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Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities.Nate Charlow - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge. pp. 211-230.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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Context Probabilism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - In M. Aloni (ed.), 18th Amsterdam Colloquium. Springer. pp. 12-21.details
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Metasemantic Quandaries.Nate Charlow - 2021 - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes From the Work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Maize Books. pp. 171-202.details
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Transformative experience and the knowledge norms for action: Moss on Paul’s challenge to decision theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press.details
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Decision-making under moral-uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemic Modals and Sensitivity to Contextually‐Salient Partitions.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):134-146.details
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VI-BayesianExpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
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A Counterexample to Modus Tollens.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.details
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Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content.Rafael Ventura - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2803-2820.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character.Alex Silk - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1773-1799.details
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How to Be an Ethical Expressivist.Alex Silk - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):47-81.details
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Moral uncertainty and fetishistic motivation.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2951-2968.details
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Against the Russellian open future.Anders J. Schoubye & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Mind 126 (504): 1217–1237.details
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Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker.Andrea Scarantino - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.details
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Nonfactual Know-How and the Boundaries of Semantics.Paolo Santorio - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):35-82.details
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Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
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How Intellectual Communities Progress.Lewis D. Ross - 2021 - Episteme (4):738-756.details
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The logic of probabilistic knowledge.Patricia Rich - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1703-1725.details
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The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity.Patricia Rich - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9669-9698.details
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Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction.Bryan Pickel - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):559-578.details
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Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know how.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Newcomb meets Gettier.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4799-4814.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1-22.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):929-950.details
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Knowledge Dethroned.Andy Mueller & Jacob Ross - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):283-296.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account.Neil Mehta - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):681-705.details
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Probability Modals and Infinite Domains.Adam Marushak - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1041-1055.details
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Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):62-79.details
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Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):184-208.details
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Must, knowledge, and (in)directness.Daniel Lassiter - 2016 - Natural Language Semantics 24 (2):117-163.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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Informational dynamics of epistemic possibility modals.Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4309-4342.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan H.\'aje & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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