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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View.Laura Gow - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):569-589.details
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Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 221-254.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54-74.details
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Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
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Is attention a non-propositional attitude?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 272-302.details
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Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language (4):674-693.details
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The Auditory Field: The Spatial Character of Auditory Experience.Keith A. Wilson - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (40):1080-1106.details
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Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.details
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The Philosophy of Ordinary Language Is a Naturalistic Philosophy.Jonathan Trigg - 2010 - Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):197-215.details
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Representation, Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience.Jonathan David Trigg - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1):5-30.details
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'.Nicholas Silins - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):329-367.details
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Sensible Over-Determination.Umrao Sethi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):588-616.details
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Sensible individuation.Umrao Sethi - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1):168-191.details
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Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.details
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Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.details
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Representationalism and the problem of vagueness.Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.details
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What are the contents of experiences.Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.details
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Do the benefits of naïve realism outweigh the costs? Comments on fish, perception, hallucination and illusion.Adam Pautz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.details
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Recent work in perception: Naïve realism and its opponents.Matthew Nudds - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):334-346.details
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Where is the Fundamental Disagreement Between Naive Realism and Intentionalism?Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (4):593-610.details
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Perceiving tropes.Bence Nanay - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):1-14.details
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Amodal completion and relationalism.Bence Nanay - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2537-2551.details
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What the Senses Cannot ‘Say’.Jonathan Brink Morgan - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):557-579.details
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The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.details
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The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.details
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Perceiving properties versus perceiving objects.Boyd Millar - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (2):99-117.details
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Misperceiving properties.Boyd Millar - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):431-445.details
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Learning to see.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (5):601-620.details
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The fragmentation of phenomenal character.Neil Mehta - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):209-231.details
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Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds.Neil Mehta - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):197-218.details
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Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.details
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Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character.Harold Langsam - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):375-389.details
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The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.details
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The integration problem for naive realism.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (5):697-716.details
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Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism.Laura Gow - 2017 - Ratio 31 (S1):35-50.details
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The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency.Laura Gow - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):723-744.details
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Colour hallucination: A new problem for externalist representationalism.Laura Gow - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):695-704.details
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When nothing looks blue.Joseph Gottlieb & Ali Rezaei - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2553-2561.details
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Consciousness and the limits of memory.Joseph Gottlieb - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5217-5243.details
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Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.details
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The Argument from Pain: A New Argument for Indirect Realism.Dirk Franken - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 93 (1):106 - 129.details
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Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection.Dirk Franken - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):63-85.details
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