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Humean theory of practical rationality

In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 265--81 (2006)

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  1. Recasting Scottish Sentimentalism: The Peculiarity of Moral Approval.Remy Debes - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (1):91-115.
    By founding morality on the particular sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith implied that the nature of moral judgment was far more intuitive and accessible than their rationalist predecessors and contemporaries would, or at least easily could, allow. And yet, these ‘Sentimentalists’ faced the longstanding belief that the human affective psyche is a veritable labyrinth – an obstacle to practical morality if not something literally brutish in us. The Scottish Sentimentalists thus implicitly tasked themselves with distinguishing (...)
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  • Bibliography.[author unknown] - 2008 - In Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.), A Companion to Hume. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 529–552.
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  • Einführung in die Ethik.Micha H. Werner - 2020 - Heidelberg, Germany: J.B. Metzler / Springer Nature.
    Open access-introduction into moral philosophy in German language that contains chapters on the concept of morality, on the development and the main positions of normative ethics, on meta-ethics, and on the various fields of applied ethics. One of its distinctive features is that it explicitly reflects on the role of morality and ethics in modern society and that it analyses the import of alternative conceptual and normative positions for determining this role. The book can be freely downloaded from the publisher's (...)
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  • Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent (...)
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  • Non-negotiable: Why moral naturalism cannot do away with categorical reasons.Andrés Carlos Luco - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2511-2528.
    Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...)
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