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The theory of knowledge: a thematic introduction

(ed.)
New York: Oxford University Press (1998)

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  1. Epistemology Neutralized.Brian Laetz - 2010 - Disputatio 3 (28):1 - 16.
    The thesis that knowledge is a partly evaluative concept is now a widespread view in epistemology, informing some prominent debates in the field. Typically, the view is embraced on the grounds that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge and a normative concept — a reasonable motivation. However, the view also has counterintuitive implications, which have been neglected. In particular, it implies that J.L. Mackie’s error-theory of value entails global epistemic scepticism and that any true knowledge claim suffices to prove (...)
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  • Why it doesn’t matter whether the virtues are truth-conducive.Robert William Fischer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-15.
    A potential explanation of a fact is a hypothesis such that, if it were true, it would explain the fact in question. Let’s suppose that we become aware of a fact and some potential explanations thereof. Let’s also suppose that we would like to believe the truth. Given this aim, we can ask two questions. First, is it likely that one of these hypotheses is true? Second, given an affirmative answer to the first question, which one is it likely to (...)
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  • El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico.María Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36 (1):243-259.
    El objeto de este artículo es analizar el problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico y ofrecer una solución basada en un tipo de justificación deflacionaria no-evidencialista a partir de la noción de habilitación de T. Burge y la de _garantía racional_ de C. Wright. El problema, en el caso del conocimiento básico lógico, es que justificar las reglas lógicas inferencialmente supone utilizar principios lógicos, con lo cual se genera un círculo vicioso. Examinamos la viabilidad del enfoque no-inferencialista de Wright (...)
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