I reconsider the idea that there is an analogy between belief in other minds and belief in God, and examine two approaches to the relevant beliefs. The 'explanatory inductive' approach raises difficulties in both contexts, and involves questionable assumptions. The 'expressivist' approach is more promising, and presupposes a more satisfactory metaphysical framework in the first context. Its application to God is similarly insightful, and offers an intellectually respectable, albeit resistible, version of the doctrine that nature is a book of lessons.

Dombrowski and Murdoch offer versions of the ontological argument which aim to avoid two types of objection – those concerned with the nature of the divine, and those concerned with the move from an abstract concept to a mind-independent reality. For both, the nature of the concept of God/Good entails its instantiation, and both supply a supporting argument from experience. It is only Murdoch who successfully negotiates the transition from an abstract concept to the instantiation of that concept, however, and (...) this is achieved by means of an ontological argument from moral experience which, in a reversal of the Kantian doctrine, depends ultimately on a form of the cosmological argument. (shrink)

To claim that the divine is a person or personal is, according to Swinburne, ‘the most elementary claim of theism’. I argue that, whether the classical theist’s concept of the divine as a person or personal is construed as an analogy or a metaphor, or a combination of the two, analysis necessitates qualification of that concept such that any differences between the classical theist’s concept of the divine as a person or personal and revisionary interpretations of that concept are merely (...) superficial. Thus, either the classical theist has more in common with revisionary theism than he/she might care to admit, or classical theism is a multi-faceted position which encompasses interpretations which some might regard as revisionist. This article also explores and employs the use of a gender-neutral pronoun in talk about God. (shrink)

The author traces the path from split brains to basic beliefs by linking the deautomatized pattern of spiritual masters, as reorted in Rorschach protocols, with subsymbolic, parallel, distriguted processing, The older brain structures constitute humanity's common heritage, while the new brain constitutes particular cultural heritages. Expanding levels of complexity move from the limbic system throuh conitive left‐mind vigilance and right‐mind responsiveness to %Pelie patterns of proclamation and manifestation to the world‐integrating mysticism of limbic input and the world‐fulfilling action of the (...) new brain. Whole brain activity combines emotional meaning and propositional explanation. Analogically seaking, the brain provides clues to understanding God. A ialectical theology parallels the reciprocal integration of brain processes. Whole brain belief originates in the old brain's evolutionary adaptation to our genetic inheritance and in the new brain's conscious intention to fulfill the will of God through our cultural inheritances. (shrink)