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A New Solution to the Problem of Negative Truth

In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. pp. 313-330 (2007)

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  1. Positive truthmakers for negative truths: a solution to Molnar’s problem.Jonas Waechter - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):579-592.
    The present paper addresses Molnar’s problem :72–86, 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called, is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible variants of (...)
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  • Truths and Processes: A Critical Approach to Truthmaker Theory.Gustavo Picazo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):713-739.
    The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this process, and I oppose the ‘static’ or ‘analytic’ approach, which is fundamentally based on our own knowledge of the conventional meaning of words and sentences, and (...)
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  • A Note on Kripkenstein's Paradox.Gustavo Picazo - 2016 - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 3 (1):3-9.
    In this note I present a solution to Kripkenstein’s paradox, based on a very simple argument: (1) natural language and rule-following are empirical phenomena; (2) no case has been described, in real life, of a person who behaves as Wittgenstein’s or Kripke’s fictional character; (3) therefore, the discussion of such a case is completely devoid of interest. I lay out the example of a ‘Kripkensteinian apple’, which has a normal weight on even days and is weightless on odd days, in (...)
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