The paper will discuss the role of the visual in French urban space. It will reveal the close connections between visual and semiotics where the visual dimension is central rather than marginal. We will evaluate altogether the psychological, legal and social impacts of the new shapes of our own environment. Rethinking our public space shapes our identities, unveils the ‘hidden’ powerful discourse behind these new urban models.

The article tries to inquire a third way in normative ethics between consequentialism or utilitarianism and deontology or Kantianism. To find such a third way in normative ethics, one has to analyze the elements of these classical theories and to look if they are justified. In this article it is argued that an adequate normative ethics has to contain the following five elements: (1) normative individualism, i. e., the view that in the last instance moral norms and values can only (...) be justified by reference to the individuals concerned, as its basis; (2) consideration of the individuals' concerns and interests—aims, desires, needs, strivings—insofar as they have a justificatory function; (3) a pluralism of references of these concerns and hence of moral norms and values to all possible elements of actions; (4) the necessity of a principle of aggregation and weighing with regard to these concerns; (5) finally, as a central principle of aggregation and weighing, the principle of relative reference to self and others, operating as a generalizing meta-principle that guides the application of concrete principles and decisions. (shrink)

: Science Studies, as developed initially in France attempt to overcome the distinctions between science and society, and correspondingly between the philosophy of science and political and social theory. Science Studies considers the theories and beliefs of scientists political rather than direct reflections of an objective natural world. I consider here Science Studies as a political theory that emerged and has developed in reaction to a particular social and political context, a crisis of technocratic politics in France. Some of the (...) leading contemporary French exponents Science Studies, a group around the journal. (shrink)

As a starting point this paper takes Dewey's nowadays oftenstressed modernity and examines his social philosophy againstthe background of the current debates on republicanism andcommunitarianism. Particularly, the anaysis of Dewey's The Public and its Problem (1927) concludesthat the attention being paid to Dewey is problematic asspecific religious assumptions – explicitly developedin A Common Faith (1934) – lie in the backgroundof his social philosophy, and are hardly being recognized.However, as it shall be shown, without considering thereligious basis, neither Dewey's social philosophy (...) norhis educational theory can be properly understood. (shrink)

As a starting point this paper takes Dewey’s nowadays often stressed modernity and examines his social philosophy against the background of the current debates on republicanism and communitarianism. Particularly, the anaysis of Dewey’sThe Public and its Problem concludes that the attention being paid to Dewey is problematic as specific religious assumptions — explicitly developed inA Common Faith -lie in the background of his social philosophy, and are hardly being recognized. However, as it shall be shown, without considering the religious basis, (...) neither Dewey’s social philosophy nor his educational theory can be properly understood. (shrink)

I present a theory of alienation that accounts for the cognitive processes involved with moral thinking and political behavior in modern societies. On my account, alienation can be understood as a particular kind of atrophy of moral concepts and moral thinking that affect the ways individuals cognize and legitimate the social world and their place within it. Central to my argument is the thesis that modern forms of social integration—shaped by highly institutionalized, rationalized and hierarchical forms of social life—serve to (...) constrain the moral- cognitive powers of subjects leading to a condition of alienation as moral atrophy. This state results from the withering of the subject's internal powers of moral reflection and an overriding predisposition to rely on external value schemas to make sense of moral and political problems. I then present an analysis of alienated moral consciousness and its implications for modern social theory. (shrink)

Niccolò Machiavelli is the father of modern constitutionalism. Constitutionalism began anew in the modern world with the study of the ancient republics and it was Machiavelli who inaugurated this revived science of politics. Five hundred years after the composition of Il Principe and the Discorsi we are still working out the implications of applying reason to the structures of law and government in pursuit of justice and the common good. Modern constitutionalism and ancient republicanism share three central beliefs: first, that (...) government should serve justice and the common good; second, that government should do so through known and stable laws; third, that these will best be secured through the checks and balances of a well-designed constitution. Machiavelli took the theories and experiences of republican Rome and applied them to his own era. This application of reason to constitutional design transformed the politics of emergent modernity and reconfigured government throughout the world. (shrink)

The article tries to inquire a third way in normative ethics between consequentialism or utilitarianism and deontology or Kantianism. To find such a third way in normative ethics, one has to analyze the elements of these classical theories and to look if they are justified. In this article it is argued that an adequate normative ethics has to contain the following five elements: (1) normative individualism, i. e., the view that in the last instance moral norms and values can only (...) be justified by reference to the individuals concerned, as its basis; (2) consideration of the individuals’ concerns and interests—aims, desires, needs, strivings—insofar as they have a justificatory function; (3) a pluralism of references of these concerns and hence of moral norms and values to all possible elements of actions; (4) the necessity of a principle of aggregation and weighing with regard to these concerns; (5) finally, as a central principle of aggregation and weighing, the principle of relative reference to self and others, operating as a generalizing meta-principle that guides the application of concrete principles and decisions. (shrink)

The financial crash of 2008 following the selling of fictitious derivatives was a crisis of both rationality and values whose aftermath has thrown the legitimation of deregulated markets, and governments, into question. This paper critiques the Becker metaphor of human capital and submits that human value is central to and the fulcrum of both economic and social values. It illustrates that Hume and Adam Smith directly countered the Hobbesian hypothesis that human nature is based only on self-interest, distinguishes market values (...) from social values, explicit from implicit values and parallels Sen in adopting an ordinal ranking of what people value rather than a search for cardinality. It draws on cognitive psychology, neural research, revealed preference theory and a principle of implicit verification. It also outlines implications for what Adam Smith centrally valued as concern for the welfare of the whole of society. (shrink)

In this paper I: (1) Describe something of the present situation in the United States and briefly contrast this with the state of affairs in other nations of the industrialised world. I emphasise health care but also allude to other social conditions: health care is merely one institution of a society and, just as do its other institutions, the system of health care reflects the basic world-view of that society. (2) Sketch the world-view and the philosophy which underwrites the use (...) of a market system in distributing what are acknowledged to be critically important social goods like health care and higher education. I show that a well-functioning market can indeed be useful when it comes to distributing some, but not when distributing other goods. (3) Suggest that when competition and the market are used to ‘regulate’ health care, technology—instead of being used to benefit patients—is apt to be used primarily to maximise individual profit: it becomes a weapon between what is often painted as ‘warfare’ among health care providers and institutions. I argue that this state of affairs is based on an undue emphasis upon the demands of individual freedom to the detriment of the community. Finally (4) I suggest an alternative approach to balancing individual with communal interests, an approach which is neither based on a predominance of one with neglect of the other, nor on a dialectic balance between them, but rather upon an approach which sees both individual and communal interests as modifying forces in a complex homeostatic balance. Individual success, in any civilised sense of the term, is possible only in a viable and well-functioning community, and a well-functioning community is not possible without individual success: the two are inevitably interdependent and linked. (shrink)

Curiosity and imagination have been neglected in epistemology. This paper argues that the role of curiosity and imagination is central to the way we think, regardless of whether it is thinking about problems of ethics or problems of science. In our ever more materialistic society, curiosity and reason are either discouraged or narrowly channeled. I shall argue that the role of curiosity and imagination for both science and ethics is so important that nurturing them can be seen as an ethical (...) obligation and suppressing them as ethically problematic. (shrink)

The article focuses on examining the distinct nature of persecution. In the article I argue that on the grounds of common historical cases of persecution an account of the core components of the concept may be established. The core comprises three central elements: asymmetrical and systemic threat, severe and sustained harm, and unjust discriminatory targeting. I will conclude the paper by suggesting that none of the components alone make persecution anything distinct. However, the simultaneous occurrence of the components may be (...) argued to amount to a separable class of harms that are among the worst-case scenarios for those having to endure them. (shrink)

The paradigm case of power as ?power over? (not ?power to') betrays a concern (1) more with the capacity to dominate others than with the unqualified capacity to act as such; (2) more with the fact, than with the morality, of dominance ? underscoring the key analytical distinction between ?power? and ?authority'; and (3) more with compulsion than co?operation. The three moves to combine (1) ?power over? with ?power to?, (2) ?power? with ?authority?, and (3) ?power? with ?co?operation?, are all (...) seen as inflationary, diminishing the value of the paradigm case, and assisting in rendering power, in its actual operations, both more obscure and insidious. Tumbling down this slope, there is a further argument, to the same effect, but secured by deflating, rather than inflating, the paradigm case. This deflationary argument (4) views luck as an alternative to power. In a world of dizzying technological innovation, marked by a deepening gap between rich and poor in the cities, between advanced and dependent states, we confront an inclination in many quarters both to expand and to contract power, so that it is everything and everywhere, thus nothing and nowhere. In attempts to substitute luck for power, it becomes difficult to assign to power responsibility, as heretofore. This paper is the first of two parts, taking a critical look at the overwhelming of power by inflation. The second part of this paper will be published in a subsequent issue, and it critically inspects the argument for deflation. (shrink)

In Western societies advance directives are widely recognised as important means to extend patient self-determination under circumstances of incapacity. Following other countries, England and France have adopted legislation aiming to clarify the legal status of advance directives. In this paper, I will explore similarities and differences in both sets of legislation, the arguments employed in the respective debates and the socio-political structures on which these differences are based. The comparison highlights how different legislations express different concepts emphasising different values accorded (...) to the duty to respect autonomy and to protect life, and how these differences are informed by different socio-political contexts. Furthermore each country associates different ethical concerns with ADs which raise doubts about whether these directives are a theoretical idea which is hardly applicable in practice. (shrink)

This article suggests that criminality in leaders might best be understood by ethicists as a matter of degree. Leaders may take without legitimate claim a variety of tangible or intangible goods including ideas and personal health. The extent to which any such act should be disfavoured is subject to debate. Moreover, both theft and control may be understood as continuous phenomena. Kleptocratic regimes within workplace or family may foster in people a habit of accepting similar treatment from economic and political (...) leaders at all levels. Forms of governance may be arranged on a continuum from those that serve to those that exploit their subjects. Responses to kleptocratic regimes range from acceptance through unconscious and conscious resistance to violent revolt. (shrink)

This article investigates the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and the reasons for which legitimacy is ascribed or denied. It fills a gap in the literature on CSR and legitimacy that lacks empirical studies regarding the question whether CSR contributes to organisational legitimacy. The problem is discussed by referring to the case of De Beers’s diamond mining partnership with the Government of Namibia. A total of 42 interviews were conducted—41 with stakeholders and one with the focal organisation Namdeb. (...) The 41 stakeholder interviews are analysed with regard to cognitive, pragmatic and moral legitimacy as defined by Suchman (Acad Manage Rev 20(3):571–610, 1995 ). The main finding is that the majority of statements on organisational legitimacy refer to moral legitimacy and most issues raised in this context challenge the company’s legitimacy despite its comprehensive CSR engagement. The study demonstrates that legitimacy gaps can be a result of communication practices that raise unrealistic stakeholder expectations and that the legitimacy gained by CSR engagement in one area cannot substitute legitimacy losses caused by failures in another. (shrink)

On a reproché au modèle perceptuel de la connaissance morale d'être inadéquat en ce qu'il serait incapable d'expliquer le signe distinctif et fondamental de l'éthique, à savoir son caractère normatif. Je tente de montrer que la critique n'est pas pertinente, car le normatif n'a en réalité qu'une place dérivée en morale : l'éthique est d'abord une question de valeurs, entités dont il est tout à fait plausible de dire que nous les percevons. Pour justifier la place dérivée du normatif, je (...) m'appuie sur les études de Max Scheler et sur l'examen de certains traits de la psychologie morale, qui tendent à montrer que le normatif n'est qu'un cas particulier de l'axiologique, mettant en évidence les caractères de force des valeurs, de risques de transgression et de contrainte.The perceptual model of moral knowledge has been the target of criticisms: it could be unable to explain the basic character of ethics, namely its normative character. I try to show that this criticism is misguided: in fact normativity is not central but lateral to ethics. What matters in ethics first and foremost are values, and it is quite appropriate to say we perceive values. To justify the lateral character of normativity, I rely on some analysis of Max Scheler and turn to some traits of moral psychology. It suggests that the normativity is a province of the axiological, characterized by strength of values, risks of transgression and constraint. (shrink)

¿Cómo pensar el sorteo con eficacia? Mi propuesta es construir una teoría general del sorteo, abordándolo de forma comparativa, para averiguar cuáles son las constantes teóricas entre la gran diversidad empírica de sus usos particulares. En primer lugar, comparo el sorteo a los otros tres modos de selección: elección, nombramiento o cooptación y certificación. En segundo lugar, analizo los marcos deliberativos, es decir, “quién decide qué y cómo”. Tercero, distingo cuatro principios democráticos del sorteo: igualdad, imparcialidad, representatividad y legitimidad. Mi (...) primera hipótesis es que el sorteo amplía considerablemente la igualdad, imparcialidad y representatividad. La segunda de mis hipótesis radica en que el sorteo es el único método de selección con una forma específica de humildad-legitimidad, mientras que los tres restantes modos de selección producen una superioridad-legitimidad que declara superior al representante por encima del representado a través del proceso de selección. (shrink)

Apoiando-se na fenomenologia filosófica e numa ciência factual , o artigo começa formulando dois problemas relativos à tolerância: 1) poder suportar os diferentes sentidos de realidade ou, respectivamente, os diferentes modos de dizer o real, e 2) poder estabelecer relacionamentos objetificantes e não-objetificantes com o mundo. Depois de mostrar que esses problemas foram sistematicamente negligenciados não somente pela literatura teológica, mas também pela filosófica , o artigo prossegue salientando que a linguagem apropriada para descrever a realidade objetificável pode ser invasiva (...) e mesmo aniquiladora - e, neste sentido, intolerante - se usada para falar da realidade não-objetificável, e que atitudes objetificantes podem destruir os modos não-objetificáveis de relacionamento com o mundo e outros seres humanos, sendo, portanto, ameaçadoras da própria essência do humano.Based on philosophical phenomenology and a positive science , this paper starts by formulating two problems of tolerance: the one being that of coming to terms with different senses of the real and different modes of talking about it, and the other that of reconciling our objectifying with our non-objectifying relationships to the world. After showing at some length that both problems have been generally neglected not only in the theological but also in the philosophical literature, the post-modern as well as the enlightened one, it will be shown that a language appropriate for describing the objectifiable reality can be intrusive and even destructive - and thus intolerant -, if used to talk about the non-objectifiable reality, and that objectifying attitudes can destroy the non-objetifying ways of relating to the world and to other persons, being, in this respect, a threat to the very essence of our humanity. (shrink)

L’article de Francis Dupuis-Déri, « Contestation internationale contre élites mondiales : l’action directe et la politique délibérative sont-elles conciliables ? »[1] soulève bon nombre de questions. Sur le fond, quoiqu’il m’eût été beaucoup plus agréable de multiplier les points d’accord en réponse à une aimable invitation à discuter cet article, je dois me résoudre à exprimer de nombreux désaccords, dont je ne sais pas toujours à quel point ils sont profonds, sauf sur une question, d’ordre éthique, où je suis sûr (...) qu’ils le sont ; car j’ai souvent été dans l’embarras quant à l’identification de la véritable conception que l’auteur se fait de la politique délibérative. Mon propos consistera essentiellement à introduire des distinctions conceptuelles qui me semblent négligées par l’auteur. Ces désaccords ne vont pas, heureusement, sans quelques points d’accord sur des questions qui me semblent dénuées d’équivocité et que j’espère importantes pour l’auteur. (shrink)