The process of making ethical judgments is much more complex than studying only personal moral philosophy variables (idealism and relativism). The renewed interest in epistemic values (virtue and vice epistemology) in contemporary philosophy has shown significant relevance to understanding ethical behavior and such values may be better predictors than studying only idealism and relativism. The purpose of this exploratory study is to examine employees’ personal moral philosophies, optimism, epistemic values, and various organizational unethical practices as compared to their managers. We (...) used Rawwas’ items of epistemology in this study. The sample consisted of 262 managers and employees. The results revealed that managers were more sensitive to organizational unethical practices, scored less on epistemic vices, less on absolutism, and more on exceptionalism than employees were. However, there was no difference between managers and employees related to moderate and minor unethical organizational practices, situationism, subjectivism, optimism, and epistemic virtues. We provided discussion of the results and implications. (shrink)

A vast majority of marketing theory and research has focused on relativism and idealism in order to understand ethical behavior. However, making ethical assessments that in turn influence behavior is much more complicated than it appears. One of the most important developments in contemporary philosophy has been the renewed interest in epistemic virtue. Epistemologists contend that belief is an ethical process that is susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one’s own life and personal experiences. Open-mindedness, curiosity, careful thinking, (...) creativity, and intellectual courage are the foundations of epistemic virtues. Closed-mindedness, intellectual overconfidence, unimaginativeness, intellectual conformity, and wishful thinking are among epistemic vices. The purpose of this investigation is to introduce epistemology to marketing ethics by linking it to personal moral philosophies (idealism and relativism) and optimism to explain various ethically challenging organizational behaviors. The items of epistemology were developed and pretested by the lead author of this study. Structural equations (LISREL) analyses found that epistemic virtues and vices are better predictors of ethical behavior than were personal moral philosophies (idealism and relativism), and their influence on mild and severe levels of unethical behaviors was enhanced by the moderator variable, optimism. Implications are designed to develop suggestions for improving ethical behavior in the workplace. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyze information security assessment in terms of cultural categories and virtue ethics, in order to explain the cultural origin of certain types of security vulnerabilities, as well as to enable a proactive attitude towards preventing such vulnerabilities.Design/methodology/approachVulnerabilities in information security are compared to the concept of “monster” introduced by Martijntje Smits in philosophy of technology. The applicability of different strategies for dealing with monsters to information security is discussed, and the strategies are linked (...) to attitudes in virtue ethics.FindingsIt is concluded that the present approach can form the basis for dealing proactively with unknown future vulnerabilities in information security.Research limitations/implicationsThe research presented here does not define a stepwise approach for implementation of the recommended strategy in practice. This is future work.Practical implicationsThe results of this paper enable computer experts to rethink their attitude towards security threats, thereby reshaping their practices.Originality/valueThis paper provides an alternative anthropological framework for descriptive and normative analysis of information security problems, which does not rely on the objectivity of risk. (shrink)

Este artículo trata de profundizar en nuestra comprensión de la naturaleza de la creenciaen tanto que actitud proposicional. Tras contextualizar la cuestión, discutimos y rechazamosdiversas caracterizaciones de la creencia —como apuesta y como alta probabilidad subjetiva—, para acabar defendiendo que creer que p consiste meramente en atribuiruna mayor probabilidad subjetiva a p que a no-p —entendiendo no-p como cualquiera delas alternativas a p y a todas en su conjunto. Propondremos además que la pregunta a la quetrata de responder una creencia (...) es fundamental para determinar el grado de creencia y lasrazones que cuentan a su favor. (shrink)

This paper discusses the virtue epistemology literature on epistemic emotions and challenges the individualist, unworldly account of epistemic emotions. It argues that epistemic emotions can be truth-motivating if embedded in co-inquiry epistemic cultures, namely virtuous epistemic cultures that valorise participatory processes of inquiry as truth-conducive. Co-inquiry epistemic cultures are seen as playing a constitutive role in shaping, developing, and regulating epistemic emotions. Using key references to classical Pragmatism, the paper describes the bridge between epistemic emotions and co-inquiry culture in terms (...) of habits of co-inquiry that act as the scaffolding of epistemic emotions. The result is a context-sensitive and practice-oriented approach to epistemic emotions that conceives of those emotions as being shaped by co-inquiry epistemic cultures. (shrink)