Within and among societies, there are competing understandings of the status of children, including debates over whether they can bear rights and, if so, which rights they bear and against whom, and their capacity to make decisions and be held responsible and accountable for actions. There also are different understandings of what constitutes a family; what authority parents have over and regarding their children; and what should happen to children who are without parents because of death, desertion, or imprisonment. These (...) and other related debates reflect deep differences in worldviews, in how one understands the legitimate role of the state, in how one comes to know the proper way to raise children, and so on. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child purports to reflect international convergence on the rights of children, on how decisions concerning children should be made, and on how children ought to be treated by the state and by their parents. This paper examines whether the Convention's framework for decision making concerning children is an appropriate framework for pediatric bioethics. Questions about how to make health care decisions for children ultimately are questions of who is in authority to make and judge such decisions. Establishing who is in authority, determining whether there are any limits to that authority and, if so, defining those limits should be the focus of efforts to develop and implement a pediatric decision-making framework. (shrink)

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective—and morally justified—means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions (...) that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where “market-place morality” is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves. (shrink)