma between two theories, direct realism and representative realism. For direct realism, the object of perception is a mind-indipendent object; for representative realism, the object of perception is a mind-dependent object or an internal one. In the chapter I, I have (...) focused on the positions of Descartes and John Locke. In the chapter II, I have presented the conception of Hume through three different arguments: the argument from illusion, the argument from secondary qualities and the argument from hallucination. Then, I have exposed the Humean objections to the proofs of external world and the theory about belief in an unperceived existence. Hume’s position is the following: the object of perception is an internal object and the representative realism is unverifiable, but not false. It follows, then, that for Hume direct realism is false. In the chapter III, I have compared the theory of Hume with contemporary direct realism, namely, with intentionalism of John Searle and Micheal Huemer, with externalism of Tyler Burge and disjunctivism by Michael Martin. I have argued that Hume’s theory is more consistent than intentionalism of Searle and Huemer and it can’t be objected by externalism and disjunctivism. (shrink)