In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2601\PINCREPL.261 : 2006-06-05 11:54
iscussion REJOINDER TO SOAMES C P Philosophy / Purdue U. West Lafayette,  ,  @. y goal in reviewing Soames’ book was to help readers of this journal evalMuate his contribution to the history of analytic philosophy, with a special focus on his discussion of Russell. Soames charges both that I misrepresent the contents of his book and that I (...) make mistakes in the interpretation of various aspects of Russell’s philosophy. If I had committed any errors of the former sort, I would certainly apologize and thank Soames for bringing such mistakes to my attention. After explaining why I do not believe I have misrepresented the contents of his book, I will turn to the one substantive issue that he raises in his reply, namely the need for unperceived sense-data in Russell’s external world program. While disagreement here is more understandable, nothing Soames says in his book or in his reply has led me to revise my original remarks. My review began with a one-page summary of Soames’ -page book. I said that “Moore, and nearly every other figure that Soames discusses, is [said to be] guilty of confusing necessity, analyticity and apriority” and in the next paragraph mentioned “Moore’s views on ethics” and “Russell’s conception of analysis ” (“Reply”, p. ). Soames replies: “Not so. Although I do show that such conflation had negative consequences for the views of several philosophers, Moore and Russell are not among them” (p. ). I could have added more page references to my discussion. On Moore, after a long list of twelve “fundamental methodological notions” which include analysis, analyticity and necessity, Soames claims that “unclarity about these fundamental methodological notions eviscerated his most important meta-ethical conclusions” (: ). For  Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century,  vols. (Princeton: Princeton U. P., ). Christopher Pincock, “History of Philosophical Analysis”, Russell, n.s.  (winter – ): –. Scott Soames, “Reply to Pincock”, Russell, n.s.  (winter –): –. References preceded by “:” or “:” refer to the volumes of Soames’ book. Other unlabelled references in the text will be either to my review or to Soames’ reply. russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (summer ): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  - _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2601\PINCREPL.261 : 2006-06-05 11:54  Discussion Russell, Soames notes that Russell’s “view that ordinary proper names mean the same as descriptions associated with them by speakers … was ultimately shown to be deeply problematic by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity” (: ). A reference is then made to Soames’ discussion of Kripke in Volume  where Soames explains how Kripke’s “modal argument” undermined Russell’s approach (: ). Soames also complains that I object to his “characterization of Russellian propositions as complexes of properties and objects whose structure mirrors the logical forms of sentences that express them” (p. ). What I said was that it was “extremely misleading” to say that (quoting Soames again) “propositions constitute the information encoded by sentences … [and of] the information encoded by a sentence (in a logically perfect language) as a complex entity the structure of which mirrors the structure of sentences” (p.  and : –). So, Soames did not say that propositions are “complexes of properties and objects” and if he had said this I would not have objected. Soames goes on to use a settheoretic construction to explain exactly what propositions are. But there is a big difference between a set-theoretic construction and a complex of the sort Russell had in mind, and a reader of Soames would have no awareness of the gap. That is, she is likely to be misled. Finally, Soames says that “Pincock foolishly speculates” (p. ) in ascribing confusion to him about the relevance of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems to Principia Mathematica. Now, when a philosopher gives an argument described as the “final nail in the coffin” (: ), and this argument depends on a tacit assumption, I submit that it is far from foolish to think that the philosopher believes that this assumption is correct. This is, after all, just the methodology that Soames employs when he reconstructs the commitments of the philosophers that he talks about. And, in this case... (shrink)