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Theories, experience, and probabilistic intuitions

In Imre Lakatos (ed.), The problem of inductive logic. Amsterdam,: North Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 285--303 (1968)

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  1. Inductivism and falsificationism reconcilable.Herman Vetter - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):226 - 233.
    Inductivism is understood as the explication of the degree of confirmation as conditional logical probability. Inductivism is not recommendable in the form of Carnap's λ-system, but tenable in the form of Bayesianism. Objections directed at it are either irrelevant or can be taken account of within Bayesianism.
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  • Unphilosophical probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.
  • Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.
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  • Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.
  • The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.
  • Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.
  • L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.
  • Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.
  • Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.
  • Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.
  • Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.
  • Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.
  • Lay arbitration of rules of inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.
  • L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.
  • The irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346-349.
  • Propensity, evidence, and diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345-346.
  • “Is” and “ought” in cognitive science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344-345.
  • Performing competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.
  • Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.
  • Intuition, competence, and performance.Henry E. Kyburg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341-342.
  • Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.
  • Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.
  • Another vote for rationality.Mary Henle - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-339.
  • Human reasoning: Can we judge before we understand?Richard A. Griggs - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):338-339.
  • Can children's irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?Sam Glucksberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):337-338.
  • Can any statements about human behavior be empirically validated?Baruch Fischoff - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):336-337.
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  • On defining rationality unreasonably.J. St B. T. Evans & P. Pollard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):335-336.
  • Rationality and the sanctity of competence.Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):334-335.
  • The persistence of cognitive illusions.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):333-334.
  • Status of the rationality assumption in psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.
  • Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
    The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.
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  • Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.
  • Induction, probabilités et confirmation chez Carnap.Samir Boukhris - 2006 - Revue de Synthèse 127 (1):115-139.
    L'idée d'associer probabilité et induction n'est pas propre au xxe siècle, mais elle a reçu un développement systématique lorsque les philosophes néo-positivistes s'en sont emparés. Dès les années 1940, le philosophe Rudolf Carnap s'est proposé de relever le «défi humien» en fondant une théorie de la confirmation par la construction d'une logique probabiliste dite «inductive». Ce projet avait été esquissé à Cambridge dans les années 1920 par l'économiste John M. Keynes. Examiner le programme de Carnap dans sa totalité, le situer (...)
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  • Rational animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.