Opponents of compulsory voting often allege that it violates a ‘right not to vote’. This paper seeks to clarify and defend such a right against its critics. First, I propose that this right must be understood as a Hohfeldian claim against being compelled to vote, rather than as a mere privilege to abstain. So construed, the right not to vote is compatible with a duty to vote, so arguments for a duty to vote do not refute the existence of such (...) a right. The right against compulsion is most easily defended within a liberal framework, hence its critics often appeal instead to a republican conception of freedom. In the latter part of the paper, I argue that even these republican arguments are inconclusive. Even non-dominating interference still conditions freedom, which may require justification. Further, citizens can live up to republican ideals, so long as they are vigilant; they need not actually vote. Thus, republican arguments fail to refute a right not to vote. (shrink)

El neo-republicanismo se ha presentado recientemente como una alternativa al liberalismo, tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como desde el punto de vista de la organización política. Sin embargo, se sostiene que al abandonar la idea de autogobierno, principalmente en el planteo de Phillip Pettit, el esquema institucional que propone no difiere fundamentalmente de la institucionalidad democrática liberal.

Some theorists, worried about liberalism’s potential as a foundation for public health ethics, suggest that republicanism provides a better background of justification for public health policies, interventions, etc. In this article, this suggestion is put to the test, and it is argued that (i) contemporary (civic) republicanism and liberalism are not nearly as opposed as it is sometimes suggested, and that (ii) the kind of republicanism which one leading scholar in the field, Bruce Jennings, as an alternative to liberalism, does (...) not reflect the contemporary understanding of republicanism as held by, e.g. Phillip Pettit et al. (shrink)

The revival of republicanism was meant to challenge the hegemony of liberalism in contemporary political theory on the grounds that liberals show insufficient concern with institutional protection against political misrule. This article challenges this view by showing how neorepublicanism, particularly on Philip Pettit’s formulation, demands no greater institutional protection than does political liberalism. By identifying neutrality between conceptions of the good as the constraint on institutional requirements that forces neorepublicanism into the liberal framework, the article shows that neutrality is what (...) neorepublicans must jettison to offer a tenable critique of liberalism. Only then can neorepublicans ensure greater protection against misrule by demanding that citizens participate more actively in politics. They can then also criticize liberalism for failing to appreciate the importance of such protection. (shrink)

Constitutionalists and deliberative democrats show increasing interest in deliberative constitutionalism. They seek to reconcile two prima facie conflicting camps in legal and political philosophy:...

According to the commonsense view of civic virtue, the places to exercise civic virtue are largely restricted to politics. In this article, I argue for a more expansive view of civic virtue, and argue that one can exercise civic virtue equally well through working for or running a for-profit business. I argue that this conclusion follows from four relatively uncontroversial premises: (1) the consensus definition of “civic virtue”, (2) the standard, most popular theory of virtuous activity, (3) a conception of (...) the common good widely shared by liberal political philosophers, and (4) the mainstream economic theory of for-profit business. (shrink)

Does John Rawls’s political liberalism require the institutional separation between state and religion or does it allow space for moderate forms of religious establishment? In this paper I address this question by presenting and critically evaluating Cécile Laborde’s recent claim that political liberalism is ‘inconclusive about the public place of religion’ and ‘indeterminate about the symbolic dimensions of the public place of religion’. In response to Cécile Laborde, I argue that neither moderate separation nor moderate establishment, intended as regimes of (...) religious governance that fix specific interpretations of principles of social and economic justice, are compatible with Rawls’s political liberalism. Furthermore, I claim that a state can ensure that both its religious and non-religious citizens enjoy a sense of self-respect and identification with their polity by leaving issues of symbolic establishment and separation open to democratic debate. I conclude that Rawls’s political liberalism transcends the standard distinction between moderate establishment and moderate separation and leaves the public place of religion open to the democratic contestation of ordinary legislative politics. (shrink)

In political philosophy, the concept of autonomy is often associated with liberalism: it serves as a justification for the liberal values of state neutrality and value pluralism, and seems coherent with the liberal definition of freedom as the absence of interference. Neo-republicans have pointed out that freedom as non-interference fails to acknowledge the fact that one may be unfree while non-interfered with, while on the other hand, not all forms of interference are freedom-limiting. They have proposed to replace the concept (...) by freedom as non-domination, which they define as the absence of actual or possible arbitrary interference. Although their definition is promising, neo-republicans tend to neglect the concept of self-government and therefore, are vulnerable to the same accusations of incompleteness faced by liberals. By focusing on the negative part of freedom as non-domination, they have omitted two aspects: first, that there are other ways to be unfree than to be the subject of mere arbitrary interference, and second, that the real value of non-domination is the capacity to act as a non-dominated being, which requires a level of self-mastery. To fix this problem, I propose an extension of the concept of non-domination and argue that the theory would benefit from including autonomy in the list of its conditions for freedom. Following the republican idea that one is only free in a free state, I propose a definition of republican autonomy that is political in nature, and depends on globalized nondomination. (shrink)

Market structures have come to dominate every area of our society, and market logic—in the form of rational choice theory, the law and economics movement, and the like—has equally dominated our thinking about society. In this thesis, I will examine one critique of this state of affairs: that offered by G.W.F. Hegel. I compare Hegel’s critique of the market to the similar critique of modern communitarians like Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel, and argue that Hegel’s distinctive conception of freedom allows (...) him to capture what is right about the modern communitarian view while avoiding most of the common criticisms. (shrink)

Modern democracy attempted to solve the dilemmas posed by opposing features from various traditions through two strategies: representation, which allowed it to incorporate citizens’ conflicting interests within a restricted collegiate group that permitted deliberation and agreement, on one side, and universal choice of representatives and governments for limited periods of time, on the other. Since the first decades of the 20th century, this notion of democracy within the framework of a republican constitution was opposed by another one that rejected all (...) forms of parliamentarianism, discussion and public deliberation in the name of a “democracy” based on the identity and homogeneity of a mass of people under the hegemonic leadership of a party, centered around the will and decisions of a managing elite and a charismatic leader, viewed as the sole representative of the people themselves. Both forms of democracy –strict and perverted – are being harassed by the powers unleashed by globalization and transnationalisation that are becoming alien oligarchies, opposed to the notion of citizenship and restrictive of its rights. In liberal parliamentary democracies the functional imperative issued by the financial sector is channeled through a crisis cabinet that assimilates demands and transforms them by managing an ever-changing budget whose aim is to add new sufferings to the bulk of the population that can only counteract through protest. Given the constitutional backdrop of these societies, with their deep democratic network, the gradual transformation of the European Union into a transnational arena fuelled by “a club of chiefs of state” has only made yet more patent the oligarchic turn of its post-crisis evolution. In plebiscite democracies the turn was operated through a sovereign entrenchment of the power of the oligarchy on the pretext of resistance to the pressure set by globalization. Since the onset of the 90s, Latin America as well as countries in Eastern Europe have witnessed a gradual turn toward what O’Donnell has termed “delegative democracies”, or neo-populism, according to other authors. These regimes are characterized by exalting a populist leader, upholding him as a savior who will gauge the needs and wishes of the mass of individuals without intermediaries, focusing mainly on those who feel excluded from the mainstream of institutionalized democracy. This ensures feedback to populist regimes supported by a hegemonic political party that lives on State resources and on the rampant corruption it protects in order to finance ‘clientelism’ among those excluded from the system by the policies of the State itself. (shrink)