Contre l’interprétation traditionnelle, selon laquelle la question posée par l’Étranger d’Élée en Politique, 300 c 5-7 constitue un argument en faveur des lois existantes, non idéales, je montre dans cet article que l’Étranger se réfère ici à un ensemble idéal de lois, tauta renvoyant à ce qui suit – à savoir, ta para tôn eidotôn eis dunamin einai gegrammena . Une telle lecture aura pour conséquence de changer notre conception du développement de la pensée politique de Platon. Car 300 c (...) est le passage qui, combiné à certains autres dans les Lois, semble offrir à nombre de commentateurs une preuve très claire du fait que Platon en soit venu à changer d’avis, même au sujet de la démocratie : en effet, celle-ci n’est plus, comme dans LaRépublique, un degré au-dessus de la tyrannie, l’ultime maladie de la cité, mais se fonde sur des « imitations de la vérité ». Bien loin de réhabiliter la démocratie , le Politique maintient et insiste sur l’indispensabilité, pour un bon gouvernement, de la connaissance, qu’il déclare catégoriquement impossible à trouver parmi un grand nombre d’individus, quels qu’ils soient.Against the traditional view, which holds that the Eleatic Visitor’s question in Politicus, 300 c 5-7 proposes an endorsement of existing, non-ideal laws, I argue in this paper that the E. V. is actually referring here to an ideal set of laws, tauta referring forward to ta para tôn eidotôn eis dunamin einai gegrammena. This reading would fundamentally alter our view of the development of Plato’s political thought. For 300 c is the passage that – when combined with certain parts of the Laws – has seemed to many to offer clear proof that Plato came to change his mind even about democracy : not any longer, as in TheRepublic, just one step up from tyranny, the « terminal disease » of the city, but even based on « imitations of the truth ». Far from rehabilitating democracy , the Politicus – so the paper argues – continues to insist on the indispensability, for good government, of expert knowledge, which it roundly declares is not to be found among any significant number of people. (shrink)

Taking up the controversial issue of the value of the laws of non-ideal cities in Plato’s Statesman, the paper argues for a modified version of the traditional interpretation, as defended against Christopher Rowe’s influential criticism. The paper agrees with the traditional view that the established laws of non-ideal cities are assumed to be good laws and that the Eleatic Stranger’s justification for this assumption can be found in 300b. But it also argues that this defence of the traditional interpretation must (...) be based on a revised understanding of the role of legislation in the Stranger’s conception of ideal rule. The unique contribution of the expert to good government consists in his distinctive ability to judge what is appropriate in each case, not in his work as legislator, which, on closer inspection, turns out to be based on the very same ancestral traditions that the second best city must resort to. (shrink)