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  1. Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations upon the Moral Sense.John J. Tilley - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
    One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson’s Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) is his discussion of “exciting reasons.” In this paper I address the question: What is the function of that discussion? In particular, what is its relation to Hutcheson’s attempt to show that the rationalists’ normative thesis ultimately implies, contrary to their moral epistemology, that moral ideas spring from a sense? Despite first appearances, Hutcheson’s discussion of exciting reasons is not part of that attempt. Mainly, it (...)
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  • Motivating Hume’s natural virtues.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):134-147.
    Many commentators propose that Hume thinks that we are not or should not be motivated to perform naturally virtuous actions from moral sentiments if we want our actions to be genuinely virtuous. It is this proposal with which I take issue in this article, arguing that Hume fully incorporates the moral sentiments into his understanding of how human beings act when it comes to the natural virtues and that he does not see the moral sentiments as a problematic kind of (...)
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  • Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  • A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.
    This article presents a limited defense of Humeanism about practical reason. Jonathan Dancy and other traditional objective-reasons theorists argue that all practical reasons, what we think about when we deliberate, are facts or states of affairs in the world. On the Humean view, the reasons that motivate us are belief-desire combinations, which are in the mind. Thus, Dancy and others reject Humeanism on the grounds that it cannot allow that anyone acts from a normative reason. I argue, first, that this (...)
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  • Las condiciones históricas de posibilidad del General Point of View una solución evolutiva al problema metaético humeano del cognitivismo moral.Santiago Álvarez García - 2017 - Co-herencia 14 (27):269-288.
    El presente artículo ofrece una solución al problema metaético que florece en la ética humeana a propósito de la conciliación entre el cognitivismo derivado de la exigencia del General Point of View y el internalismo moral que se deriva de su argumento de la motivación. Asumiendo una descripción evolutiva en la construcción de la perspectiva evaluativa representada por el General Point of View, al tiempo que un proyectivismo epistemológico para los juicios causales que conectan las motivaciones, acciones y utilidad de (...)
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  • Reid's Non-Humean Theory of Moral Motives.Esther Engels Kroeker - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):205-224.
    Contrary to the widespread view that Reid and Hume agree that reason, alone, is inert, I argue that they disagree on this point. Both accept that reason plays a role in forming moral sentiments, and that affections are components of moral evaluations. However, I show that for Reid moral evaluations (comprised of moral judgments and moral affections) are different from moral motives (which are not comprised of affections). Moral motives for Reid are mind‐independent states of affairs that are grasped by (...)
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  • Critical Notice.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):549-573.
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  • Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom. [REVIEW]Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):549-573.
    Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case (...)
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  • De ladrones y reglas. (Una visión del problema del “Sensible Knave” desde un utilitarismo de la regla atemperado).José Luis Tasset - 2011 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 52:117-139.
    En el intento de defender una interpretación de la ética y la filosofía política de David Hume cercana al utilitarismo clásico, se interpone de un modo clave el llamado problema del “ Sensible Knave ” planteado por este autor al final de su obra más utilitarista, la Investigación sobre los Principios de la Moral . Según la interpretación clásica de este fragmento, la racionalidad utilitarista en el ámbito político colisionaría con la moral volviendo a ésta última inútil. Por tanto, en (...)
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