Awareness that moral beliefs and practices have changed across time threatens our confidence in our current moral beliefs: if past moral beliefs turned out to be wrong, how can we be sure ours aren't likewise mistaken? In this paper, I set up four desiderata for a successful theory of moral progress: it must allow us to judge that progress has occurred, avoid the image of increasing correspondence towards ahistorical truthmakers, allow for revision in belief, and yet not be disobligating. Rorty's (...) pragmatist account of moral progress delivers on the first three, but at the cost of failing to meet the fourth: it drains moral beliefs of their categorical force. I then outline K.E. Løgstrup’s understanding of the relation between the ‘ethical demand’ and changing, socially mediated norms. While Løgstrup does posit an unchanging ground of normativity - the "ethical demand" to act for the sake of the other whose welfare is in our hands – he also thinks that changing social norms are an indispensable part of ethical life. I argue that Løgstrup's discussion of the ‘refraction’ of the ethical demand through changing social norms provides resources for an account of moral progress that fulfils these four desiderata. (shrink)

In this article I argue that we should distinguish two characterizations of objectivism: Mind Nongroundedness Objectivism and Mind Independence Objectivism. I focus on the debate in metaethics, although the distinction may generally apply to others. According to Mind Nongroundedness Objectivism, moral standards are not grounded in any mind, while according to Mind Independence Objectivism, moral standards hold independently of any mind. Despite its importance, this distinction has so far not been noticed in the literature. I argue that this distinction helps (...) elucidate otherwise puzzling metaethical positions. (shrink)