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Radical realism: direct knowing in science and philosophy

(ed.)
Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1992)

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  1. Review Essay: Which Way Psychology? A Discussion of Barbara: Held’s Psychology’s Interpretative Turn: The Search for Truth and Agency in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.Edward Erwin - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):291-310.
    Some psychologists have recently tried to develop new approaches to psychology incompatible with both natural-science views of the discipline and basic tenets of postmodernism. In her new book on psychology’s interpretative turn, Barbara Held refers to these thinkers as "middleground theorists" or MGTs. Most of the MGTs reject psychological laws, defend free choice and agency, stress the role of values in psychological inquiry, and argue for a hermeneutical methodology. Some reject scientific realism and embrace epistemological relativism. Both Held and I (...)
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  • Toward the Development of a Paradigm of Human Flourishing in a Free Society.Edward W. Younkins - 2008 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 9 (2):253-304.
    This essay presents a skeleton of a potential conceptual framework for human flourishing in a free society. Its aim is to present a diagram that illustrates the ways in which its topics relate to one another and why they do. It argues for a plan of conceptualization rather than for the topics themselves. It emphasizes the interconnections among the components of the schema presented. It sees an essential interconnection between objective concepts, arguing that all of the disciplines of human action (...)
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  • Ontological relativity and meaning‐variance: A critical‐constructive review.Christopher Norris - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):139 – 173.
    This article offers a critical review of various ontological-relativist arguments, mostly deriving from the work of W. V. Quine and Thomas K hn. I maintain that these arguments are (1) internally contradictory, (2) incapable of accounting for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge, and (3) shown up as fallacious from the standpoint of a causal-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and interpretation. Moreover, they have often been viewed as lending support to such programmes as the 'strong' sociology (...)
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  • Real Knowledge. The problem of content in neural epistemics.J. J. M. Sleutels - unknown